Situation Chinese Architecture within “A Century of Progress”: The Chinese Pavilion, the Bendix Golden Temple, and the 1933 Chicago World’s Fair

Long considered a notable event in American modern architectural history, the 1933 Chicago World’s Fair should also be remembered as a consequential, if unexplored, episode in Republican China’s tentative embrace of modern architecture. Organized in response to concerns over the applicability of European-originated design innovations in the United States, the primary objective of the Chicago World’s Fair was both to redefine and to promote a new modern architectural idiom “not only in America but in the world at large.” For the young Chinese nation, founded in January 1912, after the fall of the Qing dynasty, as well as its ruling Guomindang (GMD) party, which gained political control over China in 1927, the exposition seemed to offer much more: namely, an invaluable opportunity to present China to an international audience as a modern nation-state equal to other countries of the world. Roughly three years after accepting an invitation to participate in the fair, however, China, then struggling to resist Japanese occupation and hampered by its increasingly fragmented political leadership, withdrew its official commitment to the fair and found itself represented by two nongovernmentally funded structures. One was a hastily constructed Chinese courtyard-style pavilion financed by a group of Shanghai businessmen and designed through the collaborative efforts of an American and a Chinese architect. The other was a piece-by-piece reconstruction of an eighteenth-century Tibetan Buddhist shrine, the Golden Temple of Jehol, sponsored by the Chicago industrialist Vincent Bendix (Figures 1 and 2). Neither building has received any critical scholarly attention. The history of China’s unofficial architectural representation in Chicago, however, remains compelling for several reasons.

International expositions figured as important factors in shaping Chinese conceptualizations of internationalism relative to its own modern architectural representation over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Translated as wanguo bolanhui, or “ten thousand nations’ exhibitions,” such events connoted a kind of coerced multilateral engagement that, like the country’s forced opening to foreign commercial expansion in 1842, was construed to constitute the origins of Chinese modernization and the country’s own modern approach to architectural development. Although Qing China was officially involved in at least twenty-five international exhibitions between 1867 and 1904, responsibility for the design and content selection of China’s displays fell to a handful of foreign officials employed by the country’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service based in Shanghai. The result was an accumulation of architecture, images, and objects selected by expatriates that reinforced
foreign impressions of “China” as precious, fragile, and hopelessly antiquated, while obscuring the dramatic industrial, political, and social transformations roiling the country at the time. Nevertheless, it was through participation in such events that Chinese observers began to understand how architecture was used by Euro-American nations to determine a country’s “level of civilization” in the construction of what Rebecca Karl has described as the “structured totality” of a Western-centric modern world.¹

The Republican government’s decision to participate in San Francisco’s 1915 Panama-Pacific International Exhibition signaled its sensitivity to the symbolic forms of engagement required of modern statehood. The Chinese pavilion grounds, which were anchored by a simplified, scaled replica
of the Forbidden City’s Hall of Supreme Harmony flanked by two teahouses for public concessions, were met with a mixed international response (Figure 3). At least one Western editorial applauded the “modern” and “democratic” decision made by the Chinese government in reappropriating one of the Qing dynasty’s most sacred political monuments for the purposes of widespread public consumption. Chinese American observers, by contrast, found the display “extremely inferior” and “shameful” and its workmanship, undertaken by Chinese carpenters sent to San Francisco for the occasion, “entirely insufficient to represent China’s progress.” Such equivocality portended the Republican government’s challenges in rendering new, national aspirations legible to an international audience. China’s acculturation vis-à-vis modern, globally resonant architectural expression subsequently registered in its state-supported Beaux-Arts-inspired domestic building and planning program instituted over the course of the Republican government’s most stable period of rule, an era generally known as the Nanjing decade (1927–37). In major GMD-controlled cities, such as Guangzhou, Shanghai, and the country’s new capital, Nanjing, government officials, a handful of well-respected foreign advisers, and several of China’s first foreign-trained architects, many of whom studied École des Beaux-Arts-guided curricula in the United States and Europe, collectively began to promote the intertwining of Western design principles and new building materials with imperial-era ornamental motifs and compositional strategies such as ceremonial axes, decorative bracket sets, and sloping roof structures in the construction of political and cultural monuments described at the time as both modern and distinctively Chinese (Figure 4). Their collective identification at the time as “modern” Chinese architecture was derived not merely from the universal legibility of their forms or the new materials employed in their...
construction but, as Lai Delin has observed, from their status as international projects realized through the country’s first globally publicized competitions, which in themselves symbolized the Republican government’s continued efforts to achieve universal recognition as a modern nation-state.8

China’s involvement in the Chicago World’s Fair spanned a period between 1931 and 1934, when Chinese impressions of modern architecture, and, by extension, international architecture, began to change. One widely recognized catalyst was the 1933 arrival in Shanghai of news of a seminal Museum of Modern Art exhibition in New York. “The International Style,” alternatively translated as wanguo shi (“ten thousand nations’ style”) or guoji shi (“international style”), helped bring the collective attention of China’s architectural community to the idea of architecture without historical or traditional precedent.9 The Chicago World’s Fair also needs to be seen as playing an equally critical role in shaping subsequent Chinese reaction to the new style, its foreign origins, and its impact upon China’s sense of architectural autonomy, particularly given the ideological milieu of Republican China. Understanding the Chinese experience at Chicago as an influential intersection between early twentieth-century Chinese architectural discourse, the modern movement, and international exhibitionary paradigms complicates conventional narratives of the Republican government’s official building program and its resolute focus upon domestic Beaux-Arts-inspired architectural expression.10

The realization of a pair of Chinese structures ostensibly designed and temporarily constructed on foreign soil by professional Chinese architects and craftsmen for a predominantly American audience suggests the presence of a different and more complex transnational vector in China’s architectural history. The circumstances by which China was eventually represented at the fair raises important questions concerning the rhetoric of authenticity and modern Chinese architecture, the role played by international architectural exchange in this relationship, the political and technological mechanisms through which such interchanges often operate, and the range of cultural and national anxieties these vectors tend to effect. Examination of the unofficial Chinese pavilion together with the Bendix Golden Temple illuminates a transitional moment in the country’s approach to modern architecture in relation to the formation of a modern Chinese nation-state and its cultural self-representation.

The Bendix Golden Temple

The 1933 Chicago World’s Fair became a venue for its American organizers to promote their nation’s own version of “modern” architecture to counter European cultural dominance and the formidable avant-garde precedents established by expositions in Europe, such as the 1925 Exposition des Arts Décoratifs in Paris as well as the recently concluded 1929 Barcelona International Exposition.11 Promotional literature promised that Chicago would “show the world not what has happened in the past … but what is being done in the present, and what may happen in the future,” while internal fair correspondence clarified that, although each of the event’s major thematic pavilions would be designed by its architectural committee using the latest structural and technological advancements, use of the term “modern” as it pertained to the individual national pavilions was based not necessarily on modern architectural trends of the time, per se, but on broader notions of commercial and industrial progress relative to past world’s fairs.12 Foreign participants were assured that Chicago’s architectural committee would not “tell our friends representing other governments what their exhibitions shall be”; rather, they were instead encouraged to create an “attractive” display with information concerning “the manner in which other people live and meet the daily problems of existence.”13

Radical experimentation with a modern architecture unburdened by the past presented an aesthetic and political challenge to the Republican Chinese government’s preexisting public building program. However, Chicago’s inclusive, broadly progressive theme resonated with Republican officials’ eagerness to promote the country’s political and economic development abroad. In weighing their decision to participate, GMD representatives noted the “great difference” between previous fairs and the Chicago exhibition’s stated goal to “[bring] about a world at peace, in good order, in full international co-operation for the advancement of knowledge and the promotion of trade and industry … without any nationality, being opened, as it were, by the world and for the world.”14 That the Beaux-Arts-trained Paul Philippe Cret (1876–1945), a patriarchal figure in the education of many of China’s young architectural elite at the University of Pennsylvania and published skeptic of what he termed “the so-called ‘modernist trend,’ ” was named the fair’s architectural committee chair also likely eased any lingering apprehension on the part of Chinese representatives concerning their country’s ability to meet the fair’s architectural requirements.15

Just over four months after China agreed to participate, however, Japan invaded Manchuria on 18 September 1931.16 Despite the series of political and diplomatic crises triggered by the event, China’s State Council declared in December the nation’s intention to attend the fair in Chicago, appropriating $62,000 for any costs incurred therein.17 This support was followed by renewed Sino-Japanese armed conflict
outside Shanghai in January 1932 and Japan’s establishment of the independent Republic of Manchukuo that March, prompting doubt among fair organizers as to whether war would hinder China’s logistical ability to organize and finance its own pavilion.

