<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Title</strong></th>
<th>Building blocks for reforms on key issues in corporate governance: the case of Hong Kong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Author(s)</strong></td>
<td>Goo, SH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citation</strong></td>
<td>The APEC 2011 Workshop on Advancing Good Corporate Governance by Promoting Utilization of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, Washington, D.C., 2 March 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issued Date</strong></td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>URL</strong></td>
<td><a href="http://hdl.handle.net/10722/140848">http://hdl.handle.net/10722/140848</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rights</strong></td>
<td>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Building Blocks for Reforms on Key Issues in Corporate Governance: The Case of Hong Kong

Submitted by: University of Hong Kong
Building Blocks for Reforms on Key Issues in Corporate Governance: the Case of Hong Kong

Say H Coo
Member of Standing Committee on Company Law Reform, HKSAR
Associate Professor, The University of Hong Kong

Listed companies in Hong Kong

By Country of Incorporation

- incorporate in HK
- incorporated in PRC
- incorporate elsewhere
Different types of listed companies

- PRC SOEs
- PRC family controlled companies
- HK family controlled companies
- HK Govt owned companies
- Widely held companies

Major concerns in family-controlled companies:

- Appropriation of assets (2008(7); 2009(3); see 2010 APEC Economic Policy Report)
- Privatization
- Lack of internal control

Solutions:

- Regulation on connected transactions
- Headcount test
- Internal control report
Major concerns in PRC SOEs

- Independence of enterprises from state
- Monitoring performance
- Managerial abuses
- Conflicting objectives of enterprises

Solutions:
- Use of supervisory board
- Use of Independent directors
- Derivative suits

Independent directors in HK

- Requirement of ID raised from 2 to 3 in 2004
- Current proposal to increase to 1/3

Board size and number of ID: [http://webb-site.com/dbpub/boardcomp.asp](http://webb-site.com/dbpub/boardcomp.asp)

Distribution of ID per company:
Problems:

- Number of Independent directorship held per person: 
- Low pay
- Not giving enough time

Proper Role of ID?

- Should ID act as consultant to board/company?
- Watchdog for all shareholders against managerial abuses?
- Watchdog for minority shareholders?
Shareholder participation in board nomination

- Can give notice of intention to nominate
- Normally board nominates
- Rare example: David Webb nominated by shareholders to be ID of HKEx
- Nomination and voting by CCASS not conducive to shareholder participation

Code of Corporate Governance

- Rules (Compulsory)
- Code Provision (comply or explain)
- Recommended Best Practice (voluntary)

- 99% (2009) and 98% (2007) of listed companies complied with 41 or more of the 45 CPs.
- Only 39% of issuers complied with all CPs (2001, 2007).
Consultation Paper (Dec 2010)

- Moving some RBP to CP (eg director training requirement, nomination committee)
- Moving some CP to Rules (eg ID should constitute 1/3 of board).
- Also proposed new rules or CP, eg maximum number of ID a person can hold, terms of reference for CG committee, disclosing attendance record of directors by name,
- New RBP, eg establishment of CG Committee, whistle blowing policy.

Main problems with Code

- Lack of enforcement
- Weak punishment (private censure, public criticism)

- Current proposals: extending Market Misconduct Law (under Securities and Futures Ordinance) to breach of listing rules and Code.
- Phase 1: only some areas will be extended, eg disclosure requirements and connected transactions in Listing Rules, but not the Code.