

Friends in Need: Bystander Intervention for Intimate Partner Violence in Beijing and Seoul

Clifton R. Emery, Lucy P. Jordan, and Cheryl Chui

University of Hong Kong

Author Note

Clifton R. Emery, Department of Social Work & Social Administration, University of Hong Kong; Lucy P. Jordan, Department of Social Work & Social Administration, University of Hong Kong; Cheryl Chui, Department of Social Work & Social Administration, University of Hong Kong

Correspondence concerning this manuscript should be address to Clifton R. Emery, CTJ-534, 5/F, The Jockey Club Tower, Centennial Campus, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.

Email: cemery@hku.hk

## Abstract

How and why friends respond to control intimate partner violence has seldom been studied in survey data, in cross-cultural comparisons, or outside the United States. Moreover, the study of such responses has been siloed in two different research streams. The concept of bystander intervention has been mainly studied in psychology, whereas informal social control has been used in sociology. We use comparative data from two East Asian cultures (China and South Korea) to hypothesize and test for relationships among totalitarian-style partner control, Confucian gender role norms, secrecy regarding intimate partner violence (IPV), and two types of bystander intervention. The data consist of random probability samples of married/partnered women from Beijing ( $n = 301$ ) and Seoul ( $n = 459$ ). Multilevel models with the combined data indicate that protective intervention is negatively associated with Confucian gender role norms. Punitive intervention is associated with IPV secrecy and totalitarian-style partner control. There were important differences between Beijing and Seoul. Although not significant in the combined Seoul and Beijing data, totalitarian-style partner control and neighborhood informal social control were associated with more protective intervention in the Beijing model, but not in the Seoul model. Totalitarian-style partner control and IPV secrecy were associated with punitive intervention in Seoul, but not in Beijing. Interestingly, punitive intervention was positively associated with neighborhood socioeconomic status. Lower social cohesion in Beijing may explain differences in perceived bystander intervention between the two cities. Interventions for IPV must be thoroughly grounded in a deep understanding of sociocultural factors influencing bystander intervention.

*Keywords:* bystander intervention; informal social control; cross-cultural; Confucianism; intimate partner violence; friendship networks; bystander control

### Friends in Need: Bystander Intervention for Intimate Partner Violence in Beijing and Seoul

What prompts ordinary people to intervene against intimate partner violence (IPV) has been the subject of much study in the bystander intervention literature (Banyard, 2015; Taylor, Banyard, Grych, & Hamby, 2016). However, existing research has seldom been carried out in non-western cultures, examined the effects of cultural characteristics, separately considered different types of bystander intervention, or used representative population samples to understand how and why such intervention occurs. The present paper begins to fill these research gaps by studying the relationships among Confucian gender role norms, IPV secrecy, totalitarian-style partner control, and bystander intervention (by the victim's friends) of IPV in representative population samples of heterosexual married or cohabiting women from Seoul and Beijing (Emery, Wu & Chan, 2018).

Whereas Emery and Wu (2019) examined IPV as an outcome and informal social control by friends as an independent variable, the present paper, in contrast, draws on theory from psychology to study efforts by victims' friends to intervene against IPV as an outcome. Combining the two datasets allow us to examine bystander intervention against IPV by wives' friend networks in a three stage cluster sample of 720 married or partnered Seoul and Beijing women. Intimate partner violence by male partners is a serious problem in both Beijing and Seoul. Emery, Wu, Kim, Pyun & Chin (2017) estimated 19.5% of married or partnered Beijing women had experienced some physical violence during the relationship and 16.4% had experienced severe violence. Likewise, in Seoul, Emery et al. (2019) estimated 17.1% of married or partnered women had experienced physical violence by husbands at some point during the relationship.

### **Theoretical Antecedents**

In the past 20 years two distinct research literatures have emerged that study the ways in which members of informal social networks or strangers intervene against intimate partner violence (Emery & Wu, 2019; Taylor et al., 2016). One refers to such intervention as informal social control;

the other refers to roughly the same phenomenon as bystander intervention. Informal social control (Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997) was measured as one dimension of neighborhood collective efficacy, and it evolved from the social disorganization tradition in sociology (Hirschi, 1969/2002; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 1942). The study of bystander intervention (Darley & Latane, 1968) evolved from additional psychological research on the diffusion of responsibility (Allport, 1937; Gilman, 1876). *Informal social control* is defined as “informal mechanisms by which residents themselves [as opposed to police] achieve public order” (Sampson et al., 1997, p. 918). Control theory in the original sense (Hirschi, 1969/2002) referred broadly to bonds to society (attachment to parents for example) that deterred individuals from crime. In Sampson et al. (1997), the focus is much narrower and concerns surveillance to deter motivated perpetrators and direct interference with crime in progress. Confrontation of persons “exploiting or disturbing public space” is a particular focus (Sampson et al., 1997, p. 918). If informal social control began as a broad concept and narrowed towards confrontation of crimes in commission, arguably bystander intervention moved in the opposite direction. Early work on bystander intervention began with a narrow focus on intervention against immanent sexual assaults on campus (Banyard et al., 2004) and broadened to include expressing verbal disagreement with racist, sexist, and homophobic statements by other students on campus (Banyard, 2015).

The two research traditions are quite different, and the points of departure for the two bodies of research are distinct and in many ways complimentary. Banyard’s (Banyard, 2015; Banyard et al., 2004) perspective is psychological and began with the study of how and why U.S. college students respond or do not respond as bystanders to act against sexual assaults on campus. On the other hand, Emery et al.’s (2011) research adopts a sociological perspective, examining the role of neighborhoods in understanding intimate partner violence, and it has largely been carried out on representative population samples of East Asian cities (Emery, Wu, Kim et al., 2017). Whereas

Banyard's initial questions were focused on investigating what makes people do something given doing something is helpful (Banyard et al., 2004), Emery, Wu, Kim et al.'s (2017) initial questions were centered on asking: Given that people do something, what is helpful? Informal social control featured as an independent variable in Emery, Trung, & Wu's work (2015), whereas bystander intervention featured as a dependent variable for Banyard (2015).

Over time, the empirical phenomena under study in these two bodies of literature has come to contain substantial overlap. Banyard and her co-authors have moved to study the effects of bystander intervention on IPV in Western (U.S.) population samples (e.g., Taylor et al., 2016). Emery and co-authors have moved to study informal social control in Eastern (pan Asian locations) samples and by other witnesses to IPV besides neighbors (Emery, Wu, Kim, et al., 2017). To the extent that the two concepts capture the same phenomenon, the concept may be called *bystander control of intimate partner violence* (BC\_IPV). Whether BC\_IPV could viably bridge the concepts of bystander intervention and informal social control in a logically coherent fashion remains open to question and is the subject for a thorough conceptual analysis (Wilson, 1963). However, it seems relatively clear that retaining the term *control* from informal social control keeps the phenomena under study narrowed to motivated behavior aimed at deterring violence—rather than other types of informal response aimed at, for example, comforting the victim. Retention of the term *bystander* limits the role of the controller to someone who witnesses the violence while leaving the relationship of the controller to the victim open.