American fair organizers subsequently began to explore the possibility of an alternatively funded Chinese pavilion capable of eliciting tacit Republican government approval. In February 1932, fair trustees accepted the offer of Vincent Bendix, a well-known Chicago industrialist and fellow trustee, to include in the exhibition his own recently acquired Bendix Golden Temple, a replica of the Wanfaguiyi Hall of Jehol originally constructed between 1767 and 1771 at the request of the Emperor Qianlong, northeast of Beijing in the former Qing summer retreat of Chengde (Figures 5, 6, and 7). Nestled within the thick outer walls of Chengde’s Putuozongcheng Temple complex and obscured from outsiders, the original pavilion formed part of a larger, reimagined construction of the Potala Palace in Tibet. Although the buildings were commissioned on the occasion of the Qianlong emperor’s sixtieth and his mother’s eightieth birthday, their completion also coincided with the return of the Torgut tribe to Qing China from the Volga River valley. The complex’s ostensibly Tibetan façade masks a basic Han Chinese–style temple layout comprising a central organizing axis anchored by the Wanfaguiyi Hall. Such cross-cultural synthesis, as both Anne Chayet and Patricia Berger have noted, aimed at encapsulating the expansive scope and rich diversity of the Qing imperial domain. In Chicago, the temple would emerge temporarily as China’s lone, de facto architectural entry, filling the void left by the Republican government’s still tentative commitment and exposing the range of curatorial, financial, and geopolitical obstacles to China’s efforts to represent itself as well as the lack of consensus, both within China and abroad, as to what constituted a modern yet Chinese architectural aesthetic.

Bendix’s interest in the temple had initially been sparked in the summer of 1929 by Dr. Sven Hedin, the world-renowned Swedish explorer, geographer, and Sinologist, who had sought out the wealthy Swedish American businessman in the hope that he might be willing to fund an expedition to purchase a Buddhist temple in China and reconstruct it on foreign soil. Believing China’s Tibetan Buddhist heritage was at particular risk of “total extinction” in the face of growing Chinese political instability, Hedin eventually persuaded Bendix to bankroll the acquisition of two temples as well as a varied collection of Lamaistic objects to be displayed within them, one of which would be constructed in Stockholm and the other in Chicago’s Lincoln Park.

Following Hedin’s return to Beijing that November, however, negotiations concerning the potential search for and purchase of temples proved difficult, particularly given increasingly fractured relations between Chiang Kai-shek, commander in chief of the National Revolutionary Army, and other regional leaders. The delay forced Hedin to reconsider the cultural and political ramifications of the project, and it was ultimately decided to commission two replicas of the Golden Temple in Chengde, the logistics of

Figure 5  Putuozongcheng Temple, Chengde, 1767–71; the Wanfaguiyi Hall’s roof can be seen extending just beyond the top of the uppermost part of the complex (Sven Hedin Foundation, Museum of Ethnography, Stockholm, Sweden).
Figure 6 Putuozongcheng Temple and Wanfaguixi Hall, elevational section (George Staunton et al., An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China, 1799; University of Hong Kong Libraries).
which would be overseen by Liang Weihua, a Chinese architect who had worked with the German-born architect Conrad Anner on the recently completed National Library in Beijing. Hedin and his team, comprising Liang as well as the Swedish ethnographer Montell Gosta, eventually arrived in Chengde in June 1930. There they found the temple in significant disrepair and reportedly in imminent risk of collapse. The complexities involved in producing two reproductions quickly proved too challenging, and during the winter of 1930–31, seventy workmen in Beijing set about measuring and cutting the various components for one replica, which was eventually shipped to Chicago in March 1931.

First documented and drawn by George Staunton as part of the 1793 expedition of the first British envoy to China, George Macartney, both the original structure and its replica consist of roughly 28,000 individual components, measure 70 feet wide and 60 feet high, and sit atop an approximately 4-foot-high stone terrace. The symmetrical square floor plan is bound by twenty-eight round columns that support the lower section of its double-hipped roof; twenty columns are embedded in the structure’s exterior wall, with twelve columns, each 36 feet high, supporting its upper roof, which is covered with 25,000 gold-gilded copper tiles. Reconstruction plans in Chicago stalled for one year before discussions between fair officials and Bendix led to the replica’s eventual completion at the World’s Fair in September 1932 just south of Soldier Field by a team of Chinese laborers and American contractors led by Guo Yuanxi (1904–2005), a young Chinese-born, American-educated architect, and the fair’s chief construction supervisor, Donald Boothby (Figure 8).

The Temple in Chicago
In some respects, the Wanfaguiyi Hall’s replication and reconstruction amid Chinese uncertainty with respect to its official participation mirrored the dynamics of China’s earlier exhibition experiences, whereby key curatorial decisions concerning China’s artistic and architectural displays had been made by Qing-appointed foreign representatives. As at prior fairs, China seemed to find itself again relegated to a culturally and technologically subordinate status as an antiquated, Orientalized spectacle in relation to the “modern representational order” on display at Chicago. The irony of the Bendix Golden Temple’s status as a copy of a Qing replica of Tibetan Buddhist architecture did not register among fair officials, who instead sought to marry public demand for the raw exoticism of past fairs with the fair’s own pseudoscientific message of technological advancement by promoting the building as an authentic and precise example of architectural mimicry. The structure was immediately
lauded by the American press as an “exact replica” of the Lama Temple, “a perfect example of the finest in Chinese art,” and a classic example of “Lama Chinese architecture.” Indeed, the Bendix Golden Temple represented the most accurate Chinese architectural reproduction yet attempted on foreign soil. Still, the acclaim belied an inevitable series of ornamental and material inconsistencies that arose not only between the original and the copy but also between the copy’s interior and its exterior. The decision to wire the Chicago replica for electric lighting, for example, drastically diminished the phenomenological impact Hedin had described as the “mystic gloom through which rise the twelve tall columns that support the upper roof.” Yet artificial lighting was deemed necessary to highlight the temple’s interior display, which was festooned with an assorted collection of objects procured by Hedin: sculpture, furniture, textiles, a temple bell, and a prayer wheel, all artfully arranged around a representation of the bodhisattva Guanyin (Figure 9). Beyond fulfilling American imaginings of China’s architectural essence, increasing slippage in the terminology used by the fair’s promotional literature, which alternately described the Golden Temple as both a temple and a pavilion constructed by “the Chinese,” confused facts concerning who was responsible for the building’s construction while tacitly promoting the building as an adequate stand-in for China in the absence of the country’s official involvement. This differentiated the building from the exposition’s other ostensibly ethnic and culturally themed international attractions, including an “Old English” village, a Belgian village, an exhibit titled the “Streets of Paris,” the “Old Heidelberg Inn,”

