daily movements of enormous numbers of the Chinese population between home and workplace? The present work does not really address this broader question. Its answer to the narrower one, the wherefore of the ideologic slant of the theories rather than their particular objects, is given in terms of the shift towards elitism in European liberal thought at the end of the century, as well as the conservative professional and family backgrounds of the theorists under consideration.

The book covers in sequence the work of five major French and Italian contributors to the field: Taine, Sighele, Fournial, Le Bon and Tarde, conforming to a standard pattern of locating a major text by each man in the biographical, social and intellectual context in which he wrote, followed by an examination of his intended audience and actual impact, on contemporaries and later. Particular emphasis is given to the role of Fournial’s *Essai sur la Psychologie des Foules* (1892) as ‘missing link’ between the other authors. Van Ginneken claims to offer ‘more of a multicultural, multi author and multidisciplinary perspective’ than his several predecessors in this field have done and there is in fact a clear recognition of the different frameworks (legal, historical, psychological, medical, sociological) within which the five writers under consideration operated, a welcome corrective to the simplistic accounts of the origins of an area or concept often offered by psychologists (including authors of history textbooks).

The location of the period studied within its larger chronological framework is a less satisfactory aspect of the work. The author admits himself intrigued by the fact that the major works on crowds have appeared over a very short span of time (1875–1901), and certainly he makes a convincing case (though except for Fournial, not a novel one) for the five big names upon whom he concentrates. There had, however, been previous studies on crowd and mass delusional behaviour in earlier periods (particularly the Middle Ages and the revolutions of 1848); while van Ginneken very briefly mentions those of Hecker (1832) and Mackay (1841), no specific reference is made to the work of Calmeil (1845), Carus (1852), Beneke (1853) and Noack (1858). The mental epidemic model certainly prevailed in these writings, which would seem to have helped shape the broad intellectual context in which van Ginneken’s five subjects performed. Increased recognition of this earlier tradition could help to address the question posed above, as to why theories of crowd psychology are so selective in the crowd behaviours to which they attend, at least to the extent of pointing out that this selection was not distinctive to the last two decades of the nineteenth century. At the other end of the period studied, the accounts of the patterns of influence of the five leading figures are necessarily limited, relying heavily on the technique of locating public avowals of indebtedness to one or other of them by later writers and politicians.

His multidisciplinary approach van Ginneken sees as imperative to understanding not only why the field shaped up as it did but also why it has failed, in his view, really to take on, in the insular academic environment of the twentieth century. Perhaps he does it, and the modern relevance of his book, somewhat less than justice here. The concept of contagion, for instance, clearly derived from the model of mental epidemic, has lasted well on into twentieth-century social psychology, divided into the four types of behaviour, social, mental and emotional contagion, with a range of explanatory theories behind it. Psychological theories of the crowd have been offered as mitigating evidence in South African courts in recent years;¹ van Ginneken’s discussion of the early shaping of such theories has decided relevance to the thus revived debate as to the role of psychology in determining matters of legal and ethical responsibility.

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1895 was a busy year for Freud. Between completing his *Studies on Hysteria* in which the seeds of his psychoanalytic theory were to
germinate, and wrestling with the meaning of several significant dreams, he worked obsessively on a 'Psychology for Neurologists', turning out forty pages which were to remain unpublished in his lifetime. Yet this document was nothing short of an attempt at formulating a dynamic, economic and topographical theory of mind linked to speculative hypotheses about quantitative aspects of neuronal functioning. Grounded in evolutionary biology and Newtonian mechanics, it was as much a metapsychology for psychologists as a psychology for neurologists. Although he put it aside, the 'invisible ghost' of Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology, as his English translator called it, 'haunts the whole series of Freud's theoretical writings to the very end'.

This episode raises the potentially significant question of whether Freud's efforts to link his psychology to physiology and other biological and human sciences, were no more than a chimera pursued for scientific respectability, or whether they were vitally necessary for the development of his discipline. Many orthodox and contemporary commentators are of the former view - that psychoanalysis neither did, nor does stand or fall on its metapsychological 'fictions', but on the strength of its clinical data.

By contrast, Professor Kitcher, a philosopher, defends Freud's metapsychology as the raison d'être of psychoanalysis. As she says, 'To believe in a Freudian Unconscious at all is to believe that there is a system in the mind whose principles of operation are significantly different from those that govern the system to which we have access through consciousness'. His dynamic concepts - the Unconscious, the forces of repression, the repression of ideas that are sexual and originate in childhood - are therefore necessary forms of explanation of symptoms. The price of relinquishing them is the abandonment of psychoanalysis as both science and therapy since each require 'general, qualitative descriptions of the forces that shape them'.

Similarly, the formulation of Freud's mental topography was necessary to clarify the relations between unconscious and conscious parts of the mind; while his economic metaphors, best exemplified in the Project by his concept of 'cathexis', were part of the impetus he felt to quantify his science.

This intellectual superstructure was necessarily parasitic upon other disciplines and Freud borrowed ideas liberally from nineteenth-century evolutionary biology, sexology, anthropology, sociology and linguistics. Initial forays into these fields got his own ideas floated, but Freud did not continue to extort validational evidence from them in the light of their significant developments. He had high hopes for his own discipline but may not have appreciated how reliant it was upon other biological and social sciences. He thus set an unfortunate trend for his followers. By ignoring scientific findings which ran counter to prevailing orthodoxy, and by expanding the movement through the formation of national societies, publishing houses and training centres, largely outside academia, they have unwittingly contributed to its waning popularity as therapy and questionable status as science. The blame, according to Professor Kitcher, lies not so much with Freud who was certainly not careless or casual in his general approach, but rather with the prevailing Zeitgeist which inhibited continuing interdisciplinary development from this standpoint.

The historical lesson has not been fully grasped, seemingly, by those currently in the thrall of cognitivism, where there are, once again, hopes of achieving a unified theory of mind by integrating diverse findings from the fields of AI, Chomskian linguistics, informational processing and computing. The latter provides the central metaphor of cognitive science: the belief that thinking is synonymous with computing. But, as Professor Kitcher points out, while machines may model aspects of thought, thinking may be 'most perspicuously described, not in terms of computational processes, but by reference to distinctive properties of the nervous system, emotional factors, previous conditioning, other currently unrecognized factors, or all of the foregoing'.

By charting the fate of psychoanalysis, Patricia Kitcher makes a forcible argument about inherent dangers in interdisciplinary science, and thus offers a timely warning to unduly optimistic cognitive scientists caught up in the computational Zeitgeist of our own time.

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