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<th>A Divided Society: Chinese Public Opinion on Resistance Movements, Democracy, and Rule of Law</th>
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A DIVIDED SOCIETY: CHINESE PUBLIC OPINION ON RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS, DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW

Han Zhu*

Background

In 2014, the Occupy Central (OC) Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan were heated topics worldwide, and within China this was no exception. Between the two high-profile movements, the former has attracted more attention in Chinese media and society since it was directly related to the “one country, two systems” policy. In fact, the OC Movement is the first widely reported and discussed democratic movement that has occurred within PRC territory since the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement. It thus provides a rare opportunity to observe Chinese public opinion, especially as regards democracy and civil disobedience in the post-1989 era. Although there have been empirical studies on the participants in the OC Movement,\(^1\) as well as on the influence of the China factor on the Sunflower Movement,\(^2\) no systematic research has been conducted with regard to public opinion towards the two movements and the relevant issues involved in each. As more and more activists, scholars, and politicians realize that the development of democracy in Mainland China is vital for that in Hong Kong—and perhaps even in Taiwan—the consciousness of democracy and the rule of law for Mainland Chinese is certainly one of the key factors worth observing in the discussion on the development of democracy and political movements throughout the three regions.

However, there are some important questions that we must first consider: what impact have the OC and Sunflower Movements had on Mainland China? Besides the official cliché criticism of these two movements, how do common Chinese citizens view the civil disobedience movements in these two regions? Further, how much do Chinese citizens know about these two movements? To date only a handful of media reports based on sporadic interviews have revealed the attitudes of Mainland Chinese towards the OC Movement, which have been mostly negative.\(^3\) In contrast, some Mainland Chinese activists have expressed support for the OC Movement, and their public activism has resulted in serious crackdowns.\(^4\) Their courage to openly support

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\(^1\) E.g., Samson Yuen & Edmund Cheng, “Hong Kong’s Umbrella Protests Were More than Just a Student Movement”, *ChinaFile* (1 July 2015), available at https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/hong-kongs-umbrella-protests-were-more-just-student-movement; also see five public opinion polls conducted by the Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong, available at https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/report/mpCEnOCC/index.html.

\(^2\) E.g., Jieh-min Wu, “Citizen Resistance Movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan under the Influence of ‘China Factor’”, in Xie Zhenglun (ed.), *Dongya diqu de hezuo yu heping* (*Coordination and Peace in East Asia*) (Taipei: Qianwei, 2014), pp 130-144.


the OC Movement is in sharp contrast with the mainstream views held throughout Chinese society.

This chapter aims to examine public opinion on the two civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan, with a focus on the former. Questionnaire surveys were conducted with Mainland Chinese citizens to evaluate the consciousness of democracy and the rule of law, and also to explore the gap between ordinary citizens and the weiquan (rights defence) sector. The article attempts to provide answers to some bewildering developments of democracy and liberalism under China’s authoritarianism, such as the passivity of a wider civil society towards democracy and the emergence of young elites who have been educated overseas, but who remain critical of the “western-style” democracy and liberalism. It also provides some perspective for the weiquan sector in Mainland China and the civil societies in Hong Kong and Taiwan, regarding the opportunities and obstacles they face in mobilizing wider public support for rights campaigns and democratic movements.

As some academics have justifiably pointed out, political consciousness is an abstract concept that is difficult to directly observe, often requiring multi-dimensional measurements. The OC Movement provides a valuable opportunity to probe the political consciousness of the public in contemporary China. The survey solicited the respondents of three types of Mainlanders as a means to differentiate and compare the attitudes among ordinary Chinese citizens: individuals who live in Mainland China, overseas Mainland Chinese (mostly students residing in Hong Kong), and the weiquan activists (who are either located in Mainland China or overseas). The survey was designed to answer the following questions:

1. How do Chinese citizens view the OC and Sunflower Movements? What is the gap between the consciousness of common citizens and the weiquan sector, and what is the difference between citizens in Mainland China and their counterparts overseas (particularly in Hong Kong)?

2. In the opinion of Chinese citizens, is there any difference between democracy and the rule of law? Does nationalism influence their opinions on the OC Movement, democracy and rule of law?

3. Does free access to information and media influence the opinions of Mainland Chinese towards social movements, democracy and the rule of law?

Data and Methods

Quantitative Data Collection Methods

Quantitative data was collected through a questionnaire survey, which was mainly conducted from January to April 2016. Collection began after the incidents surrounding the forced disappearance of five booksellers in Hong Kong, which were publicly reported both in Hong Kong and throughout Mainland China in January 2016. The survey questionnaire included asking about respondent’s views on this
incident along with the OC Movement, with the aim of evaluating the possible
differences between the opinions of Chinese citizens towards democracy and the rule
of law.

As stated above, the respondents were categorized as: (1) ordinary Chinese citizens
who reside in Mainland China (hereinafter “Mainland Chinese” or “Category 1”), (2)
Overseas Mainlanders, who were mostly university students residing in Hong Kong
(hereinafter “Overseas Mainlanders” or “Category 2”), and (3) Mainlanders involved
with weiquan activism, primarily rights advocacy lawyers and NGO activists
(hereinafter the “Weiquan sector”). The sample was selected by convenience and
strongly relied on snowball sampling. Table 1 shows the number of respondents in
the three categories. Among the 478 completed questionnaires, 441 were web-based8
while 37 were performed by hand (mainly collected in Hong Kong).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Mainland Chinese</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Overseas Mainlanders</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Mainlanders in Hong Kong</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mainly college students)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Mainlanders in Taiwan</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Mainlanders in Foreign Countries</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Weiquan sector</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>478</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The process of distributing and collecting questionnaires was in itself an interesting
field study, which to some extent reflected the political atmosphere in China and the
diversity of Chinese Mainlanders’ attitudes towards the survey’s “sensitive” issues.
During the direct distribution of 62 questionnaires, only one respondent openly
rejected the questionnaire due to disinterest and lack of knowledge in political issues,
and three potential participants did not respond. Many of the respondents joked that
they were risking their life to complete the questionnaire and might be invited “to
drink tea” (i.e., getting questioned by the authorities).9 A government official at the
county level claimed to have little knowledge about the incidents, consulted party-
state opinions on the issues, and filled in the questionnaire accordingly. An
unexpected response from many respondents indicated that the questionnaire was too
difficult, while a few said that throughout the survey, they realized their ignorance of
the events, and expressed interest in learning more about the relevant issues. These
responses partly explain why conducting surveys like these is such a sensitive issue
and largely forbidden in Mainland China, as the survey itself increases access to
information and might potentially change the understanding and opinion of the
respondents. The process of conducting the survey itself clearly demonstrated the