In the authors' opinion, conceptual definitions tied to empirical measurement are more likely to be effective when kept narrow. For this reason, we might define bystander control of IPV as follows: any attempt by witnesses to deter IPV that involves either (a) confrontation of IPV in progress or (b) ensuring confrontation of IPV in progress by others. Bystander control will most commonly involve either direct confrontation of IPV in progress oneself or attempting to ensure

confrontation by police. However, because the present study examines bystander control as a dependent variable and because it draws on theory from psychology to do so, for the present we retain the term *bystander intervention* for the purpose of our study.

### **Bystander Intervention and Informal Social Control**

Although initially promising in the study of homicide (Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997), research examining the relationship between neighborhood informal social control and violence “behind closed doors” (Straus, Gelles, & Steinmetz, 1980/2006) in the past achieved only mixed results. For example, although some studies found a negative correlation between collective efficacy and IPV (Browning, 2002), others found no relationship (Dekeseredy, Schwartz, Alvi, & Tomaszewski, 2003). Likewise, Emery, Jolley, and Wu (2011) found no relationship between collective efficacy and desistance from intimate partner violence, but Taylor et al. (2016) found that the presence of bystanders was positively associated with more severe IPV. Findings are similarly mixed on child abuse (see Molnar, Buka, Brennan, Holton, & Earls, 2003, versus Guterman, Lee, Taylor, & Rathouz, 2009). Emery, Trung, and Wu (2015) contended that inconsistent results were not due to faulty theory, sampling, or analysis, but rather due to measuring the wrong thing.

The early research Emery, Trung, & Wu (2015) critiqued made use of the collective efficacy measure (Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997). Collective efficacy (Sampson et al., 1997) asked questions about how neighbors would respond to violence on the street, but not about how they would respond to violence in the home. Using collective efficacy as a measure of informal social control in studies of IPV and child maltreatment assumes neighbors’ response to violence in the home is similar to neighbors’ response to violence in the street. Neighborhoods with identical norms about informal social control of crime on the street (captured by the collective efficacy measure) might have divergent norms about violence within the home. Thus, employing the collective efficacy measure in an attempt to capture how people may respond to violence within the home may not be accurate.

### **Types of Bystander Intervention**

Frye et al. (2012) used an exploratory framework with 74 residents in New York to examine how residents would respond to a neighboring husband's IPV and the feasibility and effectiveness of those responses. Their study identified four emergent types of responses: victim-oriented, perpetrator-oriented, community-oriented, and formal systems-oriented, with victim-oriented responses seen as most effective but formal services responses as most feasible.

In distinguishing formal and informal responses in face of violence, Emery, Trung, and Wu (2015) developed a new measurement of informal social control (bystander intervention), targeted specifically at child maltreatment. They called this informal social control of child maltreatment (ISC\_CM) and found support for two types of intervention: one focused on protecting the victim (protective) and a second focused on punishing the perpetrator (punitive) (Emery, Trung, & Wu, 2015; Emery et al., 2019). Unlike punitive intervention, protective intervention is consistently associated with less violent victimization, injury, neglect, and poor outcomes associated with victimization (Emery, Trung, & Wu, 2015; Emery, Eremina, Yang, et al., 2015; Emery, Eremina, Arenas et al., 2017, 2019). Failure to take different types of bystander intervention into account may partially explain previous null findings.

### **Antecedents of Bystander Intervention by Friends**

Few quantitative studies of IPV have examined bystander intervention by friends as a dependent variable. Banyard and Moynihan (2011) found that a sense of responsibility for ending violence, confidence in helping, and norms encouraging bystander intervention increased intervention against IPV by friends. Further, Moynihan et al. (2011) found the Bringing in the Bystander program increased bystander efficacy, likelihood of helping, and responsibility for ending violence in their program evaluation. Victim-blaming is associated with less friend intervention against IPV (West & Wandrei, 2002). Qualitative research suggests that cultural sanctions against leaving relationships, patterns of

caution in relating to others, and forced isolation may impede victims of IPV from receiving support from friends (Rose, Campbell, & Kub, 2000). Perceived neighborhood disorder may decrease reporting of IPV by informal networks (Gracia & Herrero, 2007). The findings of Leone, Johnson, and Cohan (2007) suggest that victims of a particularly severe form of IPV characterized by control-motivated violence (intimate terrorism) may be less likely to seek help from friends but more likely to seek help from formal services.

### **Theory of Planned Behavior**

Banyard's (2015) research on bystander intervention has consistently been informed by (and found support for) Ajzen's theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), which is also useful for situating our hypotheses. In reviewing the literature, Banyard et al. (2004) identify 12 factors that influence bystander intervention. These factors can be subsumed under Ajzen's (1991) theory. These are diffusion of responsibility (Myers, 1999), moderated by group cohesion (Harada, 1985), role models (Batson, 1998), perception of victim distress (Yee & Greenberg, 1998), requests for help (Shaffer et al., 1975), community readiness to change/peer norms (Edwards et al., 2000; Schwartz & DeKeseredy, 2000), ambiguity of need for help (Harada, 1985), victim-blaming attributions (Batson, 1998), mood, locus of control, and sense of responsibility (Myers, 1999), bystander skill level (Huston et al., 1981), cost-benefit calculation (Fritzsche, Finkelstein, & Penner, 2000), and certainty about how to intervene (Christy & Voigt, 1994).

One advantage abstract theory allows for is the organization or reorganization of apparently disparate empirical findings under a single rubric. Although Banyard et al. (2004) do not bring in the theory explicitly, several of these 12 factors could be subsumed under Ajzen's (1991) theory of planned behavior. Ajzen (1991) argued that subjective norms, attitudes, and perceived behavioral control resulted in a behavioral intention, which in turn caused behavior. Perceived behavioral control is the extent to which an actor believes an action can be controlled, and it is a combination

of self-efficacy and controllability. Locus of control could be subsumed under controllability, and having role models, bystander skill level, and certainty about how to intervene could be subsumed under self-efficacy.

Attitude is a function of actors' subjective assessment of the probability that their action will produce a certain result and their evaluation of the desirability of that result. Cost-benefit calculation, ambiguity of need for help, perception of victim distress, and requests for help could be subsumed under attitude. Subjective norms pertain to morally invested rules (upon which moral judgments of right and wrong are based) that the actor perceives as applying to the situation. Norms are typically internalized by adult actors, but continue to be influenced by the social context (e.g. peers and family). Peer norms could be subsumed under Ajzen's (1991) subjective norm. In addition to its use in organizing previous empirical findings the theory of planned behavior suggests the utility of Confucian gender role norms and IPV secrecy in explaining bystander intervention in an East Asian context.

### **Contextualizing Ajzen's Theory in Beijing and Seoul**

A fundamental reason for comparing Beijing and Seoul is that both Chinese and Korean cultures are profoundly influenced by Confucianism. In relation to the discourse on violence, it is essential to understand how Confucianism was interpreted in each tradition, and how traditional interpretations have changed in modern context. In Korea during the Yi Dynasty immediately prior to Japanese colonization in 1910 (Carter et al., 1990), Confucian thought was interpreted in ways that were highly controlling and brutal to women (Hamel, 1998). Cultural interpretation of this thought during the Qing dynasty in China was similarly misogynistic (Edwards, 1990).