Figure 9 Interior, Bendix Golden Temple, Chicago, 1933 (Allen D. Albert, Official View Book: A Century of Progress Exposition [Chicago: Reuben H. Donnelley Corporation, 1933]).
an “Oriental” village, as well as a replica of a Mayan Temple, in which there existed clear distinctions in display content and program as compared to their equivalent national pavilions.30 The misidentification of the Golden Temple as a pavilion featured in an international event devoted to modern industrial and technological progress, by contrast, implied a lack of architectural or cultural achievement in China since the eighteenth century while accentuating “the ultra-modern buildings” emblematic of America’s growing international technological hegemony (Figure 10).31

At the same time, key distinctions help to reposition the Golden Temple as a product, if not necessarily of a fundamentally new power dynamic at work in Chinese international architectural engagement, then of new shifts in the degree and nature of Chinese participation. The manner by which the Golden Temple was identified, measured, documented, and eventually reconstructed in Chicago, for example, represented an unparalleled undertaking with respect to Qing architectural form, and an endeavor whose exacting attention to detail went far beyond the impressionistic constructions attempted at earlier world’s fairs. In its careful, empirical attention to the original building’s tectonic and spatial dimensions, the Bendix reconstruction constituted a new, more ambitious reengagement with Chinese architectural

Figure 10 Nash automobile advertisement featuring the Bendix Golden Temple, 1933 (Saturday Evening Post, 25 Mar. 1933; Widener Library, Harvard College Library, P338.7F [V. 205, 1933]).
history than ever before undertaken. The involvement of Chinese observers such as Guo brought Chinese attention to the ways in which notions of authenticity shaped foreign impressions of China and their implications for Chinese architectural development in relation to Republican China.

As heralded by the emergent architectural debate at home with respect to the modern movement, the nascent Chinese nation-state, and mounting geopolitical challenges to its existence, most notably from Japan. In August 1932, Japan confirmed its fair participation, despite hesitation to commit to an exhibition organized in the United States, then the most vocal critic of Japanese imperialist strategy in Manchuria. In February 1933, despite condemnation from the League of Nations, Japan expanded its military presence into Jehol (Rehe) province, site of the original Wanfuguiyi Hall and less than 62 miles from Beijing. In Chicago, any mutual mistrust between Japan's government representatives and fair officials was mollified by the eventual positioning of the Japanese pavilion within close proximity to the Bendix Temple, based upon the felt sense among American organizers of “aesthetic harmony” struck by the two buildings (Figure 11). The decision prompted protest by Chinese officials, who pointed out that China's weakened position in relation to Japan would only be emphasized by the Japanese pavilion's adjacency to the Golden Temple.

Details surfaced of an official Japanese pavilion that would resemble a Japanese village, around which would be grouped a theater, restaurants, and a teahouse employing “geisha girls” (Figure 12). There were also rumors of a purported South Manchurian Railway display within the Japanese pavilion, though fair president Rufus Dawes reassured Chinese and American officials that Japanese officials understood that “an invitation to Japan is not an invitation to Manchukuo.” Regardless, such brazen disregard for Chinese sovereignty infuriated GMD officials, who could not understand why Japan had the right to display in its official pavilion the products of “a neighboring territory which, with the exception of the present unlawful military territory by Japan, is still in every way part of China.”

Just days before the fair’s opening, Guo employed the temple to hasten the convergence of Chinese discourses on
Figure 11 Map, Century of Progress International Exposition, Chicago, 1933 (COP_16_0011_001_75_map, University of Illinois at Chicago Library, Special Collections).

Figure 12 Iwakichi Miyamoto, Japanese Pavilion, Chicago, 1933 (Allen D. Albert, *Official View Book: A Century of Progress Exposition* [Chicago: Reuben H. Donnelley Corporation, 1933]).
modernism and nationalism, publishing an impassioned editorial in the fair’s official newspaper that criticized the event’s aesthetics while declaring what he considered to be the temple’s genuine architectural significance:

One sober mind will find all the inspiration of this modern movement directly or indirectly from ancient Chinese art and architecture. The significant meaning of the structure, its principles of construction, the use of materials, and the creation of a piece of art embodying architecture, painting, and sculpture as an entirety will belittle any of the modern efforts to create a modern style. In my very humble opinion this Chinese temple and your own Fort Dearborn are more modern in their spirit than any other structure at this Century of Progress. … China has no money to expend just for effect or to cheat the eyes of people as you do when you suspend masonry upon your steel skyscrapers. This is what I call covering up the ribs.42

Guo’s essay capitalized on one of the fair’s significant advantages, namely, its role as an international platform from which Chinese architectural ideas could be projected, to assert that certain structural principles intrinsic to the modern movement be recognized in traditional Chinese structures. As such, it represents the first attempt by a Chinese architect to insert himself into an architectural debate taking place far beyond China’s own shores.

In commandeering the rhetoric of authenticity used by fair organizers to instead describe the temple as paradoxically modern, Guo’s reductivism revealed the ways in which “traditional” China, like modern China, represented contested political idealizations both inside and outside the country. As an American-funded, Han Chinese–constructed replica of a Tibetan Buddhist-inspired Manchu imperial complex now located in Japanese-controlled territory, the temple belied any nativist notions of a singular, idealized Chineseness. Yet in both his original, English language polemic and a subsequent Chinese recapitulation of his argument published in 1934, Guo maintained that the temple should be seen as an aesthetic epitome of Chinese architecture while exhorting readers to remain objectively aware of the benefits of, and limits posed by, international architectural dissemination itself. He highlighted this challenge by distinguishing the kind of modern architecture being espoused by European architects such as Le Corbusier from the movement’s gaudy distortion as it was celebrated in Chicago, without acknowledging his own complicity in the structure’s distortive staging.43 Following the fair, such equivocality would reverberate throughout Chinese architectural discourse in a number of consequential ways.

The Chinese Pavilion

Over the course of 1932, and despite the Golden Temple’s official inclusion within the fair, China-based American officials such as Judge Paul Linebarger, a longtime American adviser to the Chinese National government in Nanjing, and Julean Arnold, a Department of Commerce envoy based in Shanghai, continued to press Chinese officials for a formal commitment to the fair while beginning to assert their own, specific visions for what a Chinese government–endorsed exhibit might look like. In a March 1932 letter sent to members of the State Council in Nanjing, for example, Linebarger revealed his own imagined Chinese pavilion, which he thought should include: “A pagoda of Chinese materials by Chinese artisans, to contain office [space], 100 booths to be rented to overseas Chinese, a theatre, restaurant, economic bureau for dissemination of information concerning China; a small Chinese walled city, within which would be Chinese art, weaving, porcelain manufacturing, lapidary art work, silversmith work, food products, linen and silk work, etc.; and a reproduction of Willow Tea House in Shanghai.”44 Despite the specificity of these suggestions, American fair organizers continued to insist China was free to erect any type of structure they wanted, provided it was “thoroughly typical of the participating country.”45

Internal conflict between the fair’s promotional staff and its architectural commission produced additional contradictory guidelines concerning Chinese architectural participation. Following the selection of a pavilion site due south of the temple’s location along the fair’s lagoon just east of the Twenty-Third Street entrance, for example, Chinese representatives were informed by the fair’s architectural commission that it would only accept a Chinese design on the condition that it was a satisfying example of “modern Chinese architecture.”46 Chinese officials thus found themselves caught between competing conceptions of a suitable Chinese architectural statement at the fair. The event’s architectural commission was interested in a building closely aligned with their vision of American modernism. The US- and China-based American fair organizers mainly responsible for the event’s finances and logistics hoped for an overtly Chinese pavilion that, like the Golden Temple, would superficially reinforce American cultural presumptions with respect to China, attracting crowds and earning revenue in the process. And Chinese officials themselves desired a structure capable of promoting Republican China’s industrial and commercial modernization while calling attention to the uniqueness of traditional Chinese architecture and, by extension, China’s increasingly imperiled autonomy.
At the same time, China's own proposed pavilion at Chicago presaged an important shift in modern Chinese architectural expression; namely, the search for forms that could tackle the compositional and material challenges of new international architectural trends beyond those evoked in the syncretic Beaux-Arts-inspired building agenda back home. In June 1932, an official Chinese Fair Participation Commission, comprising a handful of government officials drawn from the Ministry of Industries as well as several members of the Shanghai-based Chinese Society of Architects, was established in Shanghai. Henry Murphy (1877–1954), a Shanghai-based American architect and longtime consultant to the Republican government, was retained as an informal exhibition adviser.47