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8 The author first tried a widely-used survey website in Mainland China to distribute the questionnaire,
but it was deleted by the administrator immediately after it was sent to the first respondent. Then, the
author used SurveyMonkey, an electronic platform for collecting data, but it was too slow for those in
Mainland China who could not open the survey webpage, so the author had to use another survey
website based in Mainland China (jinshuju.net) to collect the data in private.

9 Online chatting records on file with the author.
following: sensitivity when discussing political issues; fear of disclosure and resultant self-censorship; apolitical and apathetic mentalities; the blocking of information; and also, the enthusiasm of a few Chinese individuals towards the issues surveyed. Each of these factors provided a glimpse into the political atmosphere and public consciousness within contemporary Chinese society.

**Limitations of Data Collection**

Due to issue sensitivity, the survey had to be privately conducted in a low-profile manner, and thus the questionnaires were first distributed among acquaintances based on personal relations through snowballing, which inevitably limited the number and type of respondents. Due to the lack of a public channel when conducting the survey some localities, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, are not covered. A large number of respondents have similar backgrounds to that of the author, particularly in terms of social status and age, which resulted in several major limitations.

1. A large number of respondents came from middle class urban areas, while only a few peasants and workers from rural areas participated. Although the data might not be sufficient enough to demonstrate the difference in the opinions regarding the different classes, the opinions of the middle class may serve as an important indicator since they have long been expected to be an important force for democratization and legal development in transitional countries. The survey results on the attitudes of Overseas Mainlander Chinese towards the OC Movement was mainly sampled from college students in Hong Kong, as many Hong Kong universities have been significantly involved in the movement. Since most Mainland students in Hong Kong are postgraduates, this strongly influenced the demographic distribution in terms of respondent education level (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1 Education and Income-Level of Respondents](image)

Similarly, 91.6% of the respondents were between 20–39 years old (Figure 2), which means a vast segment of the population (those 40+) is underrepresented in this survey. While certainly constraining the data, this significant limitation should not lead one to disregard the study’s results, given that younger citizens with a college education or higher are the political and economic elites in China, and their opinions could have far-reaching influence on the prospects of Chinese democracy. It should also be noted that the gender distribution of those surveyed was roughly equal (see Figure 3).

Figure 2 Age of Respondents

![Figure 2 Age of Respondents](chart1)

Figure 3 Gender of Respondents

![Figure 3 Gender of Respondents](chart2)

b. It is possible that many of the respondents who completed the questionnaire might be more knowledgeable of the two civil disobedience movements, as well more informed about political and social issues. Those who declined to complete the questionnaire might comprise part of the larger proportion of individuals who were afraid to do so, were apathetic or who strongly opposed the movements.

c. Another factor worth keeping in mind is that the survey was being conducted when the “Fish Ball” Incident\(^1\) took place in Hong Kong, which might have influenced the attitudes of Mainland Chinese towards social movements and rule of law in Hong Kong. Due to time limitations, the questionnaire did not solicit opinions on the “Fish Ball” Incident.

Official Media Reports on the OC and Sunflower Movements

Prior to discussing the survey’s findings, it is necessary to first briefly review the media coverage of the OC Movements in Mainland China for a general idea of how the state depicted this movement and the relevant issues.

The OC Movement, as well as the Sunflower Movement, occurred when the new central leadership led by President Xi Jinping (習近平) came forward and attempted to consolidate political power. Under the new central leadership, mass and social media have been subject to intensified monitoring,\(^2\) and the mainstream media has been more actively mobilized to propagate party ideology. Discussions over high-


profile events are increasingly strictly prohibited compared to previous periods. On the other hand, the state-controlled media now plays a far more active role in response to high-profile issues, and constantly takes the moral high ground to denounce opinions unfavorable to the state. It was under this media environment in which the OC and Sunflower Movements were framed and reported in Mainland China. The China Media Project of Hong Kong University tracked daily reports on the OC Movement in the Chinese media. According to their publicized databases and the media reports I collected, most mainstream media and online news websites such as Sohu, Sina and Tencent, only cited the news releases from the Xinhua News Agency or the People’s Daily, sources which serve as the most authoritative “mouthpiece” of the state. The Chinese-language Global Times (环球时报) is almost the only mainstream media outlet that published original reports or commentary articles on the OC and Sunflower Movements.

Based on the content analysis of the media reports, the media in Mainland China, generally speaking, formed an overarching anti-OC Movement frame. In sum, four distinct sub-frames were put forward, namely, the “hostile foreign forces” (境外敌对势力) frame, the disorder/instability frame, the illegal nature frame, and the pro-independence/nationalism frame; all were constructed by the mainstream media in China to extensively criticize the OC Movement. (1) “Hostile foreign forces”: used by the state to stigmatize the 1989 Tiananmen Square Movement. By using the same tactic, the official media also accused the OC Movement of being manipulated by “hostile foreign forces”. The “hostile foreign forces” were constantly labeled as the “black hand” when official media reported on the OC Movement. (2) Disorder/instability: this frame includes several sub-themes about the OC Movement, including a negative impact on the Hong Kong economy (as well as how the Hong Kong economy has lagged behind other Mainland Chinese cities and suffered as a result of the movement), the call by Hong Kong citizens to restore order, and the (supposed) chaos caused by the OC Movement.

