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Conclusion

When looking to the goals French officials had in mind with KCW it can be concluded that only modest achievements were made in the almost 50 year long history of the territory:

1. The core problem of KCW was its administrative attachment to the Government-General of Indochina. After Doumer, who was mainly responsible for realising this linkage, had left office in 1902, the territory lacked any political vision and was purely administrated by Hanoi in order to drive the maximum profits out of its opium trade. KCW was reduced to a financial source for Indochina’s general budget. The territory’s own budget was extremely simple and did not include any expenses for economic and social matters. This made it impossible for any Chief Administrator, if he had wished so, to set up an independent policy of economic promotion or social development. Therefore, KCW remained an outside post of Indochina, dependent on it but not fully integrated into it.

2. A naval station or a coal depot was not established. The problem with the sand bar at the entrance of the main passage to the bay could never be overcome. Furthermore, France had a first-class port in Saigon and a second-class port in Haiphong. From a military-strategic point-of-view KCW actually did not enhance Indochina’s defence potential.

3. The idea of making KCW a starting-point or centre of a French sphere-of-influence in South China was not realised: The territory was hindered by the Government-General of Indochina to develop into such an important economic and cultural base because it would have meant to open the territory to French, Chinese and other investors, something that could have disrupted the strict government control over the highly profitable opium trade.
4. The notion of **connecting KCW with its hinterland by railways** was never realised. French capital was not encouraged by the Government-General of Indochina to invest into such projects, and Chinese capital were not prepared to cooperate with the French fearing that this would be the first step into France’s colonial acquisition of the entire coast line of South China between the Tonkin border and Hong Kong.

5. The **economic and social development** of KCW was appreciable but remained rather modest in comparison to German Kiaochow or Hong Kong’s New Territories. Nevertheless, the local economy continued without much interference by the colonial power. The French invested in urban projects and created modern facilities which were unknown in this part of China.

6. In **political terms** the French permitted local self-government to a certain extent. During turmoil in China, KCW offered a safe haven for refugees and immigrants, something that was appreciated by Chinese even from Hong Kong.

All in all, the history of KCW shows that this leasehold-colony acquired in 1898 from the legal point-of-view in the same way as its British, German and Russian counterparts developed in a very different manner. Its history certainly demonstrates certain characteristics of French colonial and foreign politics in East Asia at the time. In the eyes of the French of today this territory is regarded as a deadlock of their colonisation, as a failed state. However, in the eyes of the Chinese the story of KCW looks much more positive, especially when put into contrast with the turbulent events in mainland China during the same period. These opposite but not antagonistic views are offering room for a re-evaluation of the history of KCW and pointing into the direction of analysing deeper the Chinese side of the story, something that would mean to investigate further into the modernising effects of this colonial possession on the rest of China.