

**Gender Ideologies of Youth in Post-Socialist China: Their Gender-role Attitudes,
Antecedents, and Socio-psychological Impacts**

Author 1: **Dr. Anita KOO** (*corresponding author*)

Department of Applied Social Sciences

Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Email anita.koo@polyu.edu.hk

ORCID iD <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2944-8928>

Author 2: **Dr. Bryant P. H. HUI**

Department of Sociology

The University of Hong Kong

Email bryant09@hku.hk

ORCID iD <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3063-9297>

Author 3: **Prof. Ngai PUN**

Department of Sociology

The University of Hong Kong

Email npun@hku.hk

ORCID iD <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4140-8462>

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Abstract

In dialogue with the new gender ideology “egalitarian essentialism” which reveals uneven transformation of gender equity in public and private spheres, this study looks into the nuanced gender ideologies among Chinese youth, their antecedents and socio-psychological impacts on the young people. We apply latent class analysis to data on gender-role attitudes that were collected in 12 vocational colleges in China ($N = 4793$). The three gender ideology profiles that we identify—egalitarian, essentialist, and neutral groups—demonstrate an alternative version of “egalitarian essentialism” in post-socialist China which highlights that a continuation of egalitarian attitudes in families co-exists with a growth of essentialist attitudes in employment. Furthermore, multivariate analysis shows that the three gender ideology profiles are structured primarily by sex and socio-economic backgrounds. We also find that the gender ideologies contribute to the prediction of the youth’s subjective well-being, especially their future expectations and psychological distress—the relations that have been under-researched in previous studies in China.

Keywords: gender ideologies, gender-role attitude, work and family, socio-psychological well-being, China

Introduction

Gender ideologies, sometimes called gender-role attitudes, refer to beliefs concerning appropriate roles and activities for women and men (Davis and Greenstein 2009). They have been widely studied and have been the subject of numerous national and international surveys. Following the rise in women's educational and occupational attainment as well as in maternal labor force participation in most post-industrial societies, a number of empirical studies reveal a trend towards egalitarian attitudes since 1970s, which are less supportive of the gendered demarcation of work and home, where men dominate in the sphere of work while women focus on caring in families (Davis and Greenstein 2009; Donnelly et al. 2016). However, this increasing trend toward gender equality appears to have stalled since the late-1990s (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011; England 2010). It has been suggested that this stalled progress is a result of uneven transitions of gender ideologies regarding different domains of lives. For example, a number of studies report that the trends with gender stall primarily in the private sphere, but not in the public sphere (Knight and Briton 2017; Pepin and Cotter 2018; Yu and Lee 2013). The co-existence of egalitarian attitudes about gender in the labor market with essentialist attitudes about gender in families is coined as a new gender ideology "egalitarian essentialism" (Charles and Crusky 2004; Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011).

Gender ideologies are believed to be complex in nature and constructed over time. It has been well-argued that the pace and direction of change in gender ideologies is conditioned by the institutional structure and cultural legacy of a society (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Knight and Brinton 2017). Whereas numerous researchers have previously examined the construction, changes and influences of gender ideologies in advanced industrialized countries, the present study uses cross-sectional data on gender-role attitudes

among Chinese youth to understand the gender ideologies in China, a post-socialist country that has gone through a different modernization path (Rofel 1999). We apply a latent class analysis to detect the possibly diverse gender ideology profiles in the youth sample, and we predict the latent class membership by sex and socio-economic background in these classes. The structural and cultural context of Chinese society is taken seriously while conceptualizing and empirically assessing gender ideology as a multidimensional concept in this paper (Grunow, Begall, and Buchler 2018; Knight and Briton 2017).

More than the contemporary construction of gender ideologies, we are also interested in the associations between individual youths' attitudes towards gender roles and their subjective well-being, which is believed to be influenced by the cultural and social values related to gender relations in the society. Empirical research has investigated the associations between gender-role attitudes and young people's educational expectations and occupational choices (Davis and Pearce 2007; DiDonato and Strough 2013), but few studies have looked into their relations with youths' socio-psychological well-being, especially in China. To fill the gap, another contribution of this study is to examine the associations between young people's gender ideologies and their subjective well-being, especially their future expectations and psychological distress. We want to check how different gender ideologies (different latent classes) predict different outcomes.

The Debates on Gender Ideologies

Gender ideologies or gender-role attitudes are believed to act as a lens through which individuals view their social world and upon which they make decisions. It is conventionally measured along a "traditional versus egalitarian" continuum based on individuals' support of separate or joint spheres of private and public domains (Davis and Greenstein 2009).

Traditional gender ideologies refer to the support of gendered separate spheres that men dominate in work and politics (with higher value) while women focus on caring in families (with lower value). Egalitarian ideologies refer to a belief in women's and men's joint capability and responsibility for earning and caring. Based on this measure, the societal shift from traditional towards more egalitarian gender ideologies over the past decades are found in nearly all of the modern countries (Inglehart and Norris 2003). The ideological change is believed to happen as a result of the shift from agrarian societies to industrialized societies, and then towards post-industrial societies, which have radically transformed the socio-economic structure of societies and women's roles within them. In turn, the structural changes which have enabled women's increased participation in education and the labor market have also changed cultural attitudes towards gender equality. These structural and cultural transformations have resulted in less people, especially from the younger generations, supporting the rigid arrangement of separate spheres wherein only women could fulfil the caring role and only men could take up the earning role.

However, these changing attitudes towards gender have been found to have stalled since late-1990s (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011; England 2010). A slowing trend towards egalitarian attitudes or even a reversal trend of traditional ideology had attracted a large number of theoretical and empirical research among gender scholars. Charles and Grusky (2004), England (2010), Knight and Briton (2017), Pepin and Cotter (2018) suggested that the stalled progress from traditionalism to egalitarianism could be understood as the result of uneven transitions of gender ideologies regarding different domains of lives. That is, when there has been a major increase in the number of people holding egalitarian attitudes about gender and the public sphere, attitudes concerning gender and the private sphere could be rather traditional. This gap in attitudes about support for women's equality in the workforce and persistent beliefs in women's caring role in families urges us to go beyond

the unidimensional egalitarian or traditional axis of gender-role attitudes (Grunow, Begall, and Buchler 2018; Scarborough, Sin, and Risman 2019) as individuals' beliefs about the roles of women and men are much more complex. It also reminds us that while investigating gender ideologies we have to pay attention to the possible differences in gender-role attitudes with regards to employment and family.

In recent years, egalitarian essentialism, usually referred to as an example of a multidimensional ideology, is found to be the new prevailing gender ideology in the US and European countries (Knight and Brinton 2017; Grunow, Begall, and Buchler 2018; Scarborough, Sin, and Risman 2019). These ideologies do not travel in a linear fashion from traditional to egalitarian but instead represent additional configurations that combine beliefs about the appropriate roles for women and men in more nuanced ways. Gender essentialism, based on the assumption that women and men are naturally suited for distinctly different social roles, that of caregiver and breadwinner respectively, should be inconsistent with the advance of women into education and the labor market that has occurred throughout the post-industrial world. However, as suggested by Charles and Grusky (2004) and Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman (2011), the idea that women and men have some fundamental differences does not necessarily go along with attitudes about male primacy under a new liberal cultural framework of "choice". By highlighting women's autonomous decision-making and the conviction that both the public and the private spheres of life are of equal value and importance, the belief in gender essentialism is ideologically compatible with liberal egalitarian norms.

Under the concept of egalitarian essentialism, "separate but equal" has become the normative stance, blending the feminist principles of gender equity with beliefs in innate gender dissimilarities in Western societies (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011; Knight

and Brinton 2017). Taking a different modernization path, women and men in post-socialist China are believed to be influenced by the socialist ideology of gender equality and the liberal ideologies of gender and choice, following market reform.

The Complexity of Gender Ideologies in Post-socialist China

In traditional China, the Confucian family was a potent social institution that maintained male dominance by restricting women to the domestic realm (Gao 2003). However, the Chinese Revolution of 1949 promised that women would have equal rights to men in areas such as politics, economy, culture, society, and family life. During the socialist era, governmental policies followed Engel's argument that women's emancipation depended on their involvement in non-domestic production. Propaganda like "women hold up half of the sky," and "things men can do, women also can do" were prevalent (Honig 2000). Under the egalitarian ideology of "socialist equality", women were encouraged to work in the same jobs as men, and their employment was guaranteed by the state to a certain extent (Hanser 2005). In cities, becoming state employee not only entitled women and men to lifetime employment but also promised them a wide range of social services and benefits, ranging from maternity leave, childcare, healthcare, and subsidized housing to retirement pensions (Liu, Zhang, and Li 2009). Under this institutional arrangement, even though the equal engagement in labor force between the sexes has never put an end to traditional stereotypes of the roles and duties of women and men in society (Ji et al. 2017; Kan and He 2018), China's female labor force participation rate was among the highest in the world in the socialist era, and the gender wage gap was remarkably small by international standards (Kidd and Meng 2001). This strong socialist movement for gender equality has contributed to a dramatic and widespread change in roles associated with women and gender ideology. For urban women growing up in the socialist era, employment was taken for granted and as an

important component of their lives (Shu and Zhu 2012). A shift toward gender egalitarianism – an orientation towards women’s combining economic and family roles, has since occurred.