14 E.g., see China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, Report on the 709 Crackdown (Hong Kong: China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, 2016).
18 E.g., “‘Occupy Central’ Has a Serious Adverse Effect on the Economic Livelihood of Hong Kong”, Shenzhen Dushibao (Shenzhen Metropolis Daily) (30 September 2014), A02.
20 E.g., “Occupy Central Severely Disturbs Social Orders in Hong Kong”, Shenzhen Dushibao (Shenzhen Metropolis Daily) (08 October 2014), A02.
(3) **Illegal nature frame.** The media reports accentuated how the OC Movement violated the law, and some reports focused on the legal measures taken by the Hong Kong government as to how they handled the event and targeted OC participants. The media also covered commentary articles written by legal professionals who strongly denounced the movement, while articles written by liberal intellectuals or others inclined to support the OC Movement were blocked in the official mass media and could only be accessed through social media, some of which disappeared soon afterwards.\(^{21}\)

(4) **Pro-independence/nationalism frame.** This depiction of the OC Movement is mainly constructed of two sub-themes: the emergence of a pro-Hong Kong independence movement, and comparing the current situation with colonial Hong Kong. News reports and commentaries indicated that Hong Kong locals never asked for democracy during the colonial period under British rule and now, after the 1997 handover, enjoy more democracy.\(^{22}\) The official media also highlighted how the central government and Mainland China have supported economic development in Hong Kong,\(^ {23}\) and emphasized the importance of tourists from Mainland China in contributing to the Hong Kong economy.\(^ {24}\)

On social media, such as the two most widely used—Sina Weibo (Chinese version of Twitter) and the “Wechat Moments” (微信朋友圈)—postings that documented what was happening at the sites of the OC Movement disappeared almost as quickly as they appeared (this also applied to any pro-OC Movement postings). The authorities even applied a technical measure to block postings by overseas Wechat users in the later stages of the OC Movement: Wechat users in the Mainland were blocked from getting access to the postings on “Wechat Moments” of their overseas friends, but this did not deter overseas users from uploading or reading postings on any other Wechat account.\(^ {25}\) According to the China Media Project, a search of “Hong Kong” on Weibo during the protests returned “mostly entertainment, finance and tourism related results, with odd scattered results including mention of the protests”.\(^ {26}\)

**Major Findings of the Survey**

**General Attitudes: Large gap between Weiquan sector and ordinary Mainlanders**

The statistical results echo the impression that Chinese Mainlanders, in general, are inclined to hold negative attitudes towards the OC Movement, in which an average of 53.7% (n=246) of Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlander respondents are

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\(^{21}\) E.g., “‘Occupy Central’ is not A Normal Way for Expression Freedom”, *Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily)* (2 October 2014), p 4; Zou Pingxue, “‘Occupy Central’ Severely Impairs the Rule of Law Tradition of Hong Kong in Three Aspects”, *Xinhuawang (Xinhuanet)* (3 October 2014), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/talking/2014-10/03/c_1112710063.htm; also see Mo (n 17 above).


\(^{25}\) Based on my personal experience and confirmation with other mainlanders living in Hong Kong. This measure is also mentioned in an online article that details how posts on Weixin are censored, see Qing Zijin, “Test: How Weixin Contents are Censored” (4 February 2015), available at https://papo-pao.net/article/357.

opposed or strongly opposed to the OC Movement. Unsurprisingly, this is in sharp contrast with the attitude of the Weiquan sector, as only two respondents were opposed to the OC Movement and 85% (n=17) supported the cause (including 50% with strong support). In contrast, only 11.8% (n=38) of Mainland Chinese and 19.3% (n=46) of the Overseas Mainlanders have a positive attitude towards the OC Movement (see Table 2 and Figure 4).

![Figure 4](image)

**Figure 4** Respondents general opinion of OC Movement (n=478)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Strongly support</th>
<th>Somewhat Support</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
<th>Somewhat Oppose</th>
<th>Strongly Oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mainland Chinese</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Overseas Mainlanders</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Weiquan Sector</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for the Sunflower Movement, all of the respondents in the three categories demonstrated even less knowledge or concern of that movement, compared to the OC Movement. As many as 77.1% (n=249) of the Mainland Chinese and nearly 66.7% (n=90) of the Overseas Mainlanders displayed indifference or had no idea about the Sunflower Movement, while only 25% (n=5) of the respondents from the Weiquan sector displayed indifference about the movement. Nevertheless, the pattern as regards support/opposition is largely similar to that of the OC Movement. In terms of the Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders, those with a negative attitude (15.8% (n=51) and 18.5% (n=25), respectively) still somewhat outnumbered the supporters. Only one respondent from the Weiquan sector was opposed to the Sunflower movement. A majority (70%) of the respondents from the Weiquan Sector tended to support the Sunflower Movement, but this is true for only 7.1% (n=23) of
Mainland Chinese and 14.9% (n=20) of Overseas Mainlanders (See Figure 5 and Table 3).

Figure 5 General Opinion of Respondents about Sunflower Movement (n = 478)

Table 3 Mainlanders’ General Attitudes towards the Sunflower Movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Strongly support</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Indifferent/ Don’t know</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Strongly Oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mainland Chinese</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>77.1%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Overseas Mainlanders</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>66.6%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Weiquan Sector</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No Significant Correlation between “Overseas Locality” and Attitude towards the OC Movement

The survey showed that there was no significant difference between the attitudes of Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders (P > .05). However there was a mild correlation between “overseas locality” and attitude towards the Sunflower Movement (P < .05). A possible reason for the difference might be that most of the Overseas Mainland Chinese living in Hong Kong directly felt the negative effects of the OC Movement, and were thus more inclined to oppose it; all the while supporting the Sunflower Movement, of which they did not feel any direct effects.