American officials were relieved to know of Murphy's participation, indicating a fundamental lack of faith in China's ability to represent itself in accordance with American expectations. His scheme, the drawings for which were completed by August 1932, derived its inspiration from the layout of a Chinese gentleman's courtyard home and was composed of three 625-square-foot courtyards, each containing a garden, pool, and decorative rockery and ringed by a 6-foot-wide promenade (Figures 13 and 14). Two two-story buildings were placed between each courtyard, helping to delineate them while offering vantage points from which the entire pavilion could be admired. A series of adjoining rooms positioned around each courtyard would feature exhibits of Chinese paintings, sculpture, textiles, and bronzes. Concessions for the sale of Chinese goods were located just north and south of the pavilion's main courtyard nucleus, with an open-air theater for acrobatic routines and a tea garden restaurant located slightly east near the lagoon.

In consultations with Albert and Arnold, Murphy agreed that the pavilion would need to be as financially "self-supporting" as possible.48 The site was designed, first and foremost, to attract visitors. Like the Bendix Golden Temple, its ultimate success was to be based not upon any degree of architectural ingenuity or structural quality but upon its eventual financial solvency. Murphy adopted an ostensibly "Chinese" linear composition, with a series of 8-foot-wide small alleys converging on three centrally located courtyards in an effort to re-create the "crowded streets of old Canton with Chinese sign-banners overhead." An energetic, bustling collection of salespeople would lure visitors into Murphy's designed compound through an ornamental gateway, or pavillon, while Chinese artisans could be employed to sit in the open-front shops and make their wares in full view of the public. In his adherence to the strict orthogonal nature of the classic Chinese courtyard, Murphy failed to maximize the site's full spatial allotment, offering instead a phenomenologically based, exoticized emblem of China repackaged from his own personal experiences for a Chicago audience.

Although both American and Chinese fair representatives seemed satisfied with Murphy's proposal, a subsequent shift in the position of the Chinese pavilion site due to new road construction prompted the scheme's revision. In October, the Chinese Fair Participation Committee formally delegated responsibility for the pavilion's design to the Society of Chinese Architects itself.49 Within the society's ranks, an emergent younger generation of Chinese architects had begun to seek out alternatives to Beaux-Arts-design-based models, and the responsibility for the pavilion's design was subsequently entrusted to three key representatives of this generation—Xu Jingzhi (1906–83), Tong Jun (1900–1983), and Wu Jingqi (1900–1943).50

Though none of the three architects were formally trained in modernist design principles, their educational and professional backgrounds reveal shared experiences: educated in the United States, exposed to design trends in Europe, direct professional engagement with several prominent foreign American-based architects, and a professed desire to chart a new course in modern Chinese architecture.51 The group's senior member, Tong, had graduated from the University of Pennsylvania to take a position as a lecturer and founding faculty member of China's first Beaux-Arts architectural degree program at Northeast University. Tong's early lectures distinguished China's own modern architectural history, which he traced from origins in the country's first treaty ports, to the new kind of modernism he had likely experienced in Europe on a study tour in 1928, characterized as an "organism" unrestrained by the stylistic limits of "classicism" or "national boundary" but closely attuned to modern society.52 Like a number of his contemporaries, Tong predicted the risk involved in the continued creep of international architectural conformity. He urged students and practitioners alike to acquaint themselves with Western architectural history and modern building principles while actively engaging in the study of China's structural systems, in the hope that potential points of commonality might be identified that would ensure the preservation of some trace of Chinese cultural specificity within this new, evolving stage of modern architecture.

Xu, a Guangdong native who graduated from the University of Michigan's architecture department in 1930, was equally interested in mediating perceived gaps between Chinese architectural form and modernism. In May 1931, and following his completion of a one-year scholarship from Cranbrook Academy to study under Eliel Saarinen, Xu thanked the institution's director of art education, Frank E. Allen, for allowing him to freely explore "the possibilities of
Figure 13 Henry Murphy, Chinese Pavilion (proposed), Chicago, August 1932 (COP_02_0052_009_37_001, University of Illinois at Chicago Library, Special Collections).
modernizing Chinese Architecture according to true traditions, [the] needs of scientific and hygienic ways of living, and modern methods of construction.”53 Following an architectural tour of Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia funded by Cranbrook founders George and Ellen Booth, Xu returned to China in early 1932, where he began work as a draftsman in Shanghai under the Penn-trained Fan Wenzhao. Wu, meanwhile, graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1931 and spent ten months working for Adin Benedict Lacy in the United States before returning to China to join Fan’s Shanghai office in mid-1932.

The group’s pavilion proposal encapsulated a number of emergent Chinese ideas with respect to European modernism, the tempered American interpretation of European modernism on display at the fair, and the possibilities both offered to contemporary, state-sanctioned Republican architecture. As such, the project captures an important transitional moment in which some Republican-era Chinese architects, increasingly aware of the contradictory promotion of politically and socially progressive ideals through an essentially imperial-era Chinese aesthetic, began to eschew the more elaborate decorative and formal modalities of the state’s building program in favor of a more simplified, tectonic architectural expression (Figures 15 and 16). It also echoed the broad range of experimentation with modern design principles occurring throughout much of the world at the time.54

Consisting of a series of abstracted courtyards separated by stark, unadorned walls, and topped by elements of traditional Chinese design, the pavilion had four major components: a government exhibition center, a commercial concession space, a public theater, and a large, multistory restaurant and entertainment center. Visitors approaching from the reconfigured Twenty-Third Street Plaza would enter through a ceremonial pailou demarcating a “Court of Honor,” punctuated by two flagpoles flying Republican Chinese colors. Bound on the north by the government’s exhibit and to the south by the pavilion’s main concessionary space, the court offered an intermediate area of spatial and cultural convergence through which fairgoers could pass from the busy public thoroughfare into the more private compound. Within
Figure 15 Tong Jun, Xu Jingzhi, and Wu Jingqi, Chinese Society of Architects, Chinese Pavilion (proposed), Chicago, 1933 (Kaufmann & Fabry Co., Chicago [photographer], ca. 1932. HALIC, Ryerson and Burnham Archives, Art Institute of Chicago. Digital File #42655 copyright Art Institute of Chicago).

Figure 16 Tong Jun, Xu Jingzhi, and Wu Jingqi, Chinese Society of Architects, Chinese Pavilion (proposed), Chicago, 1933 (Shenbao, 21 Feb. 1933).
the compound, concession space was molded into two cell-like clusters of product booths. The smaller grouping, topped with a curvilinear Chinese roof, was intended for theatrical performances, while the larger space, centered upon a small pavilion, was segmented into quadrants. Product booths, open to entrance from either side, were constructed on a series of terraces that cascaded down to the water's edge, where they abutted the proposed multistory restaurant complex configured as a traditional Tibetan palace. To the east lay the fair's North Lagoon and Lake Michigan.

In muting its own use of elaborate but often historically inaccurate application of Chinese ornamental precedent on display in ongoing Chinese government projects in both Nanjing and Shanghai, the proposal unmasked the conflicts at work in the Republican government's nationalist agenda and the oscillating architectural and political sensibilities of China's architectural community. Chinese ornamental details were restricted to key identifiable symbols such as the pailou and Chinese roof, giving the pavilion a stripped-down functionalist aesthetic. As opposed to adhering to a traditional Chinese courtyard layout and its cardinal directional-ity (as had Murphy's more conservative scheme), the team creatively maximized the full dimensions of the site by reinterpreting the spatial concept of the courtyard as a more general organizing mechanism around which shops and exhibition booths could be positioned. The juxtaposition of relatively minimal Chinese architectural precedent atop the flat-roofed structure's otherwise unadorned concrete form speaks directly to the extent to which Xu, Tong, and Wu were willing to experiment with both the functionalism and materiality of modernist design. Presented to China's Fair Participation Committee in January 1933, a final model, plan, and accompanying review were eventually published in Shenbao, Shanghai's most prominent Chinese newspaper, on 21 February, where it was hailed as a successful negotiation between "beauty" and "economy" that "evoked China's traditional architectural style while simultaneously offering a hint of Western architectural culture."55

While the public promotion of the pavilion in the winter of 1933 coincided with news of the Museum of Modern Art's "International Style" exhibition, China's more active involvement in Chicago's fair arguably positioned this event as the more immediately and tangibly influential force in China's subsequent architectural development. The fair prompted an architectural mediation between the divergent representations of technological change inside and outside China stipulated by the fair and the Republican government's continued reliance upon Beaux-Arts design principles to spur economic and social modernization. The simultaneous promotion and parsing of both events in the Chinese media began to fuel debate with respect to the relative merits of European modernism and American modern architecture in connection to China's own building conditions. With only a handful of China's most prominent young architects able to travel to Europe and the United States, the unidirectional dissemination of the "International Style" exhibition limited Chinese architects to merely reading about, reacting to, and adapting the style in China. The Chinese Chicago Fair pavilion, by contrast, represented a more dialogic and participatory encounter.57 It provided young architects like Guo, Xu, Wu, and Tong with unique exposure to an international audience, facilitated the transmission of numerous innovative architectural trends to China, and, in so doing, began to prompt important questions concerning the continued efficacy of the nationalist building agenda.

China's Second Pavilion Scheme

Over the spring of 1933, the society's pavilion scheme slowly buckled under the external pressures of the international exposition as well as the internal burdens imposed by an embattled GMD leadership. Tong, Xu, and Wu's society-supported Chinese pavilion proposal was met with disappointment on the part of American officials such as Arnold, Albert, and Linebarger, all of whom preferred Murphy's proposal.58 Arnold, for example, found the Chinese architects' project a failed attempt to capture "the really beautiful, artistic, and unique in Chinese architecture" through the unfortunate and overeager “compromise” it struck between Chinese and foreign architecture:

Chinese architects are so keen on showing their ability to make something foreign or Western that they are inclined to discount the beauty or originality of Chinese architecture and things Chinese. In other words, most of the Chinese architects appear to prefer to be second or third rate Western style architects rather than first class Chinese architects. … While we all understand why this should be so, we wish it were not thus. Furthermore, I imagine that many Chinese believe that any imitation of Western ideas would give them the credit among westerns of being more modern, whereas they to put things up in Chinese style they might be accused of being medieval and the country rated accordingly. In other words, China in transition is something like an awkward, fast-growing youth whose hands and feet are out of all proportion to the rest of his body, and who has not yet learned how to handle them gracefully.59

Asserting America's own cultural and technological ascendance in comparison to Europe's demanded the relegation of Republican China to the fitful, liminal stage of adolescence,
Despite the fact that its struggles with modernism paralleled America’s own conflicted relationship with the phenomenon. More than exposing the organizational hierarchies at work in the fair, however, Arnold also revealed a lack of consensus among fair organizers concerning China’s stage of cultural development as gauged in architectural terms. The Golden Temple, for example, was being concurrently promoted as characteristic of China’s timeless cultural traditions, making the country both precociously young and impossibly old.

Ultimately, it was Murphy’s designs, representing the work of an obscure Western architect who had achieved unlikely fame in China, that fair organizers lauded as embodying “true” Chinese architecture. Neither they nor the Chinese government ever fully subscribed to the Tong-Xu-Wu proposal. The initial impulse to consult with Murphy suggests some unknown disagreement over the Chinese proposal, a lingering cachet held by foreign experts within a still-modernizing China, and a calculated desire to maximize China’s commercial engagement with an American audience. Moreover, the political vacuum created by the significant diminution of GMD authority throughout the country had unduly complicated the ongoing Chinese pavilion design process as well as the organization and collection of provincial goods for display. In January 1933, Chinese officials reassured fair representatives that “delay is a Chinese virtue,” while reporting that exhibition materials were being collected and, with the assistance of Arnold, would be publicly displayed in Shanghai for two weeks before being delivered to Chicago along with final blueprints for the pavilion.

With less than five months before the opening of the fair, however, organizers had yet to receive any final confirmation regarding the Chinese pavilion or its contents, leaving the country’s architectural representation in flux.

On 18 February 1933, China’s Fair Participation Committee sponsored a massive public exhibition attended by at least 500 people in Shanghai devoted to private and public solicitations for the Chinese pavilion. This was followed by a display selection subcommittee organizational meeting headed by Chiang Kai-shek adversary Chen Gongbo, who, in his capacity as China’s minister of industry, had been made responsible for coordinating China’s commercial and industrial display in Chicago. Less than two weeks later, on 2 March, and under orders purportedly from Chiang, the Chinese government formally and abruptly withdrew its financial support for the fair.

Under the pretext of China’s ongoing conflict with Japan, the surprising reversal not to fund China’s participation was purportedly urged by T. V. Soong, then vice director of Nanjing’s Executive Yuan Committee and a staunch Chiang ally, who feared Chen and his leftist faction, led by the Republican government’s erstwhile premier Wang Jingwei, would use the government’s financial support not to promote the fruits of the Republican party’s modernizing efforts abroad, but rather to further undermine Chiang’s political legitimacy and gain influence for themselves among the wealthier and more politically active members of America’s Chinese diaspora.

No longer supported by the government in Nanjing, a team of provincial representatives quickly banded together along with the Shanghai Exhibitors Association to coordinate China’s representation in Chicago:

Again the uncertainty from the Chinese National Government makes us propose a constructive plan—a plan with all the cooperation, confidences and trust from these various merchants—it can’t fail and it won’t fail. These merchants under the leadership of the writer are willing to cooperate and construct a pavilion, half the size of the proposed Chinese government lot, at their expense, to represent the Chinese Government participation. The plan composes a reservation for the Chinese Government exhibit, a Chinese Theatre (marionette), a Tea Garden, Chinese Merchandise Bazaar, and Chinese stores for various merchants. … This proposed construction will cost approximately $35,000 dollars.

Although the association expressed interest in adapting the society’s original scheme to fit their budgetary restrictions, subsequent conversations between the architect Guo, now placed in charge of facilitating China’s “unofficial” architectural participation in Chicago by the Shanghai Exhibitors Association, and local Chicago-based contractors necessitated further reductions in the pavilion’s final cost.

At the same time, and seemingly unbeknown to the Shanghai Exhibitors Association, Murphy was again approached by Arnold and asked to revise his original scheme to accommodate available funding. It was reimagined to include a smaller compound, surrounded by a 170-foot wall, 20 feet high and topped with parapets and a central gate tower, within which could be constructed an open-air acrobatic theater, exhibition space, restaurant, and tea garden, surrounded by a series of one-story structures for Chinese merchants and their respective wares (Figure 17). Arnold and Albert, pleased to see the inclusion of a “Chinese city wall” in the scheme, approved it immediately. With Murphy unable to leave Shanghai to supervise the pavilion’s construction, however, the new plans were handed over to Guo, who subsequently collaborated with Paul F. Mueller, an American engineer previously known for his work on Frank Lloyd Wright’s Imperial Hotel in Tokyo, to develop a scaled-down

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pavilion based upon both Murphy’s and the Tong-Wu-Xu proposal.

The Shanghai Exhibitors Association could only offer a $15,000 donation for the pavilion’s construction, however, which was too small to realize either Murphy’s or the Tong-Wu-Xu scheme in their entirety. Nor was China’s original official position along the lagoon still available. As a result, the exhibitors association was allotted a new location adjoining both the Golden Temple and the Japanese pavilion. By 29 April 1933, a low-lying Chinese Beijing-style courtyard compound constructed by Daniel H. Burnham Jr. and Hubert Burnham’s firm, Burnham Brothers, was “rapidly rising” in the shadow of the Golden Temple. The compound, eventually completed at less than one-eighth of its originally intended size, consisted of two major display halls linked by a covered walkway, in the center of which was positioned an open-air courtyard. Topped with a series of ornamental Chinese roofs, the building’s architecture itself was eclipsed not only by both the Japanese pavilion and the adjacent Golden Temple but also by its own elaborate interior display, which featured a dazzling collection of Chinese imperial porcelain, silk, embroidery, and painting collected from exhibition committees in Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangxi, and Jiangsu.
The Fair, Modern Architecture, and China

Despite the complications involved in their respective constructions, both the Chinese pavilion and the Bendix Golden Temple immediately signaled critical, new coordinates within a broadened conceptual map of twentieth-century Chinese architectural discourse and design. A two-page spread on the fair published in Shenbao in July 1933 revealed the extent to which Chinese architects were actively engaged with contemporary architectural discourse as framed by the fair, while equally aware of its obvious curatorial shortcomings, particularly in light of China’s ongoing political crisis. One article, for example, lamented the event’s missed opportunity to disseminate true architectural modernism by omitting figures like Le Corbusier, Frank Lloyd Wright, and the Saarinens in Chicago, echoing similar comments from Ralph Adams Cram, Buckminster Fuller, and Wright himself. Another noted the Golden Temple’s ironic presence on full display for American audiences, while the original building remained inaccessible to Chinese citizens due to the Japanese occupation of Jehol (Rehe) province.

Although Chicago initially seemed to offer an ideal venue to showcase a singularly modern architectural embodiment of early twentieth-century China, the eventual circumstances surrounding the country’s participation conspired to produce a compromised but ultimately more revealing vision of the disparate, transnational forces responsible for the country’s modern architectural representation. Zhou Zhijun, a Qingdao-based industrialist traveling through Chicago as part of a tour of industrial manufacturing practices around the world, found the Chinese pavilion an “unimpressive reflection of China’s architectural splendor,” though he acknowledged the tremendous obstacles the building had faced over the course of its construction, including the speed with which it had to be completed as well as its budget constraints. The involvement of Chicago-based Chinese diaspora in some aspects of the pavilion’s marketing, meanwhile, evinced the power of China’s overseas communities in shaping impressions of Chinese architecture outside China. One overseas Chinese commentator urged Republican leaders to continue to cooperate with Western powers such as the United States despite the professional and cultural imbalances such interactions posed.

China’s exhibition debacle at the Chicago Fair also reminds us of the extent to which modern Chinese cultural identity was forged through feelings of inadequacy, shame, and failure, often triggered by transnational engagement. Growing frustration with China’s architectural shortcomings and the role played by foreign advisers led to the gradual reconfiguration of China’s architectural discipline and discourse. Chinese architects increasingly saw the privileging of figures like Murphy and their presumed cosmopolitan value as unduly restrictive of the country’s own architectural culture. Writing in direct reference to Murphy, for example, an aggrieved Liang Sicheng declared in a 1934 editorial that a general lack of basic Chinese language skills or any comprehensive understanding of Chinese history meant that “every foreigner talking about Chinese architecture is way off the mark.” Yet Chinese architects, many of whom were students and employees of foreign architects, also bore responsibility for perpetuating essentialized notions of authenticity in relation to Chinese architecture, a point underscored by China’s frustrating experience in Chicago.

In amplifying these representational inadequacies, the fair helped to open a potential rift between the country’s architectural community and GMD officials. Tension not only stemmed from the government’s failure to support the Chinese pavilion financially but also resulted from confusion over the purported aims of the country’s national building program. Upon visiting the fairgrounds just prior to its grand opening, for example, China’s finance minister, T. V. Soong, had declared his satisfaction with China’s completed exhibit and what it revealed to American visitors about “modern China.” For a Republican government desperate to ensure the state’s survival at any cost, well-intentioned efforts on the part of Chinese architects to position Chinese architecture within a new transcultural architectural idiom proved increasingly irrelevant and unnecessary. China’s mere involvement in a fair devoted to global technological advancement was enough to support the government’s ideological program regardless of what architectural form its participation ultimately took.

Upon his return home from Chicago, Guo offered a very different perspective on the completed pavilion itself, the government’s failure to provide adequate funding, and its impact upon China’s involvement, which he described as both “incomplete” and “unsatisfying.” In a polite rebuttal published one year after the fair’s opening, the head of the Shanghai Exhibitors Association’s department of design and display, Zhang Xianglin, countered Guo’s claims. He acknowledged that although the Chinese pavilion had experienced a series of “twists and turns” because of financial restrictions, the final results had proved to be “an exquisite and clever Asian-inflected architecture,” intimating that Guo’s disappointment with the project’s eventual financial resources was both ungracious and unwarranted.

Professional debate over China’s architectural representation and the potential repercussions for modern Chinese sovereignty gave rise to a new, more vocal plurality of perspectives within China’s architectural community concerning...
what modern Chinese architecture, and by extension, modern China, might look like. The events in Chicago did not lead to the profession’s complete disavowal of the ideological exigencies of the Republican state, but they heralded a fragmentation of architectural design methodologies in China after 1933. They also predicated a development indicative of modernism’s growing appeal in China, growing dissatisfaction on the part of some Chinese architects with the government’s conservative building program, and a process within which China’s architectural participants in Chicago played crucial roles.

Following the closing of the fair in November 1933, a select group of China’s architectural avant-garde, led by both active and tangential fair participants like Guo, Tong, Xu, and Wu, set about refining the future trajectory of Chinese architectural design based, in part, on their experience with the Chicago Fair. A provocative layout in the January 1934 issue of *Chinese Architecture*, for example, interposed images of the fair’s modern buildings with the Golden Temple, reinforcing Guo’s earlier polemic concerning its conceptual status as a precursor to the structural rationalism of “modern” architecture and suggesting future avenues for design experimentation. In February, a *Shenbao* article titled “The Relationship between Traditional Chinese Architecture and Modern Architecture” posited the characteristics of spatial simplicity, the use of color, and the shared verticality of pagodas and skyscrapers as additional potential junctures between contemporary architectural design and China’s indigenous building traditions. Guo himself used images taken of the fair’s prefabricated housing units to advocate for China’s own embrace of the technology in improving the country’s housing conditions.76

A 1936 article coauthored by Wu mapped the emergence of three distinct design strategies in China, the roots of which extended back to China’s architectural antecedents on display in Chicago. The first, known as “a return to tradition,” or *fugu pai*, represented a call for a greater understanding of imperial Chinese architecture prior to the anticipated future experimentation advocated by figures like Liang. This approach recognized the inherent contradictions at work in the transnational claims made by both international exhibitionary and modernist praxes. This position was exemplified by Xu’s own winning proposal for the Nanjing Capital Museum, which relied extensively on strict Liao- and Song-era architectural ratios and proportions, evoking the mimetic attention to China’s architectural past evidenced in the Golden Temple’s reconstruction. His design seemed to emphasize the overarching significance of cultural nationalism at the expense of any particularly modernist, socially progressive agenda.77