In the early 1980s, China’s market reform era began. The transition from a socialist state to a market economy, created both structural and cultural changes, and is believed to have had mixed and complicated effects on women’s roles and experiences as well as the gender ideologies (Ji and Wu 2018). Given the overriding emphasis on efficiency and accumulation, less direct state protection led to an increase in substantial and varying gender inequalities in employment and pay have enlarged (Liu et al. 2009). The declining influence of the socialist ideology in terms of gender equality, along with the expanding market economy also resulted in the re-emergence of traditional patriarchal values and a resurgence of a more traditional gender division of labor in households and workplaces (Chen 2018; Otis 2012; Rofel 1999). In the labor market, the increased marketization has pushed women into disadvantaged positions through increasing occupational gender segregation and direct wage discrimination, which aggravated earnings inequality (He and Wu 2017). Married women are faced with a complex situation in which gender discrimination of the public sphere intertwines with growing burdens in the family sphere (Kan and He 2018). Thus, working-class wives might need to stay in the labor force while middle-class wives are more likely to withdraw from employment (Zuo 2014).

During this period of economic growth, the general expansion of education provision has enhanced the educational attainment levels of the new generation and further narrowed the education gender gap (Wu and Zhang 2010). It has been well-documented that children who were born under the one-child policy received more equal treatment at home as they grew up, particularly in terms of education investment in urban areas (Tsui and Rich 2002; Veeck, Flurry, and Jiang 2003). This overall improvement in educational attainment levels

ought to coincide with a more egalitarian gender ideology in the Chinese society. However, behind the scenes of the equally high educational investments, we cannot neglect the fact that parents continue to hold gender-specific or gender-stereotypic expectations for their only child (Liu 2006). Students' choices of study fields and career paths are also bounded by the traditional gender norms (He and Zhou 2018). Furthermore, although China has undergone a rapid process of industrialization and urbanization, due to the restriction of the residence registration system (*hukou*), there is a large gap in the level of development and practices between rural and urban areas. For example, son preference continues to be culturally prevalent in rural China (Shu and Zhu 2012).

The Present Study

In post-socialist China, the expansion of the labor market and the increasingly accessible higher education system appear to offer young women and men abundant employment opportunities. The rapid economic growth in the past four decades has also altered women's role in the marketplace and families in different ways, depending on their place of origin, family background, etc. (Ji and Wu 2018). This study attempts to understand the gender ideologies among vocational college students in China, who were born and raised after the market reform, at their critical life stages for development, i.e., receiving college education before entering the labor market and setting up their families. Benefiting from the expansion of education, they have the opportunity to pursue more education and training than their parents. Hence, they are expected to embrace more egalitarian attitudes due to greater material affluence, higher educational attainment and single-child experience (Shu and Zhu 2012). However, when jobs are no longer guaranteed by the state, these young people must fight to secure one under fierce competition. As the growing service sector looks young and feminine female workers based on stereotypes (Wen 2013), the emergence of neoliberal labor

market values is expected to bring along an essentialist gender ideology in China. We use latent class analysis to examine the varying dimensions of gender-role attitudes among the students. This approach allows us to identify three latent classes of gender attitudes in China: an egalitarian group, an essential group and a neutral group, as well as the characteristics of the respondents in each group.

Another aim of this study is to understand the associations between young people's different gender attitudes and their socio-psychological well-being. Numerous researchers have already examined the influences of gender ideologies on various work- and family-related decisions and behaviors under different institutional and cultural contexts (DiDonato and Strough 2013; Fuwa 2004). As suggested by Swidler (1986), individuals' ideologies or beliefs about how the world should operate shape the strategies of action that an individual sees as possible under that specific cultural context. As such, individuals' ideologies, which either align with or go against their experiences or realistic evaluations about how the world really operates, are also expected to affect their socio-psychological well-being.

A number of studies demonstrate the influence of gender ideology on one's expected role and its impact on psychological well-being (Sweeting et al. 2014). For example, men who hold traditional views about gender, especially those unemployed, are found to have higher levels of psychological distress than men who hold egalitarian views. Women who hold egalitarian views about gender are found to be more likely than women who hold traditional views to believe that inequalities in the division of household labor are unfair (Nordenmark and Nyman 2003). However, the associations between individuals' gender-role attitudes and their socio-psychological well-being, and their relations to the gender culture of the society have not been adequately studied. In this paper, we examine the impact of youths' gender-role attitudes on their future expectations, which reflects their levels of self-

confidence, and psychological distress. These subjective states of well-being should reflect not only their individual feelings and emotions but also what is valued in the larger society or culture to which they belong (Fuwa 2004; Swidler 1986), and, as such, are expected to be affected by individuals' gender-role attitudes and the gender ideologies of the society as a whole.

In sum, first we test if more than one gender ideology could be identified in China, using survey data from vocational college students and formal statistical models. Secondly, we establish the empirical correlates of gender-role attitudes. As gender ideologies characterize joint formulations of meaning and reality in a society (Grunow, Begall, and Buchler 2018), young people of different genders and with different family backgrounds are expected to have different experiences and reflections in this culturally unstable period, following economic and structural transitions. Finally, we explore whether gender-role attitudes are associated with youth's socio-psychological well-being in terms of (i) future expectations (measured by their expected salary and future occupational expectations), and (ii) psychological distress (measured by the levels of depression, anxiety and stress).

Method

Participants and Procedure

The data were collected from a large scale mixed-method research project examining the process of "learning-to-labor" among higher vocational college students in China (Hui et al. 2019). Twelve vocational colleges from Anhui, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hubei, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, and Zhejiang were interested in participating in a large cross-sectional survey after the school representatives attended a conference for higher vocational college educators in late 2017. Potential student respondents were invited to take part in this

survey by sending an online survey link. After signing an online informed consent, a total of 6783 respondents completed our online self-administered survey using their computers or mobile devices on a voluntary basis. We embedded six bogus items (e.g., ‘For this question, please select “*strongly agree*”’) in our survey to identify careless responses and thus ensure data quality (Maniaci and Rogge 2014; Meade and Craig 2012). After data cleaning, we included those who answered four or more bogus items correctly and completed our survey in not less than 15 minutes, resulting a final sample of 4793 respondents (2160 females, 45.07%; $M_{\text{age}} = 18.58$, $SD_{\text{age}} = 1.34$).

Measures

Gender-role Attitude

We developed eight gender-related items on career development and family role for the present study based on our qualitative interviews with the vocational college students. Roughly speaking, items 1-5 measure the youths’ gender-role attitudes relating to employment (public sphere of lives), while items 6-8 measure youths’ gender-role attitudes related to family (private sphere of lives). Together, the eight items tap the gender ideologies on the two different domains of lives. Respondents indicated on a 5-point Likert scale the extent to which they agreed on gender-related items from 1 (*strongly disagree*), 2 (*disagree*), 3 (*neutral*), 4 (*agree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). For conducting latent class analysis, we collapsed these responses into three discrete categories: *strongly disagree* and *disagree* responses were collapsed into *disagree*, *agree* and *strongly agree* responses were collapsed into *agree*, and *neutral* responses were remained as *neutral*. The eight items and their response distribution were shown in Table 1.

Expected Salary Five Years Later

The respondents' expected salary after five years of graduation was assessed by a single item "How much monthly income do you think you can have after five years of graduation?" The response ranges from 0-500RMB to more than 10000RMB with an interval of 500RMB.

Future Expectations

We developed nine items to tap the respondents' future expectations, for which they had to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale the extent to which they agreed from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Sample items include "My future job can make me happy", "My future job can improve my living standard", and "my future job is meaningful". The internal reliability of this measure is .91. They reflect respondents' self-confidence in future achievement.

Psychological distress

The 21-item Depression Anxiety Stress Scale was used to measure the respondents' negative psychological states of depression, anxiety, and stress (DASS-21; Lovibond and Lovibond 1995). Respondents indicated on a 4-point Likert scale from 0 (*did not apply to me at all*) to 3 (*applied to me very much or most of the time*) the frequency with which they have experienced symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress within the past week. Sample items are "I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all (depression)", "I felt scared without any good reason (anxiety)," and "I found it hard to wind down (stress)." The internal reliabilities of the depression, anxiety, and stress subscales are .92, .90, and .90, respectively.

Apart from the above measures, respondents also reported their demographics information, including gender, age, origin (i.e., whether the respondents' official household registration *hukou* is rural or urban), single-child (i.e., whether they are single-child in the family), both father and mother's education attainment levels (i.e., primary or below,

secondary, high school or diploma, and undergraduate or above), parents' total monthly income (i.e., 1500RMB or less, between 1501 and 3000RMB, and more than 3000RMB), part-time job experience (i.e., whether they had part-time job experience during weekend, summer or winter vacation), length of staying in the current city (5 years or less and more than 5 years). In addition, the 12 vocational colleges, where the data were collected, were classified into Central (Hubei), East (Anhui, Guangdong, and Zhejiang), North (Inner Mongolia), and West (Shaanxi, Gansu, and Guizhou) regions based on their geographical locations.

Statistical Analysis

We first conducted latent class analysis (LCA) to create gender-role attitude profiles of vocational college students. In contrast to factor analysis which groups similar items together, LCA enables classification of individuals (Muthén and Muthén 2010). A maximum likelihood procedure was used to produce one- to six-latent class models. Five thousand times random starting values were used to achieve model identification. The best latent class model was chosen based on the combination of fit measures (i.e., BIC, the Bayesian Information Criterion; AIC, the Akaike Information Criterion; CAIC, the Consistent AIC, and entropy value) and substantive theoretical interpretability (Nylund, Asparouhov, and Muthén 2007). Among various fit measures, the BIC is the most common. A lower BIC suggests a better fit and parsimony. A scree plot of BIC values was drawn to identify an “elbow” or “turning point” where the BIC value does not change considerably with the inclusion of extra classes (Moor and Wennekers 2003). Additionally, we used entropy, a standardized measure for assessing the precision of assigning latent class membership. Higher values reflect greater precision of classification (Celeux and Soromenho 1996).

After that, multinomial logistic regression and multiple regression were employed to examine what factors predicted each LCA cluster, which contains homogeneous gender-role attitude, and how each of the clusters predicted future salary and expectations, and psychological distress, namely depression, anxiety, and stress. The main analyses were performed in the *nnet* package (Venables and Ripley 2002) and *poLCA* package (Linzer and Lewis 2011) in R.

Results

Latent Class Analysis

We first conducted LCA to empirically evaluate our proposed model by identifying groups of respondents with similar patterns of scores on the eight items of gender-role attitude (see Table 1). Table 2 shows the class solutions for one to six latent classes. The BIC significantly declines from one class to three classes and then begins to level off. While the changes in the BICs between one- and two-class models and between two- and three-class models are 9% and 5%, respectively, the change in the BIC between three- and four-class models is 1% only. Figure 1 which visually illustrates the relationship between the BIC and the number of latent classes also concurs that the BIC value did not change considerably after three classes (i.e., the “elbow” or “turning point”). Therefore, the two- or three-class model is better than the four-class model. Although entropy is best with the two- or three-class model, the decrease in BIC from one- to two-class model is still substantial—we could not ignore the three-class model. Most importantly, when substantive interpretability is taken into account, the three-class model is theoretically more meaningful and parsimonious than the two-class model. Thus, we chose the three-class solution as the best model.

[Table 1 near here]

[Table 2 near here]

[Figure 1 near here]

[Table 3 near here]

Latent class 1 comprises 25% ($n = 1152$) of the pooled sample and is composed of individuals who generally hold egalitarian views on women's role in the private sphere of life. As shown in Table 3, respondents in latent class 1 are most likely to disagree that the most important thing for a woman is marrying a good marriage material (item 6, mean of .73), the main responsibility of a wife is to take care of the family (item 7, mean of .76), and it is more important for a wife to help with her husband's career than to pursue her own career (item 8, mean of .74). It is clear that respondents in this class refuse to confine women's role in family but support and legitimize women's role in labor force as of men's.

In contrast, the vast majority of members from latent class 2 agree with the items 1-5. Respondents in latent class 2 are more likely to agree that while some occupations are only suitable for men, some occupations are only suitable for women (item 1, mean of .74), men's employment pressure is greater than women's (item 2, mean of .67), men are more suitable for joining technological professions (item 3, mean of .83), while women are more suitable for joining service professions (item 4, mean of .84). A large number of them also think stable and regular occupations are more suitable for women (item 5, mean of .63). It shows that their essentialist gender views do not go along with an attitude of male primacy. For items 6-8, which measure respondents' gender-role attitudes in the private sphere of life, members from latent class 2 do not have any patterned view on them. This group, who hold essentialist views on men's and women's role in employment and labor market, is the largest class ($n = 2232$, 46% of the pooled sample).

Respondents in latent class 3 ($n = 1409$, 29% of the pooled sample) consistently have no clear view or refuse to reveal their view on men's or women's role in marketplace and in family. They are most likely to stay neutral, neither agree nor disagree, on all gender-role attitude items (means ranging from .81 to .96). To aid in interpretation, we named the three classes as (1) egalitarian group, (2) essentialist group, and (3) neutral group.

Who Has Which Gender-role Attitude?

[Table 4 near here]

[Table 5 near here]

Before running any prediction models, we reported descriptive results of all variables on the total sample as well as the sub-samples of male and female (see Table 4). Then, we cross-tabulated groups of gender-role attitude with other variables of interest as in Table 5. Since data was gathered from vocational colleges in different regions, we have controlled for the variable of region in all analyses. We ran multinomial logistic regression in which the 3-class membership of gender-role attitude serves as the outcome variable (Table 6). The results revealed that females are more likely than males to report having an egalitarian attitude rather than staying neutral, odds-ratio = 3.84, 95% CI = [3.18, 4.63], whereas they are less likely than their male counterparts to report having an essentialist attitude rather than staying neutral, odds-ratio = 0.85, 95% CI = [0.73, 0.99], or having an egalitarian attitude, odds-ratio = 0.22, 95% CI = [0.19, 0.26]. The findings also showed that respondents from urban areas are more likely to report having an egalitarian attitude rather than staying neutral, odds-ratio = 1.34, 95% CI = [1.03, 1.73], while respondents from rural areas are more likely to report having an essentialist attitude rather than an egalitarian attitude, odds-ratio = 0.69, 95% CI = [0.54, 0.88]. Not being a single child is more likely than being a single child to

report having an essentialist attitude rather than staying neutral, odds-ratio = 0.81, 95% CI = [0.67, 0.99].

Parents' educational attainment could not predict the membership of gender-role attitude, except that respondents whose father went to college are more likely than those whose father just went to primary school to report having egalitarian attitude rather than staying neutral, odds-ratio = 1.96, 95% CI = [1.15, 3.34]. In terms of parental income, respondents whose parents earn between 1501 and 3000RMB are more likely than respondents whose parents earn 1500RMB or less to report having an essentialist attitude rather than staying neutral, odds-ratio = 1.31, 95% CI = [1.08, 1.58], or having an egalitarian attitude, odds-ratio = 1.35, 95% CI = [1.10, 1.66]. Similarly, respondents whose parents earn more than 3000RMB are more likely than respondents whose parents earn 1500RMB or less to report having an essentialist attitude rather than staying neutral, odds-ratio = 1.25, 95% CI = [1.02, 1.54], or having an egalitarian attitude, odds-ratio = 1.30, 95% CI = [1.04, 1.64]. Moreover, respondents who had part-time job experience (vs. no part-time job experience) are more likely to report having an essentialist attitude rather than staying neutral, odds-ratio = 1.22, 95% CI = [1.05, 1.42].

[Table 6 near here]

Implications of Gender-role Attitudes

Expected Salary Five Years Later

Results from a multiple linear regression model (Model 1 of Table 7) suggested that age, $B = 0.18$, $SE = .05$, 95% CI = [0.08, 0.28], gender, $B = -1.29$, $SE = .17$, 95% CI = [-1.62, -0.95], hukou, $B = -0.73$, $SE = .23$, 95% CI = [-1.19, -0.27], single-child, $B = -0.64$, $SE = .21$,

95% CI = [-1.06, -0.23], and part-time experience $B = 0.61$, $SE = .16$, 95% CI = [0.29, 0.92], significantly predicted expected salary five years later, respectively. That is, respondents who are older, male, from rural area, and from a non-single-child family, and have part-time job experience expected higher salary five years later.

As for gender-role attitude, the results showed that compared to members of the neutral group, members of the egalitarian group, $B = 0.64$, $SE = .22$, 95% CI = [0.20, 1.08], and the essentialist group, $B = 0.42$, $SE = .19$, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.79], predicted significantly higher expected salary five years later, after controlling for other variables. We also used the egalitarian group as the reference category and found that there was no significant difference between the egalitarian group and essentialist group in predicting expected salary, $B = -0.22$, $SE = .21$, 95% CI = [-0.63, 0.18].

Results also showed that parental income is a significant predictor of expected salary five years later, such that the group of more than 3000RMB reported significantly higher expected salary compared to the group of 1500RMB or less, $B = 1.33$, $SE = .22$, 95% CI = [0.90, 1.77]. Setting the group between 1501 and 3000RMB as the reference category, we found that the group of more than 3000RMB reported significantly higher expected salary compared to the group between 1501 and 3000RMB, $B = 1.40$, $SE = .20$, 95% CI = [1.00, 1.80]. None of the other contrasts were significant.

[Table 7 near here]

Future Expectations

Results from another multiple linear regression model (See Model 2 in Table 7) demonstrated that gender-role attitude significantly predicted future expectations, such that compared to members of the neutral group, members of the egalitarian group, $B = 0.29$, SE

= .03, 95% CI = [0.24, 0.34], and the essentialist group, $B = 0.44$, $SE = .02$, 95% CI = [0.40, 0.49], predicted significantly higher levels of future expectations, after controlling for other variables. Compared to members of the egalitarian group, members of the essentialist group significantly predicted higher levels of future expectations, $B = 0.16$, $SE = .02$, 95% CI = [0.11, 0.20].

Results revealed that mother's education attainment level is also one of the significant predictors of future expectations. Compared to those respondents whose mother's education attainment level is undergraduate or above, respondents whose mother's education attainment level is primary or below, $B = -0.17$, $SE = .07$, 95% CI = [-0.30, -0.03], and secondary, $B = -0.15$, $SE = .07$, 95% CI = [-0.29, -0.02], predicted lower levels of future expectations.

Depression

Results from a multiple linear regression model (See Model 1 of Table 8) suggested that age, $B = -0.22$, $SE = .05$, 95% CI = [-0.31, -0.12], gender, $B = -0.97$, $SE = .16$, 95% CI = [-1.29, -0.66], significantly predicted depression, respectively. That is, respondents who are younger and male have higher levels of depression. We also found that gender-role attitude, father's education attainment level, mother's education attainment level, parental income, and region are significant predictors of depression. Compared to members of the neutral group, members of the egalitarian group, $B = -1.67$, $SE = .21$, 95% CI = [-2.09, -1.26], and the essentialist group, $B = -0.78$, $SE = .17$, 95% CI = [-1.13, -0.44], predicted significantly lower levels of depression, after controlling for other variables. We also used the egalitarian group as the reference category and found that essentialist group (vs. egalitarian group) significantly predicted higher levels of depression, $B = 0.89$, $SE = .20$, 95% CI = [0.50, 1.27].

As for education attainment level, results showed that compared to respondents whose father's education attainment level is primary or below, those whose father's education

attainment levels are secondary, $B = -0.66$, $SE = .19$, 95% CI = [-1.03, -0.29], and high school or diploma, $B = -0.57$, $SE = .26$, 95% CI = [-1.07, -0.06], predicted lower levels of depression. Compared to respondents whose mother's education attainment level is primary or below, those whose mother's education attainment level is undergraduate or above predicted lower levels of depression, $B = -1.50$, $SE = .55$, 95% CI = [-2.58, -0.42]. None of the other contrasts were significant.

Regarding parental income, results also showed that compared to the group of 1500RMB or less, the group of more than 3000RMB predicted significantly lower levels of depression, $B = -0.54$, $SE = .21$, 95% CI = [-0.95, -0.12]. None of the other contrasts were significant.

[Table 8 near here]

Anxiety

Similar to depression, anxiety was also significantly predicted by age, $B = -0.24$, $SE = .05$, 95% CI = [-0.34, -0.15], gender, $B = -0.71$, $SE = .16$, 95% CI = [-1.02, -0.40], respectively (See Model 2 of Table 8). Additionally, the regression results also revealed that gender-role attitude, father's education attainment level, mother's education attainment level, parental income, and region are significant predictors of anxiety.

Compared to members of the neutral group, members of the egalitarian group predicted significantly lower levels of anxiety, $B = -1.26$, $SE = .21$, 95% CI = [-1.67, -0.86], after controlling for other variables. Using the egalitarian group as the reference category, we found that essentialist group (vs. egalitarian group) significantly predicted higher levels of anxiety, $B = 0.89$, $SE = .20$, 95% CI = [0.50, 1.27].

With regards to education attainment level, results showed that compared to respondents whose father's education attainment level is primary or below, those whose

father's education attainment levels are secondary, $B = -0.52$, $SE = .19$, 95% CI = [-0.88, -0.16], and high school or diploma, $B = -0.51$, $SE = .25$, 95% CI = [-1.00, -0.02], predicted lower levels of anxiety. Compared to respondents whose mother's education attainment level is primary or below, those whose mother's education attainment levels are secondary, $B = -0.52$, $SE = .19$, 95% CI = [-0.88, -0.16], high school or diploma, $B = -0.57$, $SE = .28$, 95% CI = [-1.13, -0.02], and undergraduate or above, $B = -1.37$, $SE = .54$, 95% CI = [-2.42, -0.31], predicted lower levels of anxiety. None of the other contrasts were significant.

Similar to the previous model of depression, respondents whose parents' income is more than 3000RMB (vs. 1500RMB or less) predicted significantly lower levels of anxiety, $B = -0.48$, $SE = .21$, 95% CI = [-0.89, -0.08]. None of the other contrasts were significant.

Stress

As shown in Model 3 of Table 8, stress was also significantly predicted by age, $B = -0.22$, $SE = .05$, 95% CI = [-0.31, -0.12], gender, $B = -0.73$, $SE = .16$, 95% CI = [-1.03, -0.42], respectively. The regression results also demonstrated that gender-role attitude, father's education attainment level, mother's education attainment level, parental income, and region significantly predicted stress.

Regarding to gender-role attitude, compared to members of the neutral group, members of the egalitarian group predicted significantly lower levels of stress, $B = -1.19$, $SE = .21$, 95% CI = [-1.59, -0.79], after taking into account other covariates. Reversed the egalitarian group as the reference category, results revealed that essentialist group (vs. egalitarian group) significantly predicted higher levels of stress, $B = 1.08$, $SE = .19$, 95% CI = [0.71, 1.46].

In terms of education attainment, results showed that compared to respondents whose father's education attainment level is primary or below, those whose father's education

attainment level is secondary, predicted lower levels of stress, $B = -0.60$, $SE = .18$, 95% CI = [-0.96, -.24]. Compared to respondents whose mother's education attainment level is primary or below, those whose mother's education attainment levels are secondary, $B = -0.50$, $SE = .18$, 95% CI = [-0.86, -0.14], high school or diploma, $B = -0.85$, $SE = .28$, 95% CI = [-1.40, -0.30], and undergraduate or above, $B = -1.39$, $SE = .53$, 95% CI = [-2.43, -0.34], predicted lower levels of stress. None of the other contrasts were significant.

As for parental income, respondents whose parents' income is more than 3000RMB (vs. 1500RMB or less) predicted significantly lower levels of stress, $B = -0.47$, $SE = .20$, 95% CI = [-0.87, -0.06]. None of the other contrasts were significant.

Discussion and Conclusion

Treating gender ideology as a multidimensional concept, we have investigated young people's attitudes about gender in both the marketplace and in the family. We found a range of opinions concerning gender separation in the public and private spheres, and identified different gender ideologies in contemporary China. Applying LCA to data on vocational college students' gender-role attitudes, three latent classes were identified, namely egalitarian (25%), essentialist (46%), and neutral group (29%). In general, respondents in the egalitarian group disapprove of separate gendered spheres, where women are confined to family, and support equal rights for women that enable women (wives) to pursue their careers as men (their husbands) do. They do not hold strong views in terms of the gender-stereotypical role in the labor market. In contrast, respondents in the essentialist group hold the gender-essentialist views that prescribe gender differences between women and men in terms of skills and capabilities in employment. However, their essentialist attitudes only address the public sphere of life, and they neither believe that women's primary responsibility is at home nor support male primacy in the labor market.

China's transition from a socialist state to a market economy has mixed and complicated effects on gender ideologies. On the one hand, the structural and cultural changes have created a social context that is simultaneously conducive to and discouraging of egalitarian outlooks regarding gender relations, resulting in conflictual ideologies and beliefs. On the other hand, when different forces competed with each other, we found more than one dominant gender ideology in China. Using cross-sectional data, it was impossible for us to detect the changes in gender ideologies in China. However, based on the diverse gender ideology profiles in the youth sample, which is the generation that was born and grew up after the market reform, we discovered an intriguing trend among China's youth as shown by the emergence of a reverse gender ideology of "egalitarian essentialism" which demonstrates conflicting gender-role attitudes in the public and private spheres. We assume our findings represent a similar version of the stalling process of gender equality in western societies but actualizing a different version of "egalitarian essentialism" in the Chinese context. In western societies, the emergence of "egalitarian essentialism" reflects a stalling of gender equality ideology with regards to the private sphere, where beliefs about women's caring role in families persist (Charles and Grusky 2004; Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011). In China, the alternative version of "egalitarian essentialism" consists of a continuation of egalitarian attitudes with regards to families that co-exist with the growth of essentialist attitudes with regards to employment.

Our study shows that the young generation does not support the separate gendered spheres, but perceive women's combining economic and family roles as a norm. The nationally advocated egalitarian gender ideology in socialist China is shown to be prevalent in the post-socialist era. However, while young people agree that both sexes should have equal engagement in employment, they do not challenge the essentialized gender roles in the labor market (He and Zhou 2018). Instead, they align themselves with gender stereotypical

images regarding the skills and duties of women and men in the workplace. The increased occupational gender segregation and the convergence of traditional gender ideology in the expanding labor market lead to a shift towards gender essentialism in young people's gender ideology, especially with regards to the public domain of lives. Or, gender essentialism is exactly young people's reflection of or the response to the heavy and prevalent gender discrimination in the labor market (He and Wu 2017). As essentialist group is the largest group, which composed 46% of our sample, evidence showed that labor-market values in China are over-riding socialist values concerning gender equality and gender roles at work.

The second important finding of this paper is the clear bivariate associations between gender-role attitudes on the one hand, and gender, education, place of origin, and family background on the other. We have established the empirical correlates of gender-role attitudes and demonstrated that young people of different gender and with different family backgrounds had nuanced experiences and reflections of their gender roles in the public and private domains. For example, we found that an egalitarian attitude was relatively more prevalent among urban girls from higher-income families, while an essentialist attitude was more commonly shared among rural boys, who have siblings and have part-time job experience. Our results confirmed that young people of different genders, who grew up in rural and urban areas, with different levels of family resources, are likely to have different experiences that construct different gender-role attitudes.

Last but not the least, there was clear and consistent evidence that gender-role attitude has statistically significant associations with young people's socio-psychological well-being, in terms of future expectations and psychological distress. It is encouraging to discover that young people with egalitarian views performed the best by having lower levels of depression, anxiety and stress, and demonstrating a high degree of psychological well-being. This area

remains under-researched, and this study calls for more research on, and discussion of, the relationship between gender ideologies and socio-psychological well-being. In terms of future expectations, we found that young people with essentialist views were the most confident in their career development. Due to the prevalence of market values in post-socialist China, the market ideology creates a hierarchical social ladder while simultaneously inspiring hopes and dreams for the young generation, especially for those who hold an essentialist view. In our study, this group of people expected a higher future income compared with the neutral group, and they also perceived a higher level of future success when compared with the egalitarian and neutral group.

Finally, among the three latent class groups, special attention should be paid to a large group of youths who answered “neutral” to all questions related to their gender-role attitudes. In this culturally unstable period following economic and structural transitions, they did not have clear ideas about gender relations in both of the public and private domains. This uncertainty was found to have a significant negative impact on their socio-psychological well-being. This group had the lowest levels of future expectations accompanied by the highest levels of psychological distress when compared with the “egalitarian” and “essentialist” groups. If young people’s socio-psychological well-being informs us about how well youths with different gender ideologies adapt to the changing or changed structure and culture of Chinese society, the “neutral” group are those who struggle the most to adapt to the conflicted gender culture. This is a missing area in gender studies and social sciences that deserves systematic research and further exploration.

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