In addition to the insignificant difference between the attitudes of Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders towards the OC Movement, another indicator of the influence of locality is the significant correlation between the localities and whether the respondents think that the OC Movement was influenced by “foreign forces” (p=.001). Significantly less Overseas Mainlanders (39.3%, n=53) accept that there were “foreign forces” behind the OC Movement, compared to the beliefs of Mainland Chinese (55.1%, n=178) (see Figure 6).
To some extent this contrast indicates that the depiction of the influence of foreign forces on the OC Movement by state media had an effective impact in shaping the views of Mainland Chinese. The survey data also demonstrates that the Hong Kong media was the primary source of information for Overseas Mainlanders, who relied much less on the official mass media of Mainland China (only 14.8%, n=20). In contrast, official news reports were the primary source for Mainland Chinese respondents when accessing Hong Kong news. The media sources of the Weiquan sector also presented a striking contrast with Mainland Chinese, as their primary media source for overseas information was obtained by “climbing over the wall”, i.e., using private virtual networks/proxy servers to access the internet (see Table 4).

**Table 4 Top Three Media or information Sources for Respondents**

Category 1: Mainland Chinese (n = 323)

1. Social media: 53.6%
2. News websites*: 50.8%
3. Official mass media**: 34.7% (Official news***: 85.5%)

Category 2: Overseas Mainlanders (n = 135)

1. Hong Kong Media: 64.4%
2. Social Media: 54.1%
3. News websites: 28.1%

Category 3: Weiquan Sector (n = 20)

1. “Climb over the wall” for overseas news: 65%
2. Social media: 55%
3. Hong Kong media: 40%

* “News websites” refers to major Internet and commercial media, such as Sohu.com, Sina.com, and Tencent.com (see Question 19, Appendix Questionnaire), which are strictly monitored by the state.

** “Official mass media” refers to state-controlled mainstream media, such as The People’s Daily, China Central Television (CCTV), Global Times, and local newspapers (see Question 19, Appendix Questionnaire).

*** As mentioned, regarding the matter of Occupy Central, China’s news websites almost exclusively cited news releases from official sources; therefore, both news websites and the official mass media are classified as “official news” here.
Significant Correlation between Media Sources and Attitudes towards the OC Movement

Compared to the localities, there was a significant correlation between media sources and respondents’ attitudes towards the OC Movement (see Table 5 & 6).

1. Different Media Sources of Mainland Chinese Respondents (Category 1)

If media sources are categorized into three different groups, such as: 1) official news, 2) overseas information sources, and 3) social media, then supporters and opponents of the OC Movement in Mainland China relied on different resources for obtaining Hong Kong news (Table 6). Overseas information sources were the primary media source of Mainland Chinese respondents who held a more sympathetic view towards the OC Movement. In contrast, “official news”, which consists of news from the official PRC mass media and news websites, constituted the most important information source, along with social media, for Mainland Chinese respondents opposed to the OC Movement (see Table 5).

There was also a large gap between the use of “climbing-over-the-wall” software to gain overseas information between supporters and opponents of the OC Movement in Mainland China, as only 7.7% (n=19) of those opposed to the OC Movement did this for information, in contrast to the 50% (n=32) who supported the OC Movement (see Table 5).

2. Media Sources of Overseas Mainlanders (Category 2)

Table 7 shows that the major sources of obtaining HK information for Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders are significantly different, as over half of the latter relied on the Hong Kong media as their primary source, while most of former relied on news sources from within Mainland China.

Table 5 Primary Sources of HK Information: Supporters vs. Opponents in Mainland China
(Q 19: Please choose the three major media sources that you use to obtain Hong Kong news)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Official News</th>
<th>Overseas Information sources</th>
<th>Social Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Official Mass Media</td>
<td>News websites</td>
<td>Circumvent Firewall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponents</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 Chi-Square Correlations between Media Source and Attitude towards the OC Movement (excluding Weiquan Sector)(n=458)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude toward the OC movement</th>
<th>Official Mass Media</th>
<th>News Websites</th>
<th>Social Media</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Oppose</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Support</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among Overseas Mainlanders, there was also a significant correlation between media sources and attitude, as the 76.9% (n=20) who supported the OC Movement used the Hong Kong media as their primary source of information, in contrast to the 64.2% (n=43) who were opposed to the OC Movement. In terms of the latter, the official news sources in Mainland China remained one of their primary sources even if they were residing outside of China, while only 3.8% (n=1) of the Overseas Mainlanders who supported the OC Movement used the official mass media for information. In general, including other resources such as “climbing over the wall” and news from Hong Kong friends, overseas news was the dominant information source for Overseas Mainlanders who supported the OC Movement, along with social media (50.0%, n=13). In contrast, their reliance on official news from Mainland China was almost negligible. However, Overseas Mainlanders who opposed to the OC Movement relied almost the same on the three major sources for news on Hong Kong: official news from Mainland China (56.7%, n=38), Hong Kong media sources (64.2%, n=43), and social media (55.2%, n=37).

Further analysing the spectrum of Hong Kong media that Mainlanders accessed demonstrated no salient correlation between Hong Kong media and attitudes towards the OC Movement (P => .05). Nevertheless, few Mainlanders, even those opposed to the OC Movement, read the pro-establishment newspapers, such as the Takungpao (大公报) and Wenweipo (文汇报). In the neutral or liberal zone, such as the South China Morning Post (SCMP) and Apple Daily newspapers, the number of supporters was slightly higher than those who were opposed to the OC Movement (see Figure 7).