Qiuxin pai, or “the search for the new,” represented a more substantive engagement with architectural modernism and eventually was embraced by figures like Fan Wenzhao, Guo, and Tong. In June 1934, for example, a Guo-penned article lamented the superficial application of Chinese ornament to otherwise utilitarian structures like factories, shops, and public-housing projects in favor of more economic, rational means of expression.78 Tong urged the same approach, refining his own early experimentations in the Chinese pavilion scheme in the process (Figure 18). In a famous 1937

Figure 18 Tong Jun, Public Office Building (proposed), Nanjing, 1937 (Tong Ming, ed., *Tong Jun wenji*, vol. 2 [Beijing: Zhongguo jianzhu gongye chubanshe, 2001]; courtesy Tong Ming).
polemic, he exhorted Chinese architects to reconcile themselves to the flat roof, declaring that “the temple roof definitely has had its day. At present, classical Chinese architecture has nothing to offer to the modern building except surface ornamentation, and as the enduring and sublime qualities in architecture rest with structural values alone, it requires little imagination to foresee the rapid and universal adoption of the international (or modernistic) style in steel and concrete.”

Although this faction’s predilection for the formal aspects of modernism may have implied a rejection of the Republican government, Guo and Tong, like Xu, went on to write modern histories of Chinese architecture that attempted to reconcile the modern principles with traditional Chinese building practices.

The third strategy, zhezhong pai, a “compromise” of architectural eclecticism advocated by Wu, represented the most politically palatable option. It argued for an amalgamation of modern materials and Chinese ornament not unlike earlier fusions of Beaux-Arts and Chinese architectural traditions. Like the Chinese pavilion scheme itself, its hybridity sought to honor the culturally nationalistic basis of GMD authority without completely reconciling the impact of international engagement in producing a uniquely Chinese expression of modernity.

Collectively, these three positions would continue to define the theoretical parameters of China’s architectural discourse until the Japanese invasion of Shanghai on 7 July 1937.

Conclusion

The Chinese pavilion and the Bendix Golden Temple in Chicago represented a moment of discontinuity in what is typically characterized as an uninterrupted decade of Beaux-Arts-inspired civic architectural progression in China. They helped to push the scope of modern Chinese architecture well beyond the physical boundaries of China itself. In so doing, they revealed the empowering and restrictive aspects of political and cultural systems both inside and outside the country within which China’s architects struggled to operate. Both structures offered much more than a didactic overview of an emergent nation-state’s failed attempt to realize an architectural idiom at once both undeniably modern and yet historically familiar. The inability to effectively define modern Chinese architecture in Chicago exposed the problematic roots of the search itself. Chinese attempts to design a pavilion that aligned the professed social and technocratic benefits of the modern movement with their country’s own cultural nationalistic agenda were limited not only by fair organizers eager to validate their own antiquated vision of China for financial and professional gain or a Republican government whose ideological aspirations could not accommodate aesthetic alternatives, but by deep-seated professional ambivalence concerning the Chinese architect’s relationship to foreign-imposed notions of modernity. The Bendix Golden Temple, meanwhile, fulfilled exhibitionary expectations and nationalistic narratives by celebrating the country’s rich, preexisting architectural heritage without truly acknowledging its contested origins or uncertain future.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this article initially comprised a chapter of my dissertation, “Civic Architecture in a Liminal City: Shanghai, 1842–1936,” which was completed at Harvard University in 2010. Since then, a number of people have read subsequent drafts and offered valuable advice, all of which has helped to improve it immeasurably. I would like to thank Daniel Abramson, Swati Chattopadhyay, Jeff Cody, Kristen Holt-Browning, Lai Delin, Neil Levine, Elizabeth Perry, Eugene Wang, Zhu Tao, and two anonymous JS AH readers for their patience, time, and effort. I am also grateful for research funding support provided by a Mellon/ACLS Dissertation Completion Fellowship, the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, and the University of Hong Kong.


4. By the late 1920s, foreign and Chinese scholars began to identify the international treaty port as the origin point of “modern style” architecture in China. See, e.g., Tong Ming, ed., Tong Jun wenji (Beijing: Zhongguo jianzhu gongye chubanshe, 2000), 1/2.


10. As Seng Kuan notes, most histories of the era’s architecture are predicated on the notion that modernism never took root in China because Chinese architects returned to China prior to having studied modernism and just before the movement began to eclipse the Beaux-Arts style. See Seng Kuan, “Between Beaux-Arts and Modernism: Dong Dayou and the Architecture of 1930s Shanghai,” in Cody, Steinhardt, and Atkin, *Chinese Architecture and the Beaux-Arts*, 169.


16. Japan’s imperial interest in the region extended back to 1905, when its victory in the Russo-Japanese War allowed it initially to acquire a commercial sphere of influence in Manchuria. Through the subsequent establishment of the Southern Manchurian Railway, Japan was able to quickly construct a formal colonial presence there. By the early 1930s, political rifts had begun to develop between Tokyo-based officials and the Guandong Army, the Japanese garrison force responsible for protecting Japan’s Manchurian interests. Confronted by growing Chinese anger over their physical presence in the region and denied approval for the formal annexation of northeastern China by the Japanese government, Guandong officers eventually staged the 18 September explosion to justify their subsequent occupation of Manchuria. See Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 3–54.


23. Upon discovering the structure, Hedin’s assistant, Montell Gosta, reported that “dilapidation and vandalism were proceeding apace; one building after another falling into ruins, walls crumbling down, and roofs collapsing on the top of decayed colonnades. The old and stately trees in the temple were being cut down, and the timber distributed between the governor’s soldiery and the lamas.” Montell Gosta, “The Lama Temple Potala of Jehol: Plan of the Monastery Ground,” *Geografiska Annaler (Supplement: Hyllningsdrift Tillägnad Sven Hedin)* 17 (1935), 175–84. See also Montell Gosta, *The Chinese Lama Temple: Potala of Jehol, Exhibition of Historical and Ethnographic Collections made by Dr. Gusta Montell, Member of Dr. Sven Hedin’s Expeditions and Donated by Vincent Bendix* (Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1932).

24. Although Liang was originally commissioned to oversee the temple’s reconstruction in Chicago, he was eventually replaced by Guo, who earned his bachelor’s degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 1929 and master’s degree from MIT in June 1930.


27. The Golden Temple’s stone terraces, roof tiles, 10-foot-high finial, columns, and several beams were all produced in the United States for the sake of expense. At one point in the temple’s construction, fair organizers advocated for the use of several methods of painting the temple not “in accordance with the practice of the Chinese.” Guo, who was working in close conjunction with two Beijing artists brought to Chicago to complete the painting of the temple, was consequently forced to explain to the painters why, aesthetically and architecturally, omitting several steps in the painting process would not diminish the “spirit” of the structure’s traditional building methods. See John Stewart, assistant to the general manager, to J. W. Bell, general superintendent of construction, 26 Aug. 1932, box 2, folder 12-12, series XII—Concessions. Patricia Morton has discussed the gap between interior and exterior on display in African pavilions at the 1931 Colonial Exposition in Paris, where only the exterior’s visible authenticity needed to conform to French stereotypes of particular building traditions. See Patricia Morton, *Hybrid Modernities: Architecture...*
29. See, for example, “Chinese Will Erect Temple at World’s Fair”; Hedin, “Golden Pavilion of Jehol.”
30. Global economic collapse would eventually result in the official participation of only six countries: Czechoslovakia, Italy, Japan, Poland, Sweden, and Ukraine. Schrenk, Building a Century of Progress, 9, 265.
32. The country’s first Chinese professional architectural society was established by a number of foreign-educated Chinese architects in Shanghai in 1927, followed by the creation of the Society for Research in Chinese Architecture in 1930. See Li Shiqiao, “Reconstituting Chinese Building Tradition: The Yingzao fashi in the Early Twentieth Century,” JSAH 62, no. 4 (Dec. 2003), 470–89. The first professional journal devoted to the study of China’s architectural history was the Bulletin of the Society for Research in Chinese Architecture in 1930. This was followed by the launching of regular features focused on the architecture profession in two of Shanghai’s largest Chinese newspapers by 1932, Shenhao and Shi shi xinban, along with the creation of China’s first professional architectural journals, Jianzhu yuexian (The builder) and Zhongguo jianzhu (Chinese architecture), in November 1932 and July 1933, respectively.
33. See Wang Shiyu, “Fangjian Rehe putuozongcheng si songjing ting ji,” Zhongguo yingzao xuehui yuexian 2, no. 2 (Sept. 1931), 1–20. The report was later republished in Guangyong 2, no. 7 (1933), 1–4.
34. Only in 1934 did Japanese researchers Sekino Tadashi and Takeshima Takuchi publish the first definitive study of the site. See Sekino Tadashi and Takeshima Takuchi, Nekka (Jehol): The most glorious and monumental relics in Manchuria, which Japanese officials framed as being no different from America’s involvement in Cuba, would help to cement the country’s participation, along with persistent lobbying efforts of Japan’s Rotary Clubs. Allen D. Albert, confidential memo, 7 Sept. 1932, box 63, folder 2-1116, Century of Progress, series II—Government Correspondence. The eventual proposal for the Japanese pavilion grounds did, in fact, feature a South Manchurian Railway company exhibition, prompting an immediate official Chinese rebuke as well as disapproval from the US State Department. See Rufus Dawes, confidential memo, 27 Mar. 1933, box 61, folder 2-1116, Century of Progress, series II—Government Correspondence.
35. Robert Kah to C. E. Fitch, 4 Apr. 1933, box 52, folder 2-936, Century of Progress, series II—Government Correspondence.
37. Guo Yuanxi, “Xin Zhongguo jianzhu zhi jingxie,” Jianzhu yuexian 2, no. 6 (June 1934), 15–22.
38. Linebarger also suggested that if the Chinese government agreed to appropriate $100,000 for the project, “wealthy overseas Chinese in countries such as the Federated Malay States, the Philippines, Peru, America, and Canada” would be approached about financing the difference. Box 11, folder 11-125, series XI—Exhibits.
40. Felix Streycmans to general manager of exhibitions, interoffice correspondence, 18 May 1932, box 52, folder 2-937, series II—Government Correspondence.
43. The commission eventually included Chen Gongbo, commission chairman; He Bingyin, chairman of the standing committee; You Gaichun, chief of general affairs; Cai Wuji, chief of the exhibits department; and Zhang Xianglin, chief of the department of design and display. See confidential report from Allen D. Albert, 1 Sept. 1932, box 52, folder 2-936, series II—Government Correspondence.
44. See “Zhongguo jianzhu shi xuehui hunyi jilu,” Q546-1-45, Shanghai Municipal Archives, Shanghai.
45. The oldest of the three, Tong graduated from Tsinghua University in 1925 before studying at the University of Pennsylvania, where he earned a master’s degree in 1928. After working in Ely Kahn’s New York office for one year, he spent three months on an architectural tour around Europe, eventually returning to China in September 1930 to join his former Penn classmates Liang and Lin in establishing the country’s first Beaux-Arts architectural degree program at Northeast University in Shenyang. In 1933, he founded Allied Architects in Shanghai with fellow Penn alum Zhao Shen and Chen Zhi. See Lai Delin, ed., Jindai zhe jiang lu (Beijing: Zhongguo shuili shui dian chubanshe, 2006), 140–41.
46. See Ming, Tong jian wenzhi, 1-2.
47. See John Sewell to various Chinese officials, 29 Mar. 1932, box 52, folder 2-936, series II—Government Correspondence.


58. Allen Albert to Yi Gieli, Chinese consulate, 28 Nov. 1932, box 52, folder 2-936, series II—Government Correspondence.


60. Allen Albert to Thomas C. Barrington, 21 Jan. 1933, box 52, folder 2-936, series II—Government Correspondence.


62. See Zhang Shu’e, “Fuqin Canjia le jian yue Meiguo shijie bolanhui,” Shangh hai tan, no. 21, no. 5 (May 2003), 20–23.

63. H. C. S. Cai and Guo Yuanxi to Major Felix Streyczmans, 3 Mar. 1933, box 52, folder 2-932, series II—Government Correspondence. See also “Tingzhi canjia zhi bo hou chupin ren jue zixing canjia,” Shenbao, 3 Mar. 1933.

64. Murphy advocated that the entire pavilion be built using a kind of “Hollywood construction,” i.e., hollow and of cheap plaster casting, to ensure a thrifty and timely completion. Interoffice correspondence, 9 Mar. 1933, box 52, folder 2-936, series II—Government Correspondence. See also Julean Arnold to Allen Albert, 28 Mar. 1933, box 52, folder 2-930, series II—Government Correspondence.

65. O. J. F. Keatinge to L. S. Cao, 29 Apr. 1933, box 52, folder 2-932, series II—Government Correspondence.

66. Notable objects included an intricate series of thirty interlocked ivory spheres as well as a miniature jade pagoda designed by Zhang Wenti measuring 50 inches high, segmented into seven stories, and reportedly carved from a single piece of Burmese jade with the assistance of more than 500 jade carvers, requiring 1.5 million hours of work and over ten years to complete. See press release, 26 May 1933, interoffice correspondence, 9 Mar. 1933, box 52, folder 2-936, series II—Government Correspondence.


68. Zhou Zhijun, Yingzuo xiao ji u Zi zhi bo suo yan, zhuzhu mantan (Shanghai: Shangwu yin shuguan, 1934).

69. Hua qiao zhou bao, 39 (1933), 43–44.

70. For an astute analysis of the ways in which notions of failure and humiliation have come to shape China’s cultural identity, see Jing Tzu, Failure, Nationalism, and Literature: The Making of Modern Chinese Identity, 1895–1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).


72. Press release, 5 May 1933, box 52, folder 2-936, series II—Government Correspondence.


75. Although the Chinese pavilion was demolished shortly after the fair’s close, the Golden Temple remained on the fairgrounds for a second Chicago fair in 1934 before eventually being dismantled and sent to New York in anticipation of its 1939 World’s Fair. In 1943, Bendix donated the temple to Oberlin College, the alma mater of Gong Xiangzi, vice president of the GMD’s Executive Yuan. The temple was subsequently acquired by the Harvard-Yenching Institute in 1950, which relinquished its rights to Indiana University in 1970. It was eventually sent to the Sven Hedin Ethnographic Museum in Stockholm in 1984, where it still awaits reconstruction.


80. See Guo Yuansi, Fu xing xin Zhongguo jianzhu jibao shu (unpublished manuscript, Special Collections, University of Hong Kong, undated); Ming, Tong Jun wenji, 1; Xu Jingzhi, Chinese Architecture: Past and Contemporary (Hong Kong: Sin Poh Amalgamated, 1964). Tong spent World War II in Guiyang before moving to Nanjing in 1944, where he became a faculty member at Central University, later renamed Nanjing Technical University. Tong would teach at the university until his death in 1983. Guo had a successful professional career in Hong Kong, where he became the Chinese editor of the Hong Kong and Far East Builder from 1938 until 1941. He also designed a number of notable buildings in Hong Kong beginning in the late 1940s until the early 1960s. Xu also moved to Hong Kong in 1948; he became the first president of the Hong Kong Society of Architects and wrote a history of Chinese architecture.