Although historical and cultural commonalities abound, classifying Korean and Chinese cultures as essentially the same would be an enormous (and in many quarters offensive) mistake. Starting in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the experiences of Chinese and Korean cultures diverged widely because China

embarked on a socialist experiment that culminated in a radical attempt to eradicate any remnant of traditional culture (including Confucian gender role norms) known as the Cultural Revolution. At the same time South Korea embraced capitalism, development, and later a hard won democracy. Hence, although human rights probably have better legal protections in South Korea, China may have achieved greater gender parity.

Confucian gender role norms are norms that result from a traditional hierarchical interpretation of Confucian thought and that relegate women to secondary status (Emery, Kim, Song & Song, 2013, Emery, Wu & Chan, 2018). Confucian gender role norms, including circumstances when they are held by women, have been linked to violence by male partners (Emery et al., 2013; Emery et al., 2018). If women's perceptions of the likelihood of intervention by friends is relatively accurate, one reason for this linkage could be that friends may be less likely to intervene when women victimized by male violence hold norms that support male dominance. Similarly contingent on the possibility that women's perceptions are accurate, this could occur if friends were more likely to hold such norms themselves and hence rationalize the violence (a network homogeneity or peer norm effect). It could also occur if, in Ajzen's (1991) terms, a victim's Confucian gender role norms decrease a well-meaning friend's perceived behavioral control. Such norms might not decrease a friend's sense of self-efficacy (Fishbein & Capella, 2006) in an attempt to intervene, but could decrease the controllability of the outcome. This logic leads to our first hypothesis: Women's Confucian gender role norms will be negatively associated with their perception of friends' bystander intervention against IPV (Hypothesis 1).

### **IPV Secrecy**

IPV secrecy is an attitude that favors non-disclosure of IPV. Disclosure of IPV is difficult in any context (Sylaska & Edwards, 2014) but may be particularly difficult in Chinese and Korean cultures, both of which lay substantial stress on the concept of face (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003). Face has two dimensions, self-face and other-face. These dimensions mean that managing one's own image as

presented to the world, and managing the image of those to whom one is related are both important social skills in Korean and Chinese culture. If Chinese and Korean women are concerned for the image of their male partners, they may conceal intimate partner violence even from their friends (Emery et al., 2018). Moreover, cultural stress on other-face may inhibit friends from asking about IPV. Both a woman's adherence to Confucian gender role norms and norms about family privacy may signal to friends that interference would be unwelcome. Bystanders cannot plan any intervention when they are unaware of a problem. This leads to our second hypothesis: IPV secrecy of women will be negatively associated with friends' bystander intervention against IPV (Hypothesis 2).

### **Types of IPV: Totalitarian Dictatorship**

Rates of intimate partner violence, as established by epidemiological studies, are necessary but insufficient to inform on critical dimensions of IPV. Johnson (1995, 2008) argued that knowledge of the bare fact of violence alone was insufficient; rather, whether the violence is control-motivated must be taken into consideration. Perpetrator attempts to isolate the victim from her family and friends are usually defined as part of that control (Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2003). This distinction is important in practice and is correlated with the severity of violence and many other sequelae (Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2003; Johnson, 2006; Johnson & Leone, 2005). However, Emery (2011) argues that stressing the control motive, in the end, omits power. Violence may be motivated by the desire to control, but that does not indicate whether or not such control attempts are successful (in achieving power over the victim for the perpetrator). For this reason, we chose to use Emery's (2011) concept of totalitarian dictatorship rather than Johnson's (2008) intimate terrorism. *Totalitarian-style partner control* is distinct from coercive control in that complete and utter domination of the victim is the end goal, and it differs from intimate terrorism in that a power differential, rather than a control motive, is an explicit criterion (Emery et al., 2018).

The relationship between totalitarian-style control and bystander control of IPV is likely to be complex. On the one hand, totalitarian-style control of women may raise the concerns of their family and friends and render intervention more likely. In Banyard's (2004) terms, this may increase the likelihood of intervention via increased perception of victim distress and decrease the ambiguity of the need for help (both subsumed under attitude in Ajzen's, 1991, terms). On the other hand, totalitarian control may succeed in isolating the victim from family and friends, rendering it more likely that IPV is kept secret. Likewise, totalitarian-style control may succeed in brainwashing the female victim, resulting an adoption of traditional gender role norms that encourage self-blame in the event of violence. The reader should note that totalitarian-style control does not include physical violence in either the concept or the measure. Rather, totalitarian-style control is a pattern of control and domination in relationships that is used to classify types of IPV. We hypothesize that totalitarian-style control by the male partner as reported by their wives will be positively associated with friend intervention against IPV when Confucian gender role norms and IPV secrecy are held constant. This yields our third hypothesis: Totalitarian partner control by male partners of their wives will be positively associated with friend intervention against IPV when Confucian gender role norms and IPV secrecy are held constant (Hypothesis 3).

### **Summary of the Model**

Because these relationships may differ across cultures, cultural interaction effects are tested for all three hypotheses. Based on the research literature, we argue that Confucian gender role norms and IPV secrecy may be particularly important for understanding bystander control of IPV in Chinese and Korean cultural contexts and that totalitarian-style control is likely to be of importance more generally. The models control for criminological variables including (Level 2) neighborhood-level socioeconomic status, residential stability, and collective efficacy. As a neighborhood indicator of general informal social control of crime, collective efficacy is a particularly important predictor of bystander control of IPV. Models also control for (Level 1) marital status, age, household income, household size, and residence in high-rise

apartments versus other dwelling types. Because Johnson (1995) argued that victims and perpetrators of intimate terrorism were less likely to participate in surveys, whether or not a refusal conversion incentive was necessary is also controlled.

## **Method**

### **Data**

The data combine published data from Seoul and Beijing (Emery et al., 2018). The result is a representative random probability proportional-to-size (PPS) cluster sample of 506 couples in 50 neighborhoods in Beijing and 541 couples in 34 neighborhoods in Seoul. Districts (jiedao) within the fifth ring road in Beijing were used to represent neighborhoods. In Seoul districts (dong) within city limits were used. PPS samples of districts were drawn in each city on the basis of census population statistics. About 10–15 couples were interviewed in each district. The research team used measurements of maps of each district to make two random draws from the uniform distribution. These draws located a random start point, to which an interviewer was sent to door-to-door to locate the nearest dwellings and conduct face-to-face interviews. A refusal conversion protocol kept response rates high (80.2% in Beijing, 63% in Seoul).

Interviewers attended a 2-day training, and passed a written exam and certification interview on obtaining informed consent and protecting the confidentiality of the participants. Participants were told that participation was strictly voluntary, that they could withdraw from the study at any time, and that they were not required to answer questions that made them uncomfortable. Interviewers were instructed to terminate the interview and reconvene later if the confidentiality of the interview was threatened at any point. At the time of data collection, the study protocol met all of the criteria for human subjects protection at Tsinghua university in Beijing and Yonsei university in Seoul. Inclusion criteria mandated that participants needed to have been in a marriage or co-habiting relationship within the last year. For the present paper the sample was restricted to female respondents with complete data yielding sample sizes of

301 cases in Beijing and 459 in Seoul in the multilevel regression models. Apart from where noted, measures were translated into Korean for the Seoul sample and Chinese for the Beijing sample. Both translations were back-translated into English to check for accuracy. The Chinese and Korean questionnaires are provided in the supplementary materials.

## Measures

**Perceived friend intervention against IPV.** Following the previous research of Emery, Trung, and Wu (2015), perceived bystander (wife's friend) intervention against IPV was divided into protective ( $\alpha = .79$ ) and punitive ( $\alpha = .79$ ) types. The two protective items were: If they witnessed my spouse physically hurting me, my friends might...get in between my spouse and me and ...try to calm my spouse down by talking. The three punitive items were: call the police, threaten my spouse, and use physical violence against my spouse. Possible responses were: My friends (1) would never do this, (2) might do this, (3) would probably do this, (4) would definitely do this, and (5) actually did this. Scores were averaged across items. An answer of 5 indicates that there was IPV by the husband and actual (high) bystander intervention by friends. In the present study Cronbach's alpha was .80 for the protective and .77 for the punitive scales.

Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is an accepted approach for test development in psychology (Milfont & Fischer, 2010; Prudon, 2015). Prudon (2015, p. 117) argues that CFA can be problematic for the validation of questionnaires, in particular because in large samples trivial differences result in significant likelihood ratio test results. We agree with this critique and are concerned that CFA may sometimes preclude the combination of items which should, for good theoretical reasons, be kept together, particularly when outliers regularly encountered in representative data are present. Like Prudon, we are also concerned that CFA may overstate the number of factors necessary to approximate the data, resulting in non-parsimonious conceptualization. To some extent, there are disciplinary differences in preference for conceptual parsimony. Bearing these caveats in mind, we conducted CFA on the friend intervention

against IPV measure. Factor analysis suggests two factors are an adequate fit for the data ( $\chi^2 = 1.84, p = .17$ ). However, Goodness of fit for CFA was rejected ( $LR = 58.6, df = 4, p < .001$ ) and other fit indices were problematic (RMSEA = .14, CFI = .95). These problems were ameliorated when “call the police” was removed from the punitive scale. Goodness of fit was not rejected ( $LR = 1.05, df = 1, p = .31$ ), and other fit indices were acceptable (RMSEA = .01, CFI = .99).

Moreover, this approach met strong criteria for measurement invariance across Korean and Chinese cultures (Milfont & Fischer, 2010; see Table 1s of the [online supplement](#)). There was a Heywood case in the Korean data for the variance of threaten my spouse but the estimate was not significantly different from zero. Constraining loadings (difference in  $\chi^2 = 1.80, df = 2, p = .41$ ) and loadings and intercepts (difference in  $\chi^2 = 2.70, df = 2, p = .25$ ) to be the same across both samples was not significantly different from a model which allowed them to freely vary. However, a strict model which constrained loadings, intercepts, and residuals to be the same across both Korean and Chinese samples was significantly different from the model that freely varied (difference in  $\chi^2 = 11.56, df = 4, p = .02$ ). Because “call the police” is an important item with implications for both perpetrator and victim, we left it in the punitive scale in the results we present here. However, we conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results (Table 2s) when “call the police” was omitted from the punitive scale. For the combined data, removing “call the police” from the measure did not change the coefficients in sign or significance. For the Korean data alone, the secrecy coefficient lost its significance. This point is noted in its place.

**Confucian gender role norms.** The respondent's Confucian gender role norms were assessed with Emery et al.'s (2013) scale ( $\alpha = .81$ ). The scale score averaged across seven items: Men should be the leaders in society, Men should take the initiative in romantic relationships, Wives should do most household chores, The family's economic decisions should be made by the husband, Wives should follow their husbands' opinions about the wife's job, The husband's opinion is more important than the wife's in making important decisions about the children, and From time to time it's ok for husbands to use violence

against their wives to preserve the husband's authority. Responses were recorded on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 (*strongly agree*) to 4 (*strongly disagree*). The scale score was reverse-coded and averaged across items. A higher score thus indicates stronger endorsement of Confucian gender role norms. In the present study, Cronbach's alpha was .83. This scale was originally created in Korean, translated into Chinese, and back-translated into English to check for meaning.

**Totalitarian partner control.** Johnson and Leone's (2005) measure from the Violence Against Women Survey was used to measure totalitarian partner control (in Johnson's, 2008, study,  $\alpha = .70$ ). The seven items were averaged across the spouse: Tries to limit your contact with family and friends, Is jealous or possessive, Insists on knowing who you are with at all times, Puts you down in front of others, Makes you feel inadequate, Shouts or swears at you, and Prevents you from knowing about or having access to the family income. Possible responses were 1 (*never*) to 5 (*always*). A higher averaged score indicates stronger control attempts. In the present study, Cronbach's alpha was .88.

**Secrecy about IPV.** Following Emery, Wu, and Raghavan, (2015), secrecy about IPV was measured across the following six items: If my spouse ever hit me, I would try to keep it secret from...: my friends, my family, my neighbors, my co-workers, my boss, and everyone (Cronbach's  $\alpha$  was .95). Responses were given on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (*very likely*) to 4 (*very unlikely*). Items were reverse-coded and averaged, rendering higher scores higher in secrecy about IPV. For the present study Cronbach's alpha was .94.

**Collective efficacy.** Following Sampson et al. (1997), collective efficacy was measured in two subscales: Neighborhood Solidarity and Informal Social Control. Sampson et al. (1997) reported good discriminant validity and Emery, Trung and Wu (2015) reported good reliability (Cronbach's  $\alpha$ s = .90 and .85, respectively) for these two subscales. Responses were reported on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 (*strongly agree*) to 4 (*strongly disagree*). The Neighborhood Solidarity subscale (present study Cronbach's  $\alpha = .87$ ) consisted of the four items: This is a close-knit neighborhood, If your family has an important

problem people around here care, People in this neighborhood can be trusted, and People around here are willing to help their neighbors. The Neighborhood Informal Social Control subscale (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .86$ ) consisted of the following four items: You could count on your neighbors to do something about it if...children were skipping school and hanging around outside, ...children were showing disrespect to an adult, ...there was a fight in front of your house/apartment, and ...you were away and someone was trying to steal your bike. We reverse-coded and calculated neighborhood level averages for each of these scales and entered them as predictors in Level 2 (neighborhood level) of the multilevel model. Higher scores indicate higher neighborhood solidarity and higher neighborhood informal social control, respectively.

**Neighborhood socioeconomic status.** In the survey we measured monthly household income, household size, and the respondent's education. The three variables were standardized, added together (household size  $\times -1$ ), and averaged over each neighborhood to create a neighborhood socioeconomic status (SES) control. Neighborhood averages for the survey measure of the number of years lived in the neighborhood were created and entered in Level 2 as a residential stability control. Higher scores indicate higher neighborhood SES and higher neighborhood residential stability, respectively. Conceptually, Beijing/Seoul is a Level 3 variable. However, for the models this is mathematically equivalent to entering it as a Level 2 variable.

### **Analytic Issues**

Analysis were conducted in Stata11; multilevel (mixed effects) models were used (Luke, 2004). The first level estimates perceived friend intervention against IPV as a function of the  $P$  individual-level predictors and controls outlined in the hypotheses:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \sum_{p=1}^P \beta_p X_{p ij} + r_{ij} \quad (1)$$

The second level estimates the neighborhood mean of perceived friend intervention against IPV as a function of neighborhood averages in socioeconomic status, years resident, and collective efficacy (solidarity and informal social control of street disorder):

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(SES) + \gamma_{02}(YEARS) + \gamma_{03}(SOLIDARITY_{CE}) + \gamma_{04}(ISC_{CE}) + u_{0j} \quad (2)$$

For each hypothesis, the model was first run for the combined Seoul and Beijing data. It was then run for Beijing and Seoul separately. A limited interaction model then tested whether the independent variables (Confucian gender role norms, IPV secrecy, and totalitarian partner control by the husband had different relationships with bystander control in the two different cities). Finally, each model was run as a full interaction model (with all covariates and an interaction term for each covariate) to test whether the overall model differed between cities.

Although psychometric analyses suggest that the measure of friend intervention against IPV is a reasonable construct, the fact that the scale combines women's beliefs about what friends would do and what friends have actually done (a response of 5 on the item scale) remains a valid concern. Given research findings that suggest protective bystander control is associated with less violence and injury (Emery, Eremina, Yang, et al., 2015; Emery, Wu, Kim et al., 2017), protective control is particularly of interest. Unfortunately, only 22 women in the data reported that friends had at some point exercised protective bystander control of IPV, rendering this part of the data relatively low in power and unsuitable for sophisticated modeling.

## Results

Descriptive statistics are reported for Beijing and Seoul in Table 1, some of which are seen in Emery and Wu (2018); *t*-tests and Chi-square tests compare differences between the Beijing and Seoul. There were several medium-sized effects (Cohen's  $d > .50$ ). Secrecy about IPV was higher in Beijing. Totalitarian partner control by husbands was higher in Seoul than Beijing. Beijing women had stronger Confucian gender role norms. Women in Seoul had higher friend intervention against IPV scores for both protective and punitive types. The effect size difference for perceived protective intervention was large (Cohen's  $d = .92, p < .001$ ). Seoul respondents reported higher averages of neighborhood informal social control of street crime and neighborhood solidarity. Household incomes were significantly higher in

Seoul. A greater proportion of Beijing respondents lived in high-rise apartments. Women in Seoul had more education than women in Beijing.

Beijing respondents were not significantly more likely to report that a friend intervened between them and their spouse (1.69% versus .45%,  $z = 1.72$ ,  $p = .086$ ). Seoul respondents were not significantly more likely to report that their friends had called the police (1.34% versus 0%, two-sided Fisher's exact  $p = .086$ ) or threatened their husbands (1.34% versus 0%, two-sided Fisher's exact  $p = .086$ ). However, 46% of Seoul respondents believed their friends would definitely get in between their spouse and themselves (versus 22% in Beijing,  $p < .001$ ), and 50% of Seoul respondents believed their friends would definitely try to calm their spouse down by talking (versus 25% in Beijing,  $p < .001$ ).

Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) for both the protective intervention items (Wilke's  $\lambda = .69$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and the punitive intervention items (Wilke's  $\lambda = .70$ ,  $p < .001$ ) indicate the model is statistically significant. Table 2 shows the model for protective (soft) friend intervention. Totalitarian-style partner control was not associated with more protective intervention by friends in the full model; however there was a significant interaction by city: The relationship was significant in the Beijing data ( $B = .32$ ,  $p = .007$ ) and the interaction term indicated that the relationship differed significantly between cities ( $B = .35$ ,  $p = .004$ ). Hence, there is a positive relationship among the Beijing women but the relationship does not hold for the Seoul sample. In the combined data ( $B = -.22$ ,  $p = .005$ ) and in Seoul ( $B = -.27$ ,  $p = .004$ ), but not in Beijing ( $B = -.23$ ,  $p = .094$ ), the wife's Confucian gender role norms were associated with less protective intervention. Overall, wives' greater secrecy about IPV in the data was not associated with less protective intervention ( $B = -.08$ ,  $p = .083$ ). Household income was positively associated with bystander intervention in the full model. Neighborhood informal social control was significantly associated with protective intervention in the Beijing sample ( $B = .19$ ,  $p = .010$ ) but not in Seoul. Holding all other variables in the model constant, female residents in Beijing reported significantly lower protective

intervention by friends ( $B = -.44, p = .027$ ). The full interaction model found that the model was significantly different between cities ( $\chi^2 = 24.8, df = 13, p = .016$ ).

Table 3 shows the same model for punitive (hard) intervention against IPV. Totalitarian-style partner control by the husband was significantly associated with more punitive intervention by friends ( $B = .11, p = .010$ ) in the full model and in the Seoul sample, but was not associated in Beijing. IPV secrecy was associated with significantly less ( $B = -.14, p < .001$ ) punitive intervention in the full model and in the Seoul sample but not in Beijing. Average neighborhood SES was associated with significantly more punitive intervention by friends ( $B = .09, p = .001$ ) in the full model. In the Beijing sample, but not in Seoul or in the full model, the respondent's education was negatively associated with punitive intervention, but high-rise apartment residence was positively associated. The full interaction model suggested the model did not systematically differ between cities ( $\chi^2 = 15.5, df = 13, p = .22$ ).

### **Discussion**

Confucian gender role norms of women were negatively associated with perceived protective intervention by friends, but they were not associated with punitive intervention. On the other hand, IPV secrecy was related to punitive intervention, but not to protective intervention. Totalitarian-style partner control was associated with more punitive intervention by friends. However, these findings in the combined data obscure important differences in findings between women in Seoul and Beijing.

#### **IPV Secrecy and Confucian Gender Role Norms**

Hypothesis 1 posited women's Confucian gender role norms would have a negative relationship with intervention against IPV by friends. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, there was a significant negative relationship between Confucian gender role norms and women's perceptions of protective intervention by friends. This negative relationship was consistent across the full and Seoul sample for protective intervention. However, Confucian gender role norms of women had no relationship with punitive

intervention. Women with more traditional Confucian gender role norms appear to be less likely to perceive their friends would intervene in a protective fashion in these two cities.

Hypothesis 2 postulated relationships between IPV secrecy and perception of friend intervention against IPV. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, IPV secrecy was significantly related to less punitive (but not less protective) perceived intervention in the combined data. If the perceptions of the women in our data are relatively accurate, the negative relationship suggests that IPV disclosure could play an important role in invoking bystander intervention against IPV. Our findings add to research suggesting that supportive informal social network responses to IPV disclosure are associated with victim benefits (Sylaska & Edwards, 2014). The cultural stress on “face” present in both South Korea and China, insofar as it increases IPV secrecy, would appear to be a direct risk factor for less intervention by friends among women. However, the most serious risk factor may be women’s endorsement of Confucian gender role norms because these attitudes are particularly negatively associated with the form of intervention (protective) found to be protective against violent victimization, injury, and violence-induced sequelae (Emery, Eremina, Yang, et al., 2015, Emery, Wu, Kim et al., 2017; Emery et al., 2019).

### **Totalitarian Partner Control**

Hypothesis 3 postulated a positive relationship between totalitarian partner control and intervention against IPV by friends, controlling for IPV secrecy and Confucian gender role norms. Totalitarian partner control was associated with more punitive intervention by friends in the combined and Seoul data. The coefficient was smaller in size and non-significant in Beijing, and the interaction term was not statistically significant. This suggests that holding the victim’s IPV secrecy and Confucian gender role norms constant, totalitarian partner control may elicit rather than inhibit punitive intervention. However, the relationship was only significant for protective intervention in Beijing. The interaction term suggested that the relationship is different in Seoul and Beijing. It may be that totalitarian partner control both elicits the concern of friends but at the same time frightens them away from the more personal approach

necessitated by protective intervention. Given Seoul women reported significantly higher punitive intervention than Beijing women, this may indicate differential friend responses to totalitarian control. Specifically, violence in the context of totalitarian control may make friends in Seoul more likely to contact police rather than respond with protective intervention. However, friends in Beijing may be unlikely to contact the police in any event. If so, concerns raised may render protective intervention more likely. Further research is needed to explain these results.

Further research is also needed to unpack the findings with respect to Banyard's (2004) and Ajzen's (1991) theoretical factors that influence bystander intervention. The findings are consistent with the idea that increases in the perception of victims' distress and decreases in the ambiguity of the need for help may increase friend intervention against IPV, whereas decreases in the controllability of the outcome may decrease intervention. Future research could contribute substantially to the theoretical understanding of bystander intervention by developing measures of these constructs in a fully culturally contextualized model. Qualitative and quantitative research in an East Asian context could be used to unpack the extent to which the relationships between Confucian gender role norms, totalitarian-style partner control, IPV secrecy, face, and bystander intervention are mediated by perceptions of victim distress, perceived ambiguity of the need for help, and perceived controllability of the outcome. Estimates of the effect sizes of these relationships are needed for practical reasons as well because policies aimed at increasing the likelihood of bystander intervention must rank order target variables for intervention in terms of likely impact.

### **Neighborhood and Culture Effects**

The approach to measuring the effects of neighborhood SES in these models is quite conservative because the same characteristics of SES are also controlled at the individual level. This renders the finding of a positive relationship between neighborhood SES and punitive intervention quite striking because the

result is consistent with the sociological concept of emergence (Hanks, 2008; Webster, 2001). With respect to punitive intervention, the collective SES of the community appears to have an independent relationship, even when individual SES is held constant. Punitive intervention is higher in higher SES neighborhoods. It is possible that those in higher SES neighborhoods have more confidence in authorities and that this relationship is independent of the SES of individual households. Such confidence would be strictly rational if authorities are more responsive to some neighborhoods than others.

The general measure of neighborhood informal social control was significantly associated with protective bystander intervention in Beijing, but not in Seoul or in the combined data. When neighborhood informal social control is linked to bystander intervention, policies to combat crime by building up neighborhood informal social control norms can have positive externalities for victims of IPV. More research is needed to understand when neighborhood informal social control of crime is likely to be linked to bystander intervention against IPV, as well as when it is not.

All forms of informal social control (protective and punitive intervention by friends and informal social control of street crime) are higher in Seoul than in Beijing. IPV secrecy is significantly higher among women in Beijing than in Seoul. These differences are all consistent with a lack of social trust which has been documented in urban China (Zhang, Wang & Yu, 2015). Anecdotally, tales of good Samaritans being taken advantage of by cynical fraudsters abound in Beijing, often resulting in real need being ignored on the street. Prior research indicates that informal social networks can be undermined by disorganization and distrust (Gracia & Herrero, 2007; Rose, Campbell, & Kub, 2000). The foregoing rationale suggests that perceived bystander intervention by friends may be higher in Seoul because (a) of greater social cohesion in Seoul, which could stem from mass rural-to-urban migration present in Beijing (Chan & Zhang, 2009), (b) of the existence of a ghettoized migrant class in Beijing because migrants are not considered legal residents and do not have legal access to services (they are not legal residents of

Beijing under the Hukou system; Miller, 2012), (c) economically Beijing is not yet as developed as Seoul (see Ringen, 2016, pp. 145-146), and/or (d) the two cities exist under different systems of government.

If the explanation lies in higher social cohesion in Seoul, our data contain an indicator of social cohesion (neighborhood solidarity) which may shed light on the question. As seen in Table 1, there was a small but significant difference in effect size for neighborhood solidarity, which was higher in Seoul. This finding suggests that a lower degree of social cohesion in Beijing may indeed be a factor in explaining differences in perceived bystander intervention for IPV in Beijing and Seoul. However, further research that measures social cohesion more directly is needed, particularly because neighborhood solidarity did not significantly predict perceived bystander intervention in our models.

### **Limitations and Future Research Directions**

Findings generated from our study should be interpreted in light of various limitations. First, findings are subject to self-report bias because the topic is sensitive and only one member of each couple, as well as no friends or family members, was interviewed. Second, the cross-sectional and non-experimental nature of our study and resultant findings cannot indicate causal relationships, and they can be generalized only to women in Seoul and Beijing. Longitudinal, experimental, and intervention research is much needed. Third, a lack of statistical power may have accounted for the null findings in the Beijing model, yet significant interactions by city suggest that this was not always the case. Fourth, the measure of controlling behaviors of intimate terrorists in a previous study (Johnson & Leone, 2005) was used to gauge totalitarian partner control in our study. Hence, it cannot be said to adequately reflect Emery's (2011) totalitarian control because some items on the measure ask about attempts to control rather than successful attempts to control. Thus, the measure does not completely capture relational power dynamics. Finally, the measure of bystander intervention measures only control in response to physical acts of IPV, rather than including acts of emotional totalitarian control that may be more commonly witnessed in public. Our paper has documented important differences in bystander intervention among women and its antecedents

between Beijing and Seoul. Further, theoretically grounded research is needed to articulate relevant sociocultural differences and test whether these explain differences in bystander intervention between the two cities. The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) remains a relevant source for organizing and framing such an effort.

### **Practice Implications**

With increasing evidence that protective bystander intervention is associated with less IPV (Emery, Eremina, Yang, et al., 2015; Emery, Wu, Kim et al., 2017; Emery et al., 2019), policymakers and clinical practitioners have reasonable interest in promoting protective bystander intervention. In order to be effective, interventions and policies that aim to promote protective bystander intervention must comprehend specific local sociocultural contexts as well as general (theoretical) conditions relevant to increasing such intervention. Our findings suggest that both protective and punitive perceived bystander interventions by friends are higher in Seoul than in Beijing. Protective bystander intervention is negatively associated with Confucian gender role norms, but punitive intervention is associated with IPV secrecy. Both Confucian gender role norms and IPV secrecy were higher in Beijing than in Seoul, which may partially explain the differences in bystander intervention.

However, our findings and previous research suggest that low social cohesion may also be an underlying condition that results in less perceived bystander intervention in Beijing, both directly because there will be less social trust and indirectly because low cohesion may increase IPV secrecy. Fostering trusting relationships in social networks in low-cohesion contexts seems likely to be a critical component of increasing protective bystander intervention, but it may require substantial effort. Indeed, there is a substantial literature on the importance of relationship (*guanxi*) building in China (Bedford, 2011). Working *guanxi* contains elements of expressive commitments as well as utilitarian self-interest, and it is thought to be built via attention to face, *renqing* (reciprocity and proper emotional and behavioral response to circumstances), trust, and feelings (affection).

Given its association with the type of perceived bystander intervention (protective) most associated with positive outcomes (Emery, Trung, & Wu, 2015; Emery, Wu, Kim et al., 2017; Emery et al., 2019), efforts to shift Confucian gender role norms in favor of egalitarian relationships may be important for both Seoul and Beijing. This can be carried out in micro-level interventions at the individual level, but also in macro approaches to policy that promote gender equality in the home and workplace (and particularly bearing in mind that equality in the home is related to equality in the market). Gender discrimination in the labor market remains a severe problem in South Korea (Patterson & Walcutt, 2014), and Korea has one of the lowest women's employment rates in the OECD (21 percentage points below men) (Patterson & Walcutt, 2014; Yonhap, 2017). These problems may be less severe in Beijing, where child-rearing by grandparents is more normative and there is strong party support for women in the workplace (Silverstein & Cong, 2013).

There is particular need for more research and attention in policy to the implications of IPV-related separation and divorce for bystander intervention in both Beijing and Seoul. Under traditional Confucian rules, women could not choose to divorce their husbands at all, but could be divorced for committing one of the "7 evils": failure to produce a son, disobedience to parents-in-law, talkativeness, theft, adultery, jealousy, and hereditary disease (Cho, 1988, p. 105). This context creates enormous stigma for divorced women. Particularly in social networks with strong traditional Confucian gender role norms, women coping with violence could feel forced to choose between seeking formal intervention against IPV by police and courts versus informal intervention and support from friends because seeking formal intervention may entail partial or total loss of support from friends and other social networks. A prevalent sense in both Seoul and Beijing that the police and courts handle IPV unreliably at best could render the seeming consequences of this choice quite stark (Kim, Park, & Jung, 2015; Li, Wu & Sun, 2013). Protective intervention by friends may appear to be more reliable but less effective, but protection by the state less reliable but more effective (if and when it occurs).

## **Conclusions**

To our knowledge, ours is the first study of perceived bystander intervention of IPV in East Asia, as well as the first cross-cultural comparison. The paper provided substantial evidence that women's Confucian gender role norms are negatively associated with what research suggests is the most beneficial form of perceived bystander intervention against IPV. This association suggests that women who more strongly endorse such norms may be more vulnerable and less protected by informal networks. Reducing the footprint of this risk factor by reducing social acceptance of subservience and dominance and in the general population—for both men and women—is urgent. IPV secrecy was also associated with less perceived punitive intervention against IPV. Given higher levels of IPV secrecy in Beijing, campaigns to decrease the sense of stigma associated with IPV disclosure may be necessary. Totalitarian-style control is associated with perceived punitive bystander intervention in Seoul, but with perceived protective bystander intervention in Beijing. More research is needed on bystander intervention generally, as well as particularly on the efficacy of bystander intervention in the context of totalitarian-style partner control. Together, the cities of Beijing and Seoul represent nearly 30 million people (Versus, 2019). Further attempts to understand how the sociocultural context affects bystander intervention by friends has the potential to improve the lives of many.

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Table 1

*Sample Descriptive Statistics*

Variable	Beijing		Seoul		Difference	
	<i>n</i>	<i>M (SD) or n (%)</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M (SD) or n (%)</i>	<i>t/χ<sup>2</sup></i>	Cohen's <i>d</i> / Cramer's <i>V</i>
Secrecy about IPV	300	3.03 (0.82)	458	2.56 (0.74)	8.21***	0.60
Totalitarian Partner Control (Continuous)	298	1.39 (0.55)	455	1.86 (0.75)	6.63***	0.68
Totalitarian Partner Control (Dichotomous)	298	4 (1.34%)	455	35 (7.69%)	14.78***	0.14
Confucian Gender Role Norms	301	2.14 (0.48)	459	1.77 (0.47)	10.67***	0.78
Protective Intervention by Friends	297	2.45 (1.06)	450	3.29 (0.75)	12.62***	0.92
Punitive Intervention by Friends	295	1.36 (0.56)	450	1.85 (0.77)	9.43***	0.69
Neighborhood Solidarity	302	11.10 (2.93)	462	11.45 (2.64)	3.46***	0.25
Neighborhood ISC	302	10.18 (3.20)	462	11.83 (2.58)	23.95***	1.74
Household Income (USD)	298	997 (815)	462	4,367 (2,353)	23.81***	1.73
Years in Neighborhood	302	10.32 (14.39)	420	7.47 (6.55)	5.81***	0.42
High-Rise Apartment	301	207 (68.77%)	414	173 (41.79%)	50.96***	0.27
Household Size	290	3.37 (1.07)	450	2.71 (0.92)	8.94***	0.66
Wife's Age	292	42.82 (12.07)	453	44.27 (9.57)	1.81	0.13
Wife's Education (Years)	296	12.65 (3.49)	458	13.61 (2.53)	4.33***	0.32
Married	301	285 (94.68%)	435	401 (92.18%)	1.76	0.05

*Note.* Some of the data reported here is from Emery and Wu (2018).

\*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 2  
*HLM Regressions Explaining Protective Friend Intervention against IPV*

Predictors	Full Model (n = 617, 84) <sup>a</sup>		Beijing Model (n = 268, 52) <sup>a</sup>		Seoul Model <sup>b</sup> (n = 349, 32) <sup>a</sup>		Interaction Model <sup>c</sup> (n = 617, 84) <sup>a</sup>	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Level 1								
Totalitarian Partner Control (Continuous)	.09	.05	.32**	.11	-.01	.06	-.001	.06
Confucian Gender Role Norms	-.22**	.08	-.23	.12	-.27**	.09	-.24*	.11
Secrecy about IPV	-.08	.04	-.10	.08	.07	.06	-.09	.06
Wife's Age	-.006	.003	-.006	.006	-.003	.005	-.005	.004
Married	-.01	.08	.07	.14	-.13	.11	.02	.01
Wife's Education (Years)	.02	.01	-.01	.02	.04	.02	.01	.01
Household Income (\$1,000 USD)	.04*	.02	.16	.09	.03	.02	.04	.02
High-rise Apartment	.04	.07	.07	.15	.04	.09	.05	.08
Household Size	.07	.04	.07	.06	.04	.05	.06	.04
Level 2								
Neighborhood SES (neighborhood mean)	.01	.04	.02	.06	.03	.05	.01	.04
Years in Neighborhood (mean)	-.002	.01	-.001	.01	-.005	.03	-.002	.01
Neighborhood Solidarity (mean)	-.03	.05	-.08	.07	.01	.06	-.03	.05
Neighborhood ISC (mean)	.07	.04	.19**	.07	-.02	.05	.08	.04
Beijing	-.44*	.17					-1.05*	.45
Interactions								
Beijing x Totalitarian Partner Control							.35**	.12
Beijing x Confucian Gender Role Norms							.05	.16
Beijing x IPV Secrecy							-.003	.09
Variance Components								
Intercept	.12*	.04	.18*	.07	.02	.02	.12**	.04
Level-1 Residual	.67***	.04	.85***	.08	.52***	.04	.66***	.04
R <sup>2</sup> within (between)	.06	(.37)	.07	(.27)	.07	(.10)	.06	(.41)
R <sup>2</sup> overall	.25		.14		.10		.26	

<sup>a</sup>(n = ): The first number is the number of respondents, the second is the number of neighborhoods. <sup>b</sup>Full interaction model shows Seoul model is significantly different from Beijing,  $\chi^2 = 24.8$ ,  $df = 12$ ,  $p = .016$ . <sup>c</sup>Interactions:  $\chi^2 = 9.2$ ,  $df = 3$ ,  $p = .027$ .

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 3  
*HLM Regressions Explaining Punitive Friend Intervention against IPV*

Predictors	Full Model (n = 615, 84) <sup>a</sup>		Beijing Model (n = 266, 52) <sup>a</sup>		Seoul Model <sup>b</sup> (n = 349, 32) <sup>a</sup>		Interaction Model <sup>c</sup> (n = 615, 84) <sup>a</sup>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>SEB</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SEB</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SEB</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SEB</i>
Level 1								
Totalitarian Partner Control (Continuous)	.11**	.04	.06	.06	.13*	.05	.12*	.05
Confucian Gender Role Norms	-.08	.06	.001	.07	-.14	.09	-.14	.08
Secrecy about IPV	-.14***	.04	-.08	.04	-.18**	.05	-.18***	.05
Wife's Age	-.003	.003	-.002	.003	.002	.005	-.001	.003
Married	.001	.06	-.04	.08	.06	.10	.003	.06
Wife's Education (Years)	.005	.01	-.03*	.01	.02	.02	-.004	.01
Household Income (\$1,000 USD)	-.01	.02	.01	.05	-.03	.02	-.01	.02
High-rise Apartment	.02	.06	.23**	.08	-.03	.09	.03	.06
Household Size	.03	.03	-.003	.03	.06	.05	.03	.03
Level 2								
Neighborhood SES (neighborhood mean)	.09**	.03	.07**	.03	.13*	.06	.09**	.03
Years in Neighborhood (mean)	-.004	.005	-.004	.004	-.02	.03	-.004	.005
Neighborhood Solidarity (mean)	.02	.03	-.002	.03	.03	.09	-.01	.03
Neighborhood ISC (mean)	.06	.03	.03	.03	.05	.06	.05	.03
Beijing	-.02	.14					-.49	.34
Interactions								
Beijing x Totalitarian Partner Control							.05	.09
Beijing x Confucian Gender Role Norms							.14	.12
Beijing x IPV Secrecy							.09	.07
Variance Components								
Intercept	.04*	.02	.01	.01	.07*	.04	.04*	.02
Level-1 Residual	.39***	.02	.27***	.03	.47***	.04	.39***	.02
R <sup>2</sup> within (between)	.04	(.44)	.05	(.15)	.06	(.25)	.04	(.44)
R <sup>2</sup> overall	.20		.09		.14		.20	

<sup>a</sup>(*n* = ): The first number is the number of respondents, the second is the number of neighborhoods. <sup>b</sup>Full interaction model shows Seoul model is not significantly different from Beijing,  $\chi^2 = 15.5$ , *df* = 12, *p* = .22). <sup>c</sup>Interactions:  $\chi^2 = 3.3$ , *df* = 3, *p* = .35).

\**p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\**p* < .001.

**Supplementary Material**

Table 1s:

Cultural Invariance Evaluation Statistics: China & Korea Perceived Bystander Control

Model	$\chi^2$	<i>df</i>	$\Delta\chi^2$	CFI	$\Delta$ CFI	TLI	RMSEA	95% CI
Baseline	1.05	1		.99		.99	.008	0 - .099
Configural Invariance	0.25	2		1.00	.01	1.02	.000	0 - .09
Weak Invariance	1.05	4	1.80	1.00	0	1.02	.000	0 - .07
Strong Invariance	3.41	6	2.70	0.996	.004	.993	.022	0 - .074
Strict Invariance	8.38	10	11.56*	0.974	.022	.969	.046	0 - .081

**Table 2s**  
*Explaining punitive friend intervention (without police) against IPV*

Variable	Full Model (n = 614, 84) <sup>a</sup>		Beijing Model (n = 265, 52)		Seoul Model <sup>b</sup> (n = 349, 32)		Interaction Model <sup>c</sup> (n = 614, 84)	
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>
<i>Level 1</i>								
Totalitarian Partner Control (Continuous)	.12**	.05	.01	.07	.17**	.06	.16**	.05
Confucian Gender Role Norms	-.05	.07	.04	.09	-.13	.10	-.13	.09
Secrecy about IPV	-.09*	.04	-.06	.05	-.07	.06	-.08	.05
Wife's Age	-.001	.003	-.001	.003	.003	.005	-.001	.003
Married	.005	.07	-.02	.08	.07	.11	.01	.07
Wife's Education (Years)	-.01	.01	-.03*	.01	.002	.02	-.01	.01
Household Income (1,000 USD)	-.004	.02	.01	.05	-.015	.02	-.03	.02
High-rise Apartment	.04	.06	.24**	.09	-.15	.10	-.04	.06
Household Size	.03	.03	-.02	.04	.06	.05	.02	.03
<i>Level 2</i>								
Neighborhood SES (neighborhood mean)	.08**	.03	.05*	.03	.12*	.06	.08**	.03
Years in Neighborhood (mean)	-.004	.005	-.005	.004	-.01	.03	-.004	.005
Neighborhood Solidarity (mean)	.03	.04	-.002	.03	.07	.09	.03	.04
Neighborhood ISC (mean)	.04	.03	.004	.03	.05	.07	.04	.03
Beijing	.06	.14					-.07	.36
<i>Interactions</i>								
Beijing X Totalitarian Partner Control							.13	.05
Beijing X Confucian Gender Role Norms							.16	.13
Beijing X IPV Secrecy							.001	.07
<i>Variance Components</i>								
Intercept	.04*	.02	.00	.00	.06*	.04	.04*	.02
Level-1 Residual	.49***	.03	.33***	.03	.60***	.04	.49***	.03
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> within (between)	.02	(.32)	.04	(.07)	.03	(.32)	.02	(.37)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> overall	.10		.06		.10		.12	

Notes: HLM coefficients followed by standard errors. \**p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\**p* < .001

a: (n = ) The first number is the number of respondents, the second is the number of neighborhoods.

b: Full interaction model shows Seoul model not significantly different from Beijing ( $\chi^2 = 15.5, df = 12, p = .22$ ); c: Interactions: ( $\chi^2 = 3.3, df = 3, p = .35$ )