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27 Overseas mainlanders might also use a VPN to climb over the firewall when they return to Mainland China.
Figure 7 Hong Kong Media Sources Frequently Accessed by Mainlanders
(Q 20: which Hong Kong media source do you most frequently access?)

It is worth noting that both Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders who either supported or opposed the OC Movement strongly relied on social media for information, which explains why the Chinese government has further increased their control over these channels in recent years, particularly when high-profile events, such as the OC Movement, take place.

The findings contrast with a statement made by Andrew Nathan in the mid-1980s that media usage has little to do with political participation or political competence. It may be partly due to his sample and partly because of the more open public discussion over democracy and political reform during the 1980s. During that period, even the official print media openly discussed political reform and the information sources were not as diversified as those of contemporary China.

Negative Correlations between Perceptions of “Foreign Forces” and Attitudes towards OC

As previously mentioned, “foreign forces” were framed as the villain in interpreting the OC Movement, both by the official media in Mainland China as well as the leftist media in Hong Kong. The survey showed that 55.1% (n=178) of Mainland Chinese and 39.3% (n=53) of Overseas Mainlanders believed that the OC Movement was influenced by foreign forces, in contrast to the 20% (n=4) of the Weiquan sector. More importantly, respondents from the Weiquan sector do not necessarily consider foreign forces as a negative reason to oppose the OC Movement. Among the four respondents from the Weiquan sector who acknowledged the influence of “foreign forces”, none are opposed to the OC Movement. In contrast, for the other respondents there was a significant correlation between agreeing that “foreign forces” had an influence and overall attitude towards the OC Movement (p=.001). For other

participants, however, “foreign forces” were an important reason for opposing the OC Movement. Among the Overseas Mainlanders who believed that “foreign forces” had an effect, 79.2% (n=42) were opposed or strongly opposed to the OC Movement, while among Mainland Chinese, the percentage was almost the same (78.6%, n=140)(see Table 9).

The difference in attitudes vividly illustrates how differently the Weiquan sector and other Mainlanders perceive foreign factors. “Foreign forces” to the former might be a comrade or facilitator for causes and social movements, while for the latter, “foreign forces” are hostile to China (as propagandised by the state media).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8 Influence by Foreign Forces (n=478)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Q10: Do you think that the OC Movement was influenced by “foreign forces”?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very much</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Not much</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mainland Chinese</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Overseas Mainlanders</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Weiquan Sector</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table 9 Attitude of Respondents who Acknowledged Influence of “Foreign Forces” toward OC Movement (n=478) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly support</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Indifferent/Don’t know</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Strongly Oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mainland Chinese</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Overseas Mainlanders</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Weiquan Sector</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A Complicated Picture: Consciousness of Democracy vs. Rule of Law**

This survey demonstrated an interesting but complicated phenomenon: the consciousness of democracy and the rule of law of Chinese in Mainland China.

(1) Most mainlanders in general do not reject but are instead pragmatic about democracy, and in particular they are practical about the pro-democracy movements, which is consistent with previous findings.\(^{29}\) Rather than viewing democracy as an independent and desirable political ideal, most are more concerned with the ineffectiveness or impact that might be brought about by democracy and democratic movements.

First, for most ordinary Mainlanders, democracy itself can hardly stand alone as a desirable ideology which deserves to be pursued. These citizens also project their own thoughts onto Hong Kong locals: only a small proportion of mainlanders (most of them who support the OC Movement) believe that the OC Movement was caused by the desire of Hong Kong citizens for democracy, while most of them believe that current social and economic problems in Hong Kong were the primary reasons. This contrasts with findings on the motivations of Hong Kong locals who participated in the OC Movement. Empirical studies show that the demand for democracy was the primary reason for 87% of Hong Kong participants who took part in the OC Movement, while the other two major reasons were government apathy towards the demands of the protesters and the way that the police handled the event. Economic improvement is not given as an important reason for participating in the OC Movement.

Secondly, the survey found that few Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders are opposed to the OC Movement because they think that Hong Kong should not adopt a “western style democracy” (10.1%, n=18) Mainland Chinese and 9.5% (n=4) Overseas Mainlanders). The three highest ranked reasons for opposing to the OC Movement were mainly concerned with practical social and economic issues, including: the negative effect on social-economic development in Hong Kong (68.3%, n=168), deepening divisions within society (62.6%, n=154), and the overly radical strategy of Occupying Central (58.5%, n=144).

Thirdly, individuals who were opposed to the OC Movement did not necessarily oppose its agenda of universal suffrage. While 53.7% (n=246) of Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders were opposed to the OC Movement, only 29.5% (n=135) were opposed to its agenda of universal suffrage (see Figure 8). To some extent, this finding echoes a survey by Lianjiang Li, which showed that over 85% of the respondents agreed that, in principle, the township head should be popularly elected, and over 65% of the respondents agreed that the state chairman should be elected through ordinary democratic voting.

Figure 8 Comparison between Attitudes Toward the OC Movement and the Agenda of Universal Suffrage (excluding Weiquan sector)

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30 Yuen & Cheng (n 1 above).
31 Ibid.
Table 10  Attitudes Towards the OC Movement and the Agenda of Universal Suffrage 
(excluding Weiquan sector)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The OC Movement</th>
<th>The agenda of the OC: Universal Suffrage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support (incl. strongly support)</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose (incl. strongly oppose)</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A large proportion of the respondents are opposed to the OC Movement because they disagree with its radical actions, as opposed to its agenda. As Figure 9 shows, among the opponents of the OC Movement, less than half were opposed to universal suffrage, and 21.1% (n=52) even gave their approval. If respondents who were indifferent to universal suffrage or did not know what universal suffrage meant are excluded, the percentage who gave their approval is as high as 55.6%. Among those who were opposed to the OC Movement but agreed with universal suffrage, the highest-ranking reason for their opposition was the radical actions of the OC Movement (67.3%, n=35). Only seven of them were opposed to the OC Movement for the reasons that Hong Kong should not implement a western-style democracy (n=2) or that Hong Kong has enjoyed more democracy compared to its colonial period (n=5).

Figure 9 Attitude of OC opponents towards Universal Suffrage 
(Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders)

(2) There was a significant negative correlation between nationalism and attitude towards democracy and pro-democratic movements. As the analysis above indicated, there was a negative correlation between whether a respondent accepted “foreign forces” as the culprit behind the OC Movement and the attitude of respondents towards the OC Movement, as well as his/her perception of democracy.
There was a significant gap between the supporters and opponents of the OC Movement on whether they agreed that there were “foreign forces” involved, in which 74% (n=182) of those mainlanders who felt negatively towards the OC Movement believed that it was influenced by “foreign forces”, while this was the case for only 6.3% (n=4) of those who supported the OC Movement.

There was also a gap in the acceptance of the influence of “foreign forces” and “nationalism sentiment” between the Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders. While the majority of the former indicated that the involvement of the pro-independence forces in Hong Kong and foreign forces were reasons for opposing the OC Movement, less than half of the latter indicated these two factors as the primary reasons for opposing the OC Movement; and only 35.8% (n=24) of Overseas Mainlanders indicated that the involvement of the pro-independence forces in Hong Kong was a reason for their opposition, whereas this was a factor for 50.3% (n=90) of Mainland Chinese respondents (see Table 11).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11 Primary Reasons for Opposing the OC Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainland Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The rule of law is more valued than democracy, and while the ideal of democracy might be valued, pro-democratic movements are not.

Compared to the democratic movement, the respondents in general demonstrated a more supportive attitude towards the rule of law, as indicated by their different attitudes towards the OC Movement and the Lee Bo incident.33 If the respondents

33 Five staff of a causeway bookstore in Hong Kong were reportedly “forced to disappear” in early 2016 for planning to publish a book on President Xi Jinping’s private life. They were later found to be detained in Mainland China since October 2015. One bookseller named Lee Bo was last seen in Hong Kong and later found to have crossed the Chinese border without travel documents. Lee’s disappearance and the detention of the five booksellers caused widespread concern that the Chinese
who were did not know about the Lee Bo incident are excluded, the percentage who
were opposed to the arrest of Lee Bo is as high as 58.6% (n=143). Violation of the
law and the “one country two systems” policy were the highest ranking reasons for
opposing the arrest of the five booksellers, although the official media has also
portrayed the Lee Bo incident to involve “foreign forces”.34 Even among those who
were opposed to the OC Movement, 41.2% (n=49) were still opposed to the arrest of
Lee Bo (not including those who were indifferent or did not know about the Lee Bo
incident). Among the respondents who supported the arrest of Lee Bo, only 8.1%
(n=5) believed that there was involvement of foreign forces, and 40.3% (n=25) felt
that Mainland Chinese authorities handled the case according to the law.

As discussed above, the survey demonstrated that even those opposed to the OC
Movement did not necessarily reject the idea of true democratic elections. Forty-six
of the respondents were opposed to the OC Movement but agreed on its agenda of
universal suffrage, and their primary reasons for opposing the movement were social
and economic concerns, rather than anti-democratic concerns. This demonstrates that,
like many Hong Kong locals, a substantial proportion of Mainland Chinese were also
opposed to the strategies utilized by the OC Movement, instead of its agenda for
democracy.35

Conclusion: Generalisation of Findings and Implications

Gap between Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders

There are often discussions about the phenomenon in which overseas young Chinese
elites return to China only to hold nationalistic and negative attitudes towards liberal
democracies.36 This survey demonstrates that overseas experience has a certain degree
of correlation with attitudes towards democracy and democratic movements, although
the impact did not reach statistical significance. Nevertheless, Overseas Mainlander
Chinese in this study were less influenced by the framing of “foreign forces” by
Chinese state propaganda outlets, a finding which was largely attributed to the local
media and information overseas that they were able to access. However there was
almost no difference between the Overseas Mainlanders who still strongly relied on
official news sources from the Mainland, with their counterparts living in Mainland
China. This finding indirectly demonstrates the effect of state propaganda controlled
by Chinese authorities.

Effectiveness of State Propaganda on Shaping Public Consciousness in Mainland
China

34 See "Timeline: Hong Kong’s Missing Bookseller and What We Know So Far", South China Morning Post
timeline-hong-kongs-missing-booksellers-and-what-we-know-so.
35 According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Public Opinion Programme of the University of
Hong Kong in April 2013, 35 per cent Hong Kong respondents opposed the electoral reform proposal
backed by Beijing, while only 25 per cent supported the OC Movement. The result of the poll is
36 See Rowena Xiaoqing He, “Identifying with a ‘Rising China’? Overseas Chinese Student
Nationalism,” in Edward Vickers and Krishna Kumar (ed.), Constructing Modern Asian Citizenship
State propaganda has been effective in shaping the opinions of Chinese citizens towards high-profile events, including public consciousness as regards social movements and democracy. The use of “foreign forces” and “nationalism sentiments” to frame these events as constructed by the official media has been successful, particularly within Mainland China. The state-led nationalism frame in the case of the OC Movement, as well as the Sunflower Movement, fits with what Comaroff and Stern described as the “out-ward-directed sentiments that heap hostility upon others”, and such outward-directed nationalism has had an obvious negative correlation with Chinese people’s opinions on pro-democracy campaigning in Hong Kong.

Nevertheless, the survey also demonstrates good possibilities that access to different information sources may change individual opinions and help counteract state propaganda. However, the slight difference in the attitudes between Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders, and the salient differences between the respondents who have access to different information sources, demonstrate that it is not the locality that is crucial, but whether initiative is taken to obtain information on those matters. As a Chinese intellectual Zhou Lian pointed out,

“Except for the two different kinds of futures predicted by Orwell and Huxley, there might be a third possibility that: on the one hand people are forbidden to read while on the other hand they automatically stop reading any more; on the one hand they are deprived of obtaining information, on the other hand they are flooded by the sea of garbage information; on the one hand the truth is concealed while on the other hand the truth is being submerged…”

Positive and Negative Sides of Chinese Consciousness toward Democracy and the Rule of Law

The survey accentuates the dichotomy between the consciousness of democracy and the rule of law. On the positive side, few Chinese are opposed to the idea of democracy. Many respondents opposed to the OC Movement did not oppose universal suffrage, and few believed that Hong Kong should not implement a “western-style democracy.” Most of the respondents were opposed to the OC Movement because they felt that it had negative social and economic repercussions. Moreover, a relatively high rate of opposition to the Lee Bo incident demonstrates that Chinese citizens place high value on the rule of law. It appears here that nationalism is much less effective in impacting views regarding the rule of law. Nevertheless, the negative correlation between attitudes towards the rule of law and democracy casts doubt over what Pei Minxin states: that rights consciousness has become a crucial driver of “democratic resistance”. It seems that for most ordinary Chinese citizens, there is no connection between democracy and a guarantee of the rule of law and individual rights.

For those who are keen to see a democratic transition for China, the findings of this research also provides a gloomy side to the public consciousness of democracy.

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and political movements. The survey demonstrates that the views of democracy for
Chinese people remain quite pragmatic and utilitarian. For the large number of
Mainlander respondents in this study, the value of democracy is weighed against other
values and elements, such as social welfare and economic development.

This study accentuates that besides nationalism, pragmatism is another important
factor that negatively correlates with Chinese citizens’ opinions of democratic
movements and democracy. Social and economic stability and development are the
principle standards for ordinary Chinese citizens in evaluating democratic movements
and democracy, even though some of them approve of democratic arrangements, such
as universal suffrage. To a certain extent, the findings echo Havel’s argument that the
post-totalitarian system is built on “foundations laid by the historical encounter
between dictatorship and the consumer society”. The willingness of ordinary
Chinese citizens to surrender higher values when faced with material certainties also
probably contributed to the adaptability of the authoritarian system in China.

**Implications for the Weiquan Sector and Civil Societies in Hong Kong and Taiwan**

With regard to the consciousness of democracy and the rule of law, the gap between
the consciousness of the Weiquan sector and ordinary Chinese citizens was,
unsurprisingly, strikingly large. The ordinary Chinese middle-class people might be
called “realists”, while the members of Weiquan sector are probably the rare but
active idealists in Chinese society. Under nationalism sentiments, the tension between
Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong societies has intensified during and after the OC
Movement. In contrast, the Weiquan sector, along with a small proportion of
ordinary citizens, share the same pro-democracy stance as the participants in the OC
Movement. The crackdown on China’s weiquan sector before and after the OC
Movement has further driven weiquan activists to the social movement sector (SMS)
in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Since they are facing the same “common authoritarian
enemy”, the SMS and rights activism groups in the three regions have increasingly
interacted with each other.

In the face of increasing aggressiveness from the Chinese party-state, the coalitions
among civil societies in the three regions are important forces for resisting the
influence and infiltration of authoritarianism in the three regions. As Andrew Nathan
pointed out, there has been an increasingly negative impact of China’s
authoritarianism on global democratization, so it is unsurprising that Hong Kong
and Taiwan, two neighbours of Mainland China, feel the most direct influence of its
power. The rights advocacy sector of the civil society, regardless whether it is in
Mainland China or Hong Kong or Taiwan, comprises the crucial players for resisting
the expansion of authoritarian power.

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40 See Vaclav Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” in Vaclav Havel et al. (eds.), The Power of the
41 Generally see Nathan (n 29 above).
42 Ibid, p 15.
43 See Lily Kuo, “The Uglier Side of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement Pits Chinese against Chinese”,
umbrella-movement-pits-chinese-against-chinese/; also see Public Opinion Programme of the
University of Hong Kong, “HKU POP Release Latest Survey on Hong Kong People’s Ethnic Identity”
44 See Hung Ho-fung & Iam-chong Ip, “Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement and the Making of
China’s Offshore Civil Society” (2012) 3 Asian Survey 504.
46 As Jiunn Rong Yeh also pointed out, the primary underlying issue of the Sunflower Movement was
the increased engagement across the Taiwan Strait, and that “the transformation to civic
constitutionalism in the light of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement bears tremendous significance … to
However, the mobilization of a wider sector of civil society in Mainland China has long been a vital but difficult issue for activists. This is now also a problem for the civil societies in Hong Kong and Taiwan which they need to take into consideration when discussing the promotion of democracy in the two regions, and which is inevitably associated with the development of law and democracy in Mainland China. Improving democratic consciousness and counteracting state propaganda are still challenging tasks for the Weiquan sector in contemporary China. In fact, this study shows that the prospect of mobilizing support for legal development seems to be more promising in current Chinese society.

It is hoped that this study helps to enrich current understanding regarding the public consciousness of democracy and the rule of law in contemporary China. More importantly, this study may also evoke discussions on the development of democracy in Hong Kong and Taiwan into a larger context that incorporates ordinary Chinese citizens and the Weiquan sector in Chinese civil society. Ultimately, the public consciousness of democracy and law is vital to the trajectory of democracy and rule of law in Mainland China, which inevitably influences events in Hong Kong and Taiwan. After all, “nothing is stronger than an idea whose time has come”.47


Appendix Questionnaire (Originally supplied in Chinese to all participants)

1. Do you know about the OC movement?
   □ very well   □ somewhat   □ not much   □ not at all

2. Do you know about the universal suffrage and political reform in Hong Kong?
   □ very well   □ somewhat   □ not much   □ not at all

3. Please choose the members of the “Occupy Central Trio” (choose 1 to 3 individuals):
   □ Jasper Tsang Yok-sing (曾鈺成)   □ Benny Tai Yiu-ting (戴耀廷)
   □ Leung Chun-ying (梁振英)   □ Eric Tat Ming Cheung (张达明)
   □ Chan Kin Man (陈健民)   □ Joshua Wong (黄之锋)
   □ Chu Yiu-ming (朱耀明)   □ Raymond Wong Yuk-man (黄毓民)
   □ Leung Kwok-hung (梁国雄)   □ Jimmy Lai Chee-ying (黎智英)
   □ Don’t know

4. Do you know about the white paper on Hong Kong issues released by the State Council in 2014?
   □ very well   □ somewhat   □ not much   □ not at all

5. How do you feel about the OC movement?
   □ Strongly support (please go to Q7)
   □ Support (please go to Q7)
   □ Neutral (please go to Q7)
   □ Oppose (please go to Q6)
   □ Strongly oppose (please go to Q6)
   □ Don’t know (please go to Q7)

6. Main reasons for opposing the Occupy Central movement:
   □ No need to implement Western-style democratic election
   □ Hong Kong already enjoys enough democracy and freedom compared to its colonial period
   □ Involvement of pro-independence forces in Hong Kong
   □ Impairs economic and social development in Hong Kong
   □ Deepens social division
   □ The strategy of occupying central is too radical
   □ Involvement of overseas forces
   □ Other

7. Do you agree with the demands of the Occupy Central movement, i.e., to implement genuine universal suffrage so that candidates from the establishment or the pan-democratic campaigns can run for elections?
   □ Strongly agree   □ agree   □ indifferent   □ oppose   □ strongly oppose
8. Do you agree that the Hong Kong police should have fired tear gas to disperse the Occupy Central participants?
☐ strongly agree ☐ agree ☐ neutral ☐ oppose ☐ strongly oppose
☐ don’t know about the event

9. Do you agree that the Occupy Central impairs the rule of law in Hong Kong?
☐ Strongly agree ☐ agree ☐ neutral ☐ oppose ☐ don’t know

10. Do you think that the Occupy Central was influenced by “foreign forces”?
☐ very much ☐ somewhat influenced ☐ neutral ☐ not much ☐ not at all

11. What do you think are the reasons for the occurrence of the Occupy Central movement?
☐ Political ideals of Hong Kong locals in their pursuit for democracy and freedom
☐ Dysfunction of Hong Kong political system and governance
☐ Dissatisfaction of Hong Kong locals with economic and social development
☐ Dissatisfaction of Hong Kong locals about the increasingly reduced cultural/social/economic gap between Hong Kong and Mainland
☐ Influence by foreign forces
☐ Influence by pro-independence force in Hong Kong
☐ Influence by colonial culture
☐ Don’t know
☐ Other

12. How many times have you been to the site of the Occupy Central movement?
☐ 0 ☐ 1–2 ☐ > 2 ☐ Refuse to answer

13. Do you know about the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan?
☐ very much ☐ somewhat ☐ not much ☐ not at all

14. Do you agree with the Sunflower Movement:
☐ Strongly agree (please to Q16)
☐ Agree (please go to Q16)
☐ Indifferent (please go to Q16)
☐ Oppose (please to Q15)
☐ Strongly oppose (please go to Q15)
☐ Don’t know (please go to Q16)

15. Reasons for Opposing the Sunflower Movement:
☐ Violates the Constitution and rule of law
☐ Influenced by pro-independence ideologies in Taiwan
☐ Unwise to oppose trade treaty
☐ Shouldn’t occupy the Legislation Yuan and the Executive Yuan
☐ Don’t know
☐ Other

16. Do you know about the “disappearance” of Hong Kong bookseller Lee Bo and others?
☐ very well ☐ somewhat ☐ not much ☐ not at all

17. Do you agree with the coercive measures that the authorities took towards Lee Bo and others?
☐ strongly agree ☐ agree ☐ indifferent ☐ oppose ☐ strongly oppose
☐ don’t know

18. What is your opinion on the disappearance of Lee Bo and four other booksellers?
☐ Violates the rule of law principle
☐ Violates “One Country-Two Systems” principle
☐ Mainland authorities handled the case according to the law
☐ Lee Bo and others were punished for their own wrong doings
☐ Involvement of foreign forces
☐ Don’t know
☐ Other

19. Please choose the three major media sources that you used to obtain Hong Kong news:
☐ Official mass media in Mainland China (e.g., CCTV, Global Times and local newspapers) (please go to Q21)
☐ News websites (e.g., Sina.com and Tecent.com) (please go to Q21)
☐ Social media (e.g., Weibo & Weixin) (please go to Q21)
☐ Hong Kong media (please to Q20)
☐ Climb over the wall to gain access to overseas media (please go to Q21)
☐ Information from friends in Hong Kong (please go to Q21)
☐ Other (please go to Q21)

20. Which Hong Kong Media source do you most frequently access? (please select 1-3 responses):
☐ Mingpao
☐ Takungpao
☐ Apple Daily
☐ Wenweipo
☐ Oriental Daily
☐ TVB
☐ South China Morning Post
☐☐Online Media
☐☐Free newspapers
☐☐Other

21. Your gender:
22. Your age:
23. Your education:
24. Your monthly income:
25. Your place of residence:
26. Number of times that you have visited Hong Kong/length of period of stay in Hong Kong:
27. Your occupation in Hong Kong/Mainland